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GATT, THE MARSHALL PLAN, AND OECD

MY reason for choosing the above title is that these three organizations have many aspects of interdependence in origin and, to some extent, in operation. I am sure I would have had difficulty in writing about any one of them exclusively.

One day in March 1947, I walked into President Truman's office with a big book under my arm. The book contained lists of thousands of commodities on which hearings had been held (or offered to be held) in order to give interested parties an opportunity of presenting their reasons against a reduction in import duties. The book also indicated the extent to which the Department of State felt reductions in duties could be made in the forthcoming tariff negotiations in Geneva.

The President spent some time in questioning me about different commodities; then he initialed a memorandum approving the purpose and use of the book. This was our authority for the multilateral negotiations at Geneva, resulting in an agreement known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, commonly referred to as GATT. Fifty nations now belong to GATT, and in the fifteen years of its existence, it has greatly contributed to almost doubling international trade to the present total of about $125 billion annually.

When I presented the book to the President for his approval, I said that we had not included wool, as we were hoping to leave wool out of the negotiations at Geneva. I often wonder now how I ever could have thought that this would be possible.

When Mrs. Clayton and I stepped off the *Queen Elizabeth* at Southampton on our way to Geneva, one of the secretaries

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from our embassy in London met us. One of the first things he handed me was a dispatch from Washington to the effect that a bill relating to the wool tariff had been introduced in Congress, and that if this bill became a law, it almost certainly would result in an advance in the tariff on wool.

It soon was quite apparent, after the Geneva Conference opened on April 11, 1947, that the success of our tariff negotiations there depended on our ability to offer a substantial concession in the U. S. tariff on wool. The principal country interested in the export of wool was Australia, and, of course, Britain backed up Australia in this stand with all the power she could exert.

I was fortunate in having Dr. Clair Wilcox, Chief of the Office of International Trade Policy, assisted by Mr. Winthrop Brown, Chief of the Division for Commercial Policy, in active charge, under me, of negotiations.

I spent most of my time, especially at dinner and in the evenings, with representatives of other countries, many of whom I had met at other international conferences—FAO, UNRRA, and the meetings of the governors of the International Bank and International Monetary Fund.

In my meetings with these representatives of other nations, we not only talked about tariff negotiations and the Charter for an International Trade Organization (which was also on the Agenda of the Geneva Conference), but I took this occasion to inquire as to economic, financial, and food conditions in their respective countries. I was surprised and in some cases shocked by conditions in the countries of western Europe, particularly the serious food situation which most of them faced.

Crops were short, not only because the growing season had been unusually adverse, but because the whole economic situation was such as to discourage the farmers from putting in a normal acreage of grain.

In most cases, the farmers knew that their surplus grain, if carried to market and sold, would yield only paper money, in which farmers had no confidence. The things that the farmer desperately needed—farming implements, clothing, and manufactures of various kinds—were mostly unobtainable, because industry had not got back into full production of such items. Under these circumstances, farmers not only

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curtailed their acreage but in many cases grazed their cattle on the grain instead of harvesting it. Thus, the division of labor, on which modern peacetime society rested, had almost broken down in these countries.

This made it necessary for the governments of the countries thus affected, particularly France and Italy, to import grain from the United States, Canada, and other countries, and this meant that the gold and dollar reserves of such countries, slender as they were, became dangerously depleted.

This situation weighed heavily on my mind, and I longed for an opportunity to present it personally to Secretary Marshall, and to Under Secretary Acheson. The latter had made a speech on May 8, 1947, at Cleveland, Mississippi, in which he referred to the very serious conditions in western Europe and said that the United States might have a rescue job to do there.

The opportunity to present this matter to Messrs. Marshall and Acheson came sooner than I expected.

It was agreed that I should return to Washington to see if I could help prevent the passage of the wool bill, to which I have referred. Mr. Acheson and I had acquired some reputation for success with Congress. I have been informed that during the Eisenhower Administration a complaint was made to Sam Rayburn that the State Department could not get anything through Congress. Rayburn replied:

> You ought to do it the way Acheson and Clayton used to. They would start at opposite ends of the corridors of the House Office Buildings, and those that one could not convince, the other would take on. They made the lives of the Congressmen so miserable that they had to agree to their project!

So Mrs. Clayton and I boarded an airplane May 18, 1947, for New York. Flying was not so good in those days as now, so we were more than twenty-four hours en route, which did not help the very bad cold I had contracted a few days before leaving Geneva. When we arrived in Washington, I had some fever, went to a doctor, and was told that I had a touch of bronchial pneumonia and should go to bed at once. I did this, and, meantime, the Congress passed the wool bill. I am quite sure they would have done this anyway, regardless of any efforts I might have been able to make.

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On my arrival in Washington, I found the Planning Committee of the Department of State, under the chairmanship of George Kennan, actively considering the western European situation because of the receipt of cables from our various embassies and from me calling attention to the seriousness of this situation and the fact that it was deteriorating rapidly.

I had made notes on the plane of a memorandum which I wanted to hand Secretary Marshall regarding the economic, political, and food situation in western Europe.

On account of my illness, this memorandum was not completed and handed to Secretary Marshall until May 27, 1947.

I quote this memorandum almost in full, because it gives the then-existing facts:

The European Crisis

(1) It is now obvious that we grossly underestimated the destruction to the European economy by the war. We understood the physical destruction, but we failed to take fully into account the effects of economic dislocation on production—nationalization of industries, drastic land reform, severance of long-standing commercial ties, disappearance of private commercial firms through death or loss of capital, etc., etc.

(2) Europe is steadily deteriorating. The political position reflects the economic. One political crisis after another merely denotes the existence of grave economic distress. Millions of people in the cities are slowly starving. More consumer's goods and restored confidence in the local currency are absolutely essential if the peasant is again to supply food in normal quantities to the cities. (French grain acreage running 20–25% under pre-war, collection of production very unsatisfactory—much of the grain is fed to cattle. The modern system of division of labor has almost broken down in Europe.)

(3) Europe's current annual balance of payments deficit:

UK	$2¼ billions
France	1¾ "
Italy	½ "
US-UK Zone Germany	½ "
	$5 billions

not to mention the smaller countries.

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of living. If it should be lowered, there will be revolution.

Only until the end of this year can England and France meet the above deficits out of their fast dwindling reserves of gold and dollars. Italy can't go that long.

(4) Some of the principal items in these deficits:

From the U. S.:	Coal, 30 million tons	$600 million
" " " :	Bread Grains, 12 million tons	1,400 million
" " " :	Shipping services at very high rates on imports and exports	—— million

Before the war, Europe was self-sufficient in coal and imported very little bread grains from the United States.

Europe must again become self-sufficient in coal (the U. S. must take over management of Ruhr coal production) and her agricultural production must be restored to normal levels. (Note: No inefficient or forced production through exorbitant tariffs, subsidies, etc., is here contemplated.)

Europe must again be equipped to perform her own shipping services. The United States should sell surplus ships to France, Italy and other maritime nations to restore their merchant marine to at least prewar levels. . . .

(5) Without further prompt and substantial aid from the United States, economic, social and political disintegration will overwhelm Europe.

Aside from the awful implications which this would have for the future peace and security of the world, the immediate effects on our domestic economy would be disastrous: markets for our surplus production gone, unemployment, depression, a heavily unbalanced budget on the background of a mountainous war debt. *These things must not happen.*

(6) . . . Our resources and our productive capacity are ample to provide all the help necessary.

The problem is to organize our fiscal policy and our own consumption so that sufficient surpluses of the necessary goods are made available out of our enormous production, and so that these surpluses are paid for out of taxation and not by addition to debt.

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This problem can be met only if the American people are taken into the complete confidence of the Administration and told all the facts and only if a sound and workable plan is presented.

(7) It will be necessary for the President and the Secretary of State to make a strong spiritual appeal to the American people to sacrifice a little themselves, to draw in their own belts just a little in order to save Europe from starvation and chaos (*not* from the Russians) and, at the same time, to preserve for ourselves and our children the glorious heritage of a free America.

(8) Europe must have from us, as a grant, 6 or 7 billion dollars worth of goods a year for three years. With this help, the operations of the International Bank and Fund should enable European reconstruction to get under way at a rapid pace. Our grant could take the form principally of coal, food, cotton, tobacco, shipping services and similar things—all now produced in the United States in surplus, except cotton. The probabilities are that cotton will be surplus in another one or two years. Food shipments should be stepped up despite the enormous total (15 million tons) of bread grains exported from the United States during the present crop year. We are wasting and over-consuming food in the United States to such an extent that a reasonable measure of conservation would make at least another million tons available for export with no harm whatever to the health and efficiency of the American people.

(9) This three-year grant to Europe should be based on a European plan which the principal European nations, headed by the UK, France and Italy, should work out. Such a plan should be based on a European economic federation on the order of the Belgium-Netherlands-Luxembourg Customs Union. Europe cannot recover from this war and again become independent if her economy continues to be divided into many small watertight compartments as it is today.

(10) Obviously, the above is only the broad outline of a problem which will require much study and preparation before any move can be made. . . .

W. L. Clayton. 5/27/47.

This memorandum, plus my several talks with Secretary Marshall, between May 27, 1947, and up to the time he left

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to make his speech at Harvard on June 5, 1947, merely confirmed the information that many of our embassies and I had been cabling to the Department of State.

Since the wool bill had been passed by the Congress, our only chance of preventing it from becoming law was to induce President Truman to veto the bill. The Department of State gave me the job of submitting to him the arguments why this should be done, but it was suggested that I should arrange for a certain official, having an opposite point of view, to accompany me and present his reasons why the bill should become a law. This was all arranged, and, in due course, this official and I presented ourselves at President Truman's office and made our arguments. The principal argument of the other official was political. My principal argument for the veto was that if this bill became a law, the U. S. Delegation at Geneva might as well pack their bags and come home, because the success of the Geneva Conference depended upon the United States' ability to make some concession in the wool tariff, and the bill that we were talking about undoubtedly would cause an advance in the wool tariff.

The President listened attentively to our arguments but reserved his decision. Several days later, I learned that President Truman had vetoed the bill. I then asked for another appointment with him and told him, as I had before, that unless we were in a position to make some concession in the wool tariff, the Geneva Conference would be a failure. He indicated that he understood this. I had a little typed memorandum, giving us authority to make a concession in the wool tariff of twenty-five per cent. I put this memorandum before him, and he did not hesitate to initial it.

This action of the President, following his veto of a bill which would have resulted in increasing the wool tariff, was the greatest act of political courage that I have ever witnessed.

With this, I flew to Geneva, via London and Paris.

Secretary Marshall asked me to talk with the principal western European governments regarding certain points that we would have to insist upon in connection with our assistance to them.

There were two main points which Secretary Marshall and the Department of State insisted upon:

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(1) That the recipients of Marshall Plan aid should organize themselves into a committee of cooperation, not only for the life of the Marshall Plan but even after Marshall Plan aid should end.

(2) Furthermore, that this committee, composed of recipients of Marshall Plan aid, should work out the measure and mechanics of this aid and present it to the United States as an agreed plan.

Such a committee indeed was informally set up under the chairmanship of Sir Oliver Franks (now Lord Franks).

I arrived in London June 22, 1947, and immediately reported to the United States Ambassador, the Honorable Lewis W. Douglas.

Thereafter, Ambassador Douglas and U. S. Ambassador Caffery in Paris and I worked as a team of three on the Marshall Plan. We attended many meetings in Paris of Sir Oliver Franks' committee, the Committee for European Economic Cooperation (CEEC).

On my arrival in London, Ambassador Douglas and I met with the British Cabinet for a discussion of the Marshall Plan matter.

At that time, Mr. Ernest Bevin, British Minister of Foreign Affairs, was preparing for a trip to Paris on about June 27 for a meeting with Mr. Bidault, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Molotov, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

At that time, the road was open for Russia and her satellite countries to be included in the Marshall Plan.

The meeting between Messrs. Bevin, Bidault, and Molotov was for the purpose of trying to reach an agreement, which these three would present to all the other recipients of Marshall Plan aid as to the mechanics of setting up the enterprise.

I stayed in London for several days, and we had no difficulty in agreeing with the British regarding the Marshall Plan, all of which was set down in an *aide-mémoire*. I do not here quote this memorandum, because I have no copy of it.

Regarding the Paris meeting of Messrs. Bevin, Bidault, and Molotov, it should be stated that Poland and Czechoslovakia already had cabled direct to Washington that they

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wished to be included among Marshall Plan recipients, but Moscow had caused both countries to withdraw this agreement.

At the Paris meeting, the Russians insisted upon each country acting on its own, just making out a list of its requirements, presenting it to the United States, and letting the United States fill the bill.

The Russians would not agree to any kind of western European organization or institution having to do with Marshall Plan aid.

After two or three days, it was clear to Molotov and his delegation that the English and the French were determined to agree to Washington's condition in this matter, so Molotov and his group just walked out of the meeting.

I not only had the wise counsel of Ambassadors Douglas and Caffery in dealing with Sir Oliver Franks' committee, but I conferred often with Jean Monnet who came several times to Geneva to see me, and whom I saw often in Paris.

Soon after I was made Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs in December 1944, I had met Jean Monnet in Washington and, as he represented the Treasury Department of the French Government, had numerous dealings with him.

I have always believed that tariffs and other impediments to international trade were set up for the short-term, special benefit of politically powerful minority groups and were against the national and international interest.

As shown by Paragraph 9 of my memorandum of May 27, 1947, I felt that the Marshall Plan presented an opportunity to introduce the principle of regional free trade in western Europe.

I discussed this matter frequently with Jean Monnet who convinced me that western Europe was too weak in 1947 to accept conditions of regional free trade. I recognized then that Monnet was correct in this viewpoint. Europe had to get a good deal more flesh on its bones before setting up a common market.

However, the object which Secretary Marshall and the Department of State had in mind in insisting upon the formation of a Western European Committee of Cooperation was to get these countries working together, so that the effects of Marshall Plan aid would cause western European countries

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to follow policies conducive to benefits for the entire section rather than for individual countries.

European countries did not customarily work together in matters of this kind, and representatives of several countries took the position that they could not agree to the continuation, after Marshall Plan aid ceased, of any organization that they might set up.

Ambassadors Douglas and Caffery and I were meeting from day to day with Sir Oliver Franks and his group (a total of sixteen countries), and when the representative of one of these sixteen countries made the statement that European countries were not in the habit of looking over the back fence of their neighbors to see what they were doing, I stated that perhaps we were all pursuing a will-o'-the-wisp and might as well forget about it.

The whole situation got very tense. It was quite clear that representatives of at least three countries were prepared to vote against the idea of the continuation of such an organization after Marshall Plan aid ceased, so the suggestion was made one Thursday or Friday that we should adjourn to the following week in order to give time for the representatives of these three countries to go back home and talk with the heads of their governments. This was done, and when we met again the following week, the representatives of these three countries said that their governments had agreed to the continuation of the organization, even after Marshall Plan aid had ceased.

The committee, informally organized into the Committee for European Economic Cooperation under the chairmanship of Sir Oliver Franks was then set up formally, in the Spring of 1948, under the title of Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). This organization fully justified the faith of Secretary Marshall and his advisers, because it managed to secure the removal of many of the restrictions on imports between European countries. In time, the United States and Canada became associate members of this organization; still later, it was changed to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which is its present name. The United States and Canada are now full members of OECD.

I opened this paper with a reflection upon the interde-

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pendence of GATT, the Marshall Plan, and OECD. I feel impelled to conclude with another reflection of a different character. It is that without the courageous and resolute political leadership of the kind exhibited by President Truman in the instances I have cited, the needs I describe could well have met with responses unpleasant to contemplate.

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HOUSTON, TEXAS

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THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS SUPPORTERS: A SELF-EXAMINATION *

EVERYONE born into the world alive, we know, is either a little liberal or a little conservative. But in the United States liberal and conservative, even as those terms continue to lose and acquire meanings, connote primarily domestic attitudes. For Americans as we look out beyond our borders, every child born into today's worldly travail would be, more aptly, either a little internationalist or a little isolationist. (Or, since the contrary of internationalism is no longer isolationism, perhaps a "unilateralist" or a large-sized "nationalist.")

It is to "internationalists" that this is written, in candid family discussion. I do not stop to identify them; for the most part they will recognize themselves, or be recognized, if only by their opponents. Nor does any definition promise to convey "internationalism." Internationalism, as I use it, is not a philosophy, political or moral. It is not a principle, although it is frequently involved with "principle." Internationalism is an attitude or a tangle of attitudes, part moral, part political; part idealism, part realism; part altruism, part self-interest, more or less enlightened. They add up to a way of looking at the world and at the place and role of the United States in it. In the main, with ample allowance for individual differences, internationalists share particular and predictable attitudes on important issues of foreign policy: on war and peace; on national security; on disarmament and arms control; on the cold war; on neutralism; on colonialism; on foreign aid; on trade and tariffs; on unilateralism, bilateralism, multilateralism, in actions or institutions; on NATO and the European Community; on Cuba and China; on the Congo; on international order and international law; on the Bricker Amendment and the Connally Reservation.

* This paper was written to serve as the basis for discussion at Consultation No. 14, "Moral and Political Limits of Internationalism," sponsored by the Council on Religion and International Affairs, in Washington, D.C., November 1962. It is published, as revised, with the permission of the Council.

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The epitome, and a principal focus, of much that is meant by "internationalism" has been the United Nations. It is with the United Nations, and with the attitudes of American internationalists toward the United Nations, that we are concerned here. American supporters of the United Nations, it must be admitted, appear in need of renewing their strength. Their support for the United Nations needs re-examination, notably self-examination. We have fallen far from the easy grace that was our monopoly in "the last days" brought by victory in World War II; even erstwhile supporters have fallen away and begun to question. We have lost, too, the easy certainties of those days; it is not always clear to us how far our support for the United Nations goes, what it entails or requires, how it is reconciled with other desirable policies, with national or individual self-interest, with sophistication and realism. Uncertainty has seeped even into our attitudes toward the bible of the United Nations, the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The increasing uncertainties of supporters of the United Nations suggest the need to reason why. They suggest that it may be time to ask why we feel as we feel and propose what we propose, to re-examine our attitudes to assure that they have not become frozen in yesterday's context and encrusted with positions no longer relevant. It may help, also, to re-educate ourselves in a few respects about the character of the United Nations which we support, and about its place in the policy of the United States.

I. SUPPORTING THE UNITED NATIONS

Internationalists are themselves a variegated species, but in their differing ways they have, generally, "supported the United Nations" since its conception during the Second World War; they have continued to support it through major transformations in its character, and in the face of radical changes in the policy of the United States toward the United Nations.

The story is familiar. It was so brief, and now so long ago, that many forget the shattered dream of Big Power amity and cooperation that brought major disillusionment, the frustration of the plans for a relaxed world order under the United Nations, surely the disappointment of those who planned yet

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stronger international institutions. With disappointed hopes came popular and Congressional skepticism, if not cynicism; "realism" took the forefront, "idealism" had to lie lower. The United Nations was early demoted from "*the* cornerstone" to "*a* cornerstone" of American foreign policy, and support for specific United Nations programs faltered if they did not seem to contribute to national security or to U.S. "victory" in the cold war. Multilateral efforts subsided in favor of traditional bilateral diplomacy. Disarmament efforts continued, but soon even became suspect in some eyes. The progress of international order was reversed: efforts to transform political questions into legal ones, to achieve additional accepted norms, and perhaps impartial adjudication, largely subsided; instead, even what had seemed to have qualities of law became uncertain, international law was subordinated to national foreign policy, and every nation did that which was right in its own eyes. Americans have continued to support the United Nations but in many cases without conviction, even grudgingly.

Some internationalists sometimes still appear amazed that American enthusiasm for the United Nations is not what it was even less long ago than 1945, that programs which seem so eminently reasonable meet growing resistance and rejection, that even pro-United Nations victories are increasingly narrow. This amazement itself may suggest inadequate appreciation by United Nations supporters of the forces shaping the reactions of citizens and leaders: the traditional isolationism of the American people, the wish to avoid "foreign entanglements"; the hopes and disappointments, the costs without obvious return, that have accompanied American commitments to the world before and since the United Nations—the world wars, Korea, Communist expansion. The cold war, in particular, has engendered a war vocabulary and war attitudes more conducive to nationalism, even chauvinism, and emotion, to "art thou for us, or for our adversaries," than to attitudes of rationality and recognition of common interests that inspire devoted support for the United Nations.

But while it is important to recognize these reasons for the increasing obstacles faced by United Nations supporters, it is not with the beam from the eye of others that the internationalist kingdom can be built. Examination may sug-

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gest that there is fault, too, in our own attitudes, some of them showing desposits of early postwar days, already too infrequently recalled. We were reluctant to shed the original conception of the United Nations, although the world not being what was thought, the United Nations could not be what was planned. We were reluctant to admit the failure of Big Power cooperation, to recognize the conflicting views of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China as to how the world ought to be. We were reluctant to recognize the facts of power and the needs of national security which ran counter to the early assumptions and the original dream.

Most of us have learned, but in a measure, for some internationalists at least, similar or related faults are still too much with us. We have tended to be reluctant to recognize national interest, as though ours was profane but that of others, sacred. We have tended to idealize the United Nations as though it were an article of faith, rather than an essential political institution with essential, practical purposes. We have tended to romanticize—hoping that we are not patronizing—about others, about new nations, about "neutrals."

If one would generalize, the faults of the internationalist—in his attitudes toward the United Nations as on some other issues—are kin to the virtues of his positions. Being farseeing, he tends to be romantic and sometimes spills over into sentimentalism. Seeing the other fellow's point of view, and having to defend it to the chauvinist, he sometimes identifies with it. Concerned with assuring that others do not reduce moral questions to differences of taste or judgment, he sometimes elevates his own opinion or preference to principle. Pressing for decency, fairness, and rationality in international affairs, he is reluctant to recognize the lack of these in others. Concerned with recognizing the interests and the views of others, he may give them more than their due, and the United States less than it deserves.

Internationalists recognize that it is essential to avoid major war and to strive for peace, even—or especially—with Russia. Nothing in internationalism requires that we avoid recognizing that it is the Soviet Union, far more than the United States, that is responsible for the early inadequacies

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of the United Nations, for tension in Berlin, for lack of substantial progress in disarmament. Internationalists recognize that aid to new nations is practical as well as moral, essential to U.S. economic welfare as well as to U.S. interests in the cold war. Nothing in internationalism requires that we continue to give aid to nations without taking heed that they are able and willing to use it effectively. Internationalists recognize the importance of the United Nations. Nothing in internationalism requires that we support or accept irresponsible action by nations when that irresponsibility is reflected within the United Nations. The virtues of cooperation do not, *ipso facto,* render desirable every alliance, every integration, every submersion of nations into some larger unit.

Disappointment—and reluctance to admit and accept it—idealization, romanticism, are not immoral; but they are not solid foundations for national policy or a sturdy platform from which to influence national policy. Internationalism and support for the United Nations are surely no less essential now than they were in 1945; but to be relevant and effective, they must be built on an understanding of nations and the United Nations in today's world.

II. UNDERSTANDING THE UNITED NATIONS

Misunderstandings of the United Nations by its friends have not been the most egregious, but they are misunderstandings to be particularly dispelled if intelligent support for the United Nations in U.S. foreign policy is to be maintained.

To articulate the obvious but sometimes forgotten, the nation is and will continue to be the current political unit. The United Nations is built on it, as is clear from its very name and from every frequent reference to matters "international." Old societies adhere to it, new ones aspire to it and insist on it, even if they must simultaneously seek new, "less sovereign" arrangements for their survival and development. Little is as universally accepted in the international arena as notions of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and independence. Even "international communism" has not eliminated national boundaries and conceptions. The nation, one may assume, will figure in world politics for a long time.

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The persistence of nations does not mean, of course, the inevitability of virulent nationalism.

The internationalist, too, begins with a society of nations, however much some may deplore it or dream of the day when they will wither away. The foreign policy he would influence is that of our own nation, the United States. And nations, not unlike individuals, act in their own interests as they see their interests. They cooperate not from self-sacrifice, but for a common good to all.

National self-interest is a difficult concept in international relations, and internationalists, no less than ultra-nationalists, sometimes stumble over it. Metaphors which deal with the society of nations as though it were a society of men do not always add clarity; they inject values which are only speciously appropriate between nations, and confuse concepts of international morality, playing into the hands of those who reject morality between nations when they really mean that morality takes different forms and makes different requirements of nations.

Failure to understand national interest can be fatal to any internationalist position. We do not decry or eschew patriotism even when we flush scoundrels from its refuge. We are against chauvinistic nationalism, not merely from morality or taste, but because we do not think it serves the interest of the United States. To the internationalist no less than to the most extreme nationalist, U.S. foreign policy must be determined by U.S. interests. Internationalism does not need to insist on "morality," on idealism, on altruism, or cooperation per se; internationalism recognizes that policies which may look like or reflect any of these are frequently in the true interest of the United States.

The internationalist, then, must not be trapped into accepting even the appearance of a dichotomy between "U.S. interests" and "UN interests." The question for U.S. policy is not what can the United States do for the United Nations; it is, more clearly, what can the United Nations do for the United States. Nor must we be deceived by fears that the United States is "using" the United Nations for its own interests. The United Nations has no purposes other than those of its members, and is only the means of achieving those purposes. Whatever may be true for other

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nations, the purposes of the United Nations are, in the long run at least—and for the middle run, too—the purposes of American foreign policy. The United States is concerned to help achieve a world of nations at peace, enjoying independence with diversity, providing their peoples a decent share of the world's goods and opportunities; it can work to these ends through the United Nations. Peace, security—our own and that of others—effective control of armaments, improvement of the general economic and social welfare, are principal goals of American foreign policy as well as purposes of the United Nations. Even the immediate goals of the United States in the cold war (unlike those of the U.S.S.R.) are not far from those of the United Nations—support for the independence of nations, stability with peaceful change, foreign aid, and intelligent trade patterns. The need is to recognize, identify, even tailor U.S. interests common to those of the mass of United Nations members.

The internationalist must recognize also that the United Nations is not the only means for achieving United States goals, even the goals it has in common with the United Nations and with its members. Security against other big powers was one risk for which the United Nations was not—and could not—be equipped; the United Nations can only support national and allied defense efforts. Defending the democratic institutions of other countries against subversion may require national effort, with only ancillary support from the United Nations. The internationalist must also recognize that encouraging other forms of cooperation, whether in Europe or in the Americas, with appropriate degrees of U.S. participation, may contribute to United Nations goals directly, and build as well internationalist attitudes which will carry over into U.S. relations with the United Nations.

It is essential to recognize, too, that the United Nations has changed in basic ways; the changes reflect realization of initial error as well as adjustment to changes in the world which the United Nations represents.

The evolution of the United Nations may be epitomized in terms of its Secretaries General—from Lie to Hammarskjold to Thant. Mr. Lie of Norway came to office with the original conception, and—as in Korea—dared to use the Charter and the institution even in support of one big power

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against another. Under Hammarskjold of Sweden, and his adroit personal diplomacy, the United Nations did not take sides in the cold war, but rather mediated and moderated. The United Nations was for the interests of the small powers, including their interest in tempering the cold war. In the United Nations the big powers might even be made to support the interests of small powers. U Thant of Burma continues the process: the United Nations is almost universal; small and new nations are the large majority; the center of political gravity has moved to Asia, perhaps on the way to Africa. The cold war is of little interest except that it must be kept in check; colonialism and racism are the political targets, economic development the principal objective.

Slowness to recognize the evolution of the United Nations has troubled internationalism all along, but it did so particularly at the beginning. In the after-glow of World War II, we have suggested, some—including some in very high places—seemed to have the impression that with the United Nations would come the end of national power and its politics. But the United Nations did not abolish national power; it assumed and built on it. It also assumed that the allies of World War II would cooperate and join their power, adjusting or subordinating any conflicting interests, or at least sublimating them to a plane of political and economic competition. But while the principles were to apply to all, the Charter made no provision and intended no provision for protecting big powers against each other and small nations against big ones by enforcement action. Inevitably when the Soviet Union appeared to threaten other nations, small or big, provision had to be made outside the United Nations for the contingencies for which it did not (and could not) provide.

Isolationists and skeptics, of course, saw sooner the failure of the dream; they, in turn, failed to see what the United Nations could do or could be made to do. For some years, they went along, enjoying the hope that the United Nations might constitute a coalition against the Soviet Union. That hope terminated when the changing complexion of United Nations membership, combined with increasing Soviet sophistication, put an end to commonplace, overwhelming majorities against Russia. Too eager to reject the United

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Nations, isolationists and ultra-nationalists refused to see the interests of the United States which the new United Nations could serve. They were far less perceptive than the Russians who, recognizing the importance and potential of the United Nations, paid it the homage of attempting to frustrate or control it by *Troikas* and otherwise. The internationalist, on the other hand, reluctant to admit disappointment, was also slow to exploit the realistic potential of the United Nations. More serious still, he was reluctant to turn elsewhere to supply what the United Nations could not. In particular, he took too long to accept NATO. Failing to recognize early that NATO was not an inconsistent alternative to the United Nations, he helped others into that error; thinking they had to choose, they inevitably chose NATO, and turned from the United Nations.

The consequences of this error are still with us, and the internationalist must continue to fight it. As far as one can see, and regardless of test bans and other thaws in the cold war, there will be need for some defensive alliance against Soviet threat. Combined with this need, other forces have drawn our allies together and are exercising vague centripetal forces on the United States. One need not exaggerate the probability of radical political readjustments in an Atlantic Community to accept the likelihood of continued and extended relationships between the United States and western Europe. NATO itself may change radically in response to the changes since its creation, in the focus and character of the Soviet threat, in military weapons and strategy, in the condition of our allies. But the Atlantic area will surely remain an area of major concentration for U.S. policy.

The internationalist will welcome these policies. He will seek to promote attitudes and policies reflecting equality, cooperation, joint deliberation, and interest. But he will be alert to assure that the Atlantic Community and its variations should not become an alternative to the United Nations in U.S. foreign policy; it must be a complement to the United Nations and indeed a center for cooperation in making the United Nations effective for the important tasks which it can do now and in the future.

Recognizing that the United Nations is something different from what was once thought, the internationalist will be

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able to lead in constructive use of the United Nations for what it can do. If the United Nations is not capable of defending the United States or other nations against a major power, it can help deter such attacks. If the United Nations cannot prevent Soviet subversion, it can help deter such subversion as well as strengthen states and governments to render subversion less likely. The United Nations can play a big role in preventing hostilities not directly involving the United States and the Soviet Union. It can even help temper the cold war. It promises, perhaps, new United Nations roles, as in the Congo, in New Guinea, or in Malaysia. It can act as midwife for peaceful political and economic change, and itself administer programs of social and economic development. It can concentrate the policies of the powers of the world to influence the policies of one nation or another. For our conflict with communism, the United Nations can be more meaningful and more effective now that its membership is nearly universal and more variegated. While the United States (like the Soviet Union) gains little from blatant cold war propaganda and cold war skirmishes, the United States can gain considerably from action in the United Nations which supports peace, independence, and economic development.

The United Nations is an Instrument of International Politics

Perhaps the greatest confusion about the United Nations is common to its friends and foes. Foes point to cold war and world tension, to the spread of communism, to more-or-less patent international hostilities, and conclude that the United Nations has failed. This, of course, is old error. The United Nations reflects the interests and conflicts of the world. It can seek to accommodate these interests, prevent their irruption into active hostility, but it has no magic wand to make conflicting interests cease to conflict, and no force to enforce judgments. If the magic wand could be made, it is not clear that we would entrust it to anyone or any body; if the force could be created, it is not clear that any nation—including the United States—would agree to accept and submit to it.

The internationalist makes an analogous error. One hears

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periodic accusations by "friends" of the United Nations that it is being "by-passed" if some important issue between nations is not laid in its bosom. Of course, if resort to the United Nations is avoided even when other measures to deal peacefully with crises are not successful, the United Nations and its Charter may be reduced to neglected pieties. It is a very different matter, however, to insist that every issue arising between nations must come to the United Nations. Important international issues generally do come into its purview; it is not essential that they get there in any particular manner, at some particular time, or at all. Already it is a commonplace that it is no contribution to the growth of the United Nations to bring to it matters which are beyond its capabilities to improve. While it may be desirable occasionally to record a moral or political judgment, it does not help the United Nations if it takes action which will prove vain, either because it is irresponsible or because it so vitally affects some nation's interests that it could not comply. What is fundamental, the United Nations needs no "business." Like a national police or judicial system, the United Nations, ideally, should have no business at all. And the Charter itself makes it the primary duty of nations to settle their disputes themselves, provided they do it by peaceful means. Negotiation between the parties, if it leads to resolution, is, then, the first, the best, perhaps the only way for giving effect to the United Nations Charter and its system of order and law. Crises need not be prolonged, settlements need not be postponed or jeopardized, merely to give the United Nations a "role," or to build its record.

A special manifestation of this error, or of a similar error, may be found in the quest for disarmament. Here, too, the faults of the internationalist are not the most serious obstacles to a rational disarmament policy in the national interest. The isolationist and the ultra-nationalist are still reluctant to explore with open mind the possibility that agreed controls or limitations on armaments may contribute to U.S. security and other national interests more than can the uncertainties of the arms race. Some insist on more inspection than is necessary, instead of admitting that they oppose a particular—or any—disarmament agreement. Others have seized on real need for inducing and verifying compliance

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with a proposed agreement to make a principle of "inspection." Perhaps because they seek inspection for other purposes, they often fail to recognize that what is usually considered "inspection" is merely one way of verifying compliance with an agreement, that there may be other means of verification—perhaps less unacceptable to both the United States and the Soviet Union—that will deter violations and supply the necessary information as to whether a nation is complying. But if these are the errors of others, the internationalist, too, has contributed error. If he has not made a principle of inspection, he tends to make a principle of international inspection. He would like to use disarmament to help build the United Nations and auxiliary international institutions. But international inspection tied to the United Nations may not be the most effective detection system in all circumstances, and may not be acceptable to negotiating nations. Agreement on some disarmament measures may be more easy to achieve if inspection is left to reciprocal national verification—as in the Test Ban Agreement. Successful disarmament agreements may contribute measurably to international order, to strengthening the United Nations and other international institutions. Surely, quixotic insistence on international inspection for the sake of building international institutions should not become an obstacle to agreement on arms control or disarmament where it is otherwise in the national interest.

A related and perhaps even more serious misapprehension of the United Nations is that one can bring matters to it "for solution." The United Nations is not a judicial body before which two or more parties may seek an impartial decision in the light of accepted norms or principles. The United Nations is an instrument of international politics and diplomacy, a complicated, delicate, sometimes erratic instrument. It can do wonders, sometimes—in presenting varying interests and attitudes, focusing them on a given issue, making them available for adjustment and compromise, bringing other political influences to bear upon them.

With regard to issues of peace and security, the United Nations can be invoked in different ways, for different purposes, by different parties. In regard to those in which the Big Powers have major interest, the United Nations is an

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organism for concentrating political influence to contain and relax tensions. It is a forum for negotiations; it affords a means whereby other nations, with less involvement, can suggest adjustments and focus influence on parties who have not been able to resolve their differences. The United Nations might be used to gain support for a position which a party to a controversy seeks to maintain, or to compel concession from the other side. It might, on the other hand, be used by a state to let itself be "compelled" to make a concession or compromise that it is not prepared to make on its own. United Nations action, or the threat of United Nations action, might also be a means to bring about negotiations between parties or to affect the timing, progress, or outcome of negotiations.

In short, the United Nations is a political organization; the Security Council and the General Assembly are political bodies. They consist of representatives of nations. The United Nations can act on any issue only through the initiative of some members and the support of more, usually the vote of majorities. For the United States to bring a matter to the United Nations, wash its hands, and hope that some magic answer will come out would be reckless and irresponsible. What will come out will be influenced by what is put in, and what is done with it within the United Nations. And what the United Nations will do depends in large measure on what the United States proposes that it do, what policies it seeks, and what consultations, adjustments, and compromises can achieve. Taking an issue to the United Nations is not itself a "policy." It must not be a substitute for a policy; it should be a step in a policy and an instrument of a policy. The United States can bring an issue—whether Berlin, or Cuba, or Laos—to the United Nations, but it must know what it seeks, what policies consistent with the Charter and with the character of the organization it will ask for—as well as what is likely to come out.

III. THE DIFFERENT FACES OF THE UNITED NATIONS

We have asserted that the United Nations is a political body. It needs also to be stressed, however, that there is another face to the United Nations—the law of the Charter;

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that the different faces—the law and the United Nations institution—are to be distinguished, as well as seen together in a total conception.

The UN Charter consists of two distinct elements. It is first a treaty in which adherents accept fundamental obligations, principally that (except in self-defense against armed attack) members must refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of other states. (An ancillary requirement that members "settle their disputes by peaceful means" has not achieved affirmative significance, and in practice has seemed to mean only that members may not resort to force.) Other undertakings by members—for example, "to take joint and separate action in cooperation with" the United Nations to promote economic and social ends—are primarily hortatory, vague, and difficult to enforce. The bulk of the Charter, on the other hand, does not consist of obligations at all. It is a constituent document establishing institutions and defining their purpose, authority, and limitations. The Charter establishes various organs to maintain peace and to promote social and economic welfare; it distributes responsibility to various organs and calls for cooperation by the members.

The law of the Charter forbidding unilateral force is, of course, intertwined with the institutional pattern created by the Charter. One may say, indeed, that the primary purpose of the institution was to implement and enforce the law of the Charter against war. Unlike national self-help, the United Nations organs may authorize force when there is a threat to the peace even before armed attack has taken place. (At least as originally conceived there was no suggestion in the language or history of the Charter that the United Nations might authorize force for purposes other than maintaining peace, for example, to vindicate the principle of self-determination or the observance of human rights.)

The relation of the law to the institution, however, is more complicated than merely that of law to law enforcement. Authority to enforce includes the power not to enforce (as in Goa). In order to decide whether and how to enforce, moreover, the Security Council and the General Assembly must first sit in judgment on the action of member nations. And in the process of judgment and enforcement, inevitably

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the Council, and particularly the Assembly, exercise also legislative influence modifying the law of the Charter. In the first instance, of course, the actions of members, and the reactions of other members, have the effect of interpreting what the Charter obligations mean. Then, deliberations, recommendations, resolutions, and actions in the Council or Assembly inevitably determine what the law of the Charter means or may be held to mean in the future. That nations used and justified force at Suez, for example, inevitably entailed interpretation of the law of the Charter and an effort to persuade others to accept it. That the United States and other members held that this force was not justified constituted their different interpretation of the Charter. That the organs of the United Nations acted to have the use of force undone reinforced the meaning of the Charter as the majority interpreted it. Failure by the organs to take this action might, of course, have had important legislative consequences for the law of the Charter on the circumstances in which unilateral force may be used. Even little Goa—the action of India, its support by some members and its condemnation by others, the failure of any action by organs of the United Nations—has affected the meaning of the principle of the Charter against unilateral use of force, although it may be viewed by some as a special exception for attacks on colonialism (or even a smaller exception based on Goa's territorial relation to India) which hopefully will be limited there.

This built-in legislative, "amending" power, by nations and by the UN organs, may allow for changes in the law which have proved necessary in the experience of nations. It is of course a dangerous power, for passion and politics of the time may result in far-reaching, immature "amendment" of the original constitution. It was perhaps inevitable, and generally desirable, that the Charter be read to enhance the authority of various organs of the United Nations. Unhappily, other "amendments" to the Charter to date, and more that are threatened, would also erode the law of the Charter by increasing the circumstances in which nations may use self-help. But the law and the institutions are two faces of the United Nations profoundly interrelated. Supporters of the United Nations must remember, and remind

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others, that both faces exist; in particular, that there exists a fundamental legal obligation not to use force quite apart from anything the UN organs do, that the outlawing of unilateral force is a fundamental aspect of "the United Nations." Without the law against self-help, the institution lacks its principal purpose; indeed, one might question whether the United Nations could survive merely as a "legislature" without a "Constitution," without the basic principle of "order"—the prohibition of national force in self-help. Neither the law nor the institution may exert decisive influence in the determination of national policies; both exert appreciable, variable weight in support of international order. It is far from clear that the Charter, universally accepted and paid even the homage of hypocrisy, exerts a lesser deterrent effect than institutional majorities. Together, law and institution promise substantial hope for substantial order.

The law is essential, and the institution's primary purpose is to enforce that law. But the institution is a political body, not a court of law invoked by an agency dedicated to law enforcement. Even where it is agreed that the law has been violated, what shall be done about it is determined by the organs of the United Nations and these, we emphasize, are political institutions of international diplomacy. The United Nations, and United States policy in the United Nations, should support Charter observance, but they must also take into account the context of relations which led to the Charter violation, the character of the United Nations, and the attitudes of the nations that compose it. One may applaud the leadership of the United States in bringing the United Nations to the aid of the Republic of Korea. One need not blame the United States for dropping the question of Goa in the circumstances of the case. Surely, the United States cannot raise the question of the incursions of Communist China against India so long as India for its own reasons does not seek the assistance of the United Nations or of its members in that forum.

At Suez, on the other hand, one may well ask whether the United States acted with proper understanding of the relation of the law of the Charter to the political institutions that constitute the United Nations. The attacks at Suez and

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Sinai were unlawful, but they had been provoked by Egyptian actions which were also not wholly consistent with the spirit of the Charter. Other violations of international law were charged, other national interests were claimed to have been violated. In the circumstances, even a judicial body might well have issued a decree which would have dealt both with the violation and with its causes. Surely the General Assembly—a political body—might have dealt with the causes, with the seizure of the Canal, with the basic issues between Egypt and Israel, when it sought to undo the violations of the Charter.

Parliamentary Diplomacy

When we think about U.S. policy toward and in the United Nations, we think, usually, not of the obligations to refrain from force, but about U.S. attitudes toward the institutions established by the Charter, particularly the General Assembly. The deliberations and resolutions of these organs of the United Nations are political; the procedures, the motivations, the influences governing them are political.

I do not propose to draw sharp lines between commands (by the Security Council) and recommendations (usually by the General Assembly). In view of the veto, the Security Council cannot usually command an unwilling United States. For present purposes, whether the United States should exercise a veto in the Security Council raises many of the issues involved in the question whether the United States should disregard a recommendation of the Assembly. When the Assembly seeks to maintain international peace and security, moreover, its recommendations are in support of legal obligations in the Charter and deserve and command the highest compliance and support. Nor do I insist that legal obligations are very different from political incentives. In international affairs, in particular, the violation of legal obligations may be more offensive to morality, but its consequences are also largely "political"; and while most nations are—and should be—more reluctant to breach an obligation than to disregard a recommendation, all states will do the one or the other in some circumstances, with the political consequences the principal deterrent to non-compliance in either case.

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Still, for whatever difference it may make, the "decisions" of the United Nations which concern us here are not legal adjudications or determinations, but political recommendations. The principal "recommender"—the General Assembly—is a special kind of political body. The United Nations now has 111 members and all are represented equally in the General Assembly. Equal vote suggests a body based not on the realities of power or any other selected qualities deemed relevant, but on a concept of equality of all nation-states. And decision by majority suggests another a priori concept—the right to make political judgments and decisions by majority of these nations acting as a parliament.

All of us are tempted, of course, to translate the familiar to the necessary. Americans think of institutions as democratic, to be run by a majority vote. And other nations, even those who do not know democracy or parliamentary majority vote at home, seek or accept it in the organs of the United Nations. The result is a body applying parliamentary practices to representatives, not of individuals, but of nations and governments. But it is far from clear that if the nation is a "natural unit" for some purposes, it is the proper unit for this purpose. If we recognize the right of nations to discuss any matter of international concern, one may yet ask whether issues arising in the discussion should be "decided" by majority vote of the nations. (In international conferences generally, nations are bound only by what they themselves agree to.) The "parliamentary body," moreover, represents a world which is not a unit with common agreed interests. The nations do not constitute a commonwealth dedicated to a common weal in all areas; the constitution to which they are committed is not universal or all-embracing; the issues that come before the United Nations include matters of divergent interest not covered by Charter commitment or other clear, agreed guiding principles.

Again, one might distinguish between questions. We lay aside internal questions of organization—whether membership, representation, or the selection of a Secretary-General. These must, of course, be decided by majority, as the Charter contemplated, and outvoted nations must acquiesce. In regard to substantive matters, issues of war and peace perhaps affect all nations sufficiently to suggest that, in a world of na-

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tions, the views of a majority of nations ought generally to prevail. Many economic and social issues, on the other hand, affect different nations differently, even if not always along the lines of "have" or "have-not." Other issues—colonialism, human rights—surely affect different nations differently, and have different importance for the "world community."

One must distinguish, too, among the different characters and roles played by the United Nations and the different kinds of action taken or recommended. The "majority vote" has different significance when two nations are urged to stop fighting and accept UN machinery to keep the peace (Gaza, for instance); when it recommends a guide to national policy for all nations (as in the Declaration of Human Rights); when it calls for specific political action by a particular nation (say, South Africa); when it establishes an economic program (like the United Nations Special Fund).

I would not favor changing the voting system; equality is the hallmark of prestige and sovereignty, particularly for the new nations, and its rigors are modified by influence enjoyed and exerted by advantaged nations. I am not suggesting that one nation-one vote should apply to issues of war and peace only, or to some issues and not to others. That is no longer feasible, and efforts to achieve it would be fraught with difficulty and danger to the United Nations. What is suggested is that the members of the General Assembly in their debates and in their recommendations must recognize the "artificial" character of their role. They must recognize, in particular, that their interest, their right to judge and recommend is very different in regard to sending police to help maintain the peace, from what it is when they recommend that a few nations contribute large sums to a development fund, or even that they disarm in ways which they believe may seriously affect their security. Internationalists surely must judge differently the different actions and the respect they deserve.

In our context, the United Nations is a voice of conscience, of world opinion and influence. If the voice is firm and clear and responsible, and represents a largely united United Nations membership, it will frequently be heard and heeded. Smaller nations will be more obedient (unless, as in the case of Communist satellites, a bigger one offers protection). *In extremis,* any nation will disregard the voice of the United

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Nations if important self-interests are believed at stake. In general, the West is more sensitive, more reluctant to face the guilt and the political cost of disregarding it. The Communist countries have frequently flouted it, but even they must pay it some respect. The point is that the issues that may come before the United Nations because they are now of international concern, require of all member nations maturity, self-restraint, responsibility. And it may be that whether other nations—say, the United States—should be obliged to listen and to follow majority decisions, may depend exactly on the issue involved, the responsibility with which it was considered and the decision voted—as well as how deeply it cuts into vital U.S. interests. The opinion of the International Court of Justice, which apparently recognizes as a legal obligation financial assessments by the General Assembly for any purpose, only underscores the need for responsibility in majority action.

There may be some occasions when irresponsible action on the part of United Nations members will compel the United States to refuse to go along. There may be occasions when vital U.S. interests are jeopardized by some call from a UN majority. They will be rare. Internationalists will recognize that UN majorities are also not infallible or irresistible, and that ultimately the United States may have to act as in its own enlightened judgment its security dictates. But internationalists will scrutinize sharply every suggestion that the United States disregard a UN resolution, and conclude reluctantly that it must do so in a particular, rare case. They must not allow every "violation" to become a rejection of the United Nations, or a precedent for further non-compliance.

To admit that UN actions are political and that there may be instances when the United States may feel compelled not to comply is hardly to adopt the recent suggestion that the United States pays too much attention to the United Nations or cares too much for so-called world opinion, at expense to its own interests. The relation, in general, of U.S. interests to UN interests has been considered. In regard to "world opinion," both proponents and opponents in recent exchanges seem to be aiming beside the point. Of course, we have said, the United States must look to its own interest; but may not

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its true interest lie in working through the United Nations, in seeking to mobilize its resources and its influence for a desired policy? May not true U.S. interest lie in giving substantial respect to UN resolutions so that it can build the influence of the United Nations and of such resolutions? Attention to world opinion is not a duty; it may only be a necessity when we are engaged in a struggle much of which is a struggle for men's opinions. As the United Nations is a particular focus of "world opinion," we can disregard it only with acute awareness of the need to do so. It is surprising that the "realists" so alert to the realities of the politics of national power are so insensitive to the realities of the politics of multinational power, focused at the United Nations.

IV. THE CASE OF CUBA

One ought not end this self-examination without some words about Cuba. Recent developments there afford hard lessons for supporters of the United Nations. They suggest, first, that it is sometimes as difficult to define the "internationalist position" on an issue as it is to indicate the "liberal position" on domestic questions involving sharply competing values. Perhaps one must conclude that in extreme situations involving the national security, internationalist positions differ less markedly from those of ultra-nationalists, though their tone and their procedures may be very different. Cuba also stirs echoes of *inter arma silent leges,* or, at least, of Mr. Justice Holmes' comment that hard cases make bad law; some internationalists and *soi-disant* supporters of the United Nations have seemed prepared to accept and even promote some very bad law. In fact, the hardest lesson may be that, in crisis, internationalists must guard against the temptation to be or appear to be more nationalist than the ultra-nationalists.

The U.S. action in the Cuban incident, its apparent "success," and its acceptance by the U.S.S.R., promise important if yet uncertain consequences for international relations and for U.S. foreign policy. Their impact on the United Nations is less clear. Perhaps the consequences may be very different for the two different faces of the United Nations—the UN institution and the law of the Charter. The UN institu-

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tion proved important as an available forum or context for negotiation and, perhaps—in the person of the Secretary-General—of good offices and impartiality. (To the United States it also afforded an important political forum to prove its case and disarm critical international political opinion.) For the authority of the organs of the United Nations to control the use of force, and for the law of the Charter, the consequences are less cheerful. Most distressing are the lengths to which even United Nations supporters have felt obliged to go to justify the action of the United States.

United States relations with Castro's Cuba have been a trial for internationalism almost from the beginning. Internationalists were particularly unhappy about the abortive invasion in April 1961. If, as appears, there was substantial involvement by the United States, the action was unilateral, and its failure, and events since, have helped to belie any justification for the action in "necessity," as well as the need to act alone. Although the United States was supporting an action by "rebel" Cubans, a major role by the United States was probably illegal, violating the less ambiguous principles of international law—the charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States. The "quarantine" imposed in October 1962, also disturbed internationalists, but with different and more complex cause. Some were reluctant to conclude that developments in Cuba so imperiled U.S. security as to require measures which created a serious danger of nuclear war. Some—probably a small minority, even among internationalists—also had doubts about the steps taken. Accepting the facts as alleged, they wondered whether Soviet missile bases in Cuba would substantially increase the danger to the United States since—they had been led to believe—the Soviet Union had adequate missiles elsewhere which could destroy—hence deter—the United States. If the Cuban bases had primarily political rather than military objectives, these critics were more disposed to question the need for the blockade, and particularly its precipitateness and its unilateral aspects. They raised questions also about the legality of the measures taken, both as concerned Cuba and the nations whose vessels might be affected. A blockade is a violation of "the freedom of the seas," a "warlike" act and —they argued—a use of force contrary to the UN Charter.

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If at all, such measures could be justified only pursuant to UN resolution; at least nothing should have been done until after attempts in and through the United Nations to resolve the difficulties by negotiation and good offices.

These critical views were expressed, but most internationalists apparently did not share them. They, too, perhaps, were uncertain about the military importance of Cuban bases; but it was probable, they thought, that although the Soviet Union supposedly had short-range missiles in plenty, it had only a few intercontinental missiles at home (and not many submarines which could launch shorter-range missiles at the U.S.). Hitherto, then, Europe had been the principal target of Soviet missiles, and the hostage for the West; Cuban bases would bring the United States and the Latin American countries within reach of missiles of shorter range. That would complicate the theory and politics of deterrence, render less credible our commitment to risk destruction at home in behalf of the defense of Europe, and jeopardize the present international stability; it would also seriously unsettle the peace of this hemisphere.

Those who accepted the desirability of the quarantine also sought to justify it as consistent with the obligations of the United States to the United Nations and the UN Charter. Of course, they said, self-help should be avoided; in principle it might have been preferable to take measures (even the quarantine) only pursuant to authorization by the United Nations, after attempts to determine impartially the facts charged by the United States and to achieve the voluntary elimination by Cuba and the U.S.S.R. of the threatening weapons. But while this might have been preferable in principle, it was not realistic to demand it, and might have seriously jeopardized the success of the move. It was important to stop further missiles from coming into Cuba as well as to prevent the completion of the missile sites. Also, UN action might have been futile; it is most unlikely that the United Nations would have authorized the quarantine in the face of Soviet and Cuban denials and opposition; and unilateral action by the United States after failure to obtain UN approval would have been more difficult and even more violative of "internationalism" and the spirit of the Charter.

That the United States acted without authorization by the

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United Nations may reflect adversely on the institution. Even more likely, it will affect the law of the Charter. Clearly, the United States asserted the right to take action involving military power against the interests of other nations—Cuba, the Soviet Union, as well as others whose vessels plied to Cuba—without the authorization of an appropriate organ of the United Nations. Still, sober examination, with due concern for both the immediate interests and the ultimate importance of preserving the Charter, does not leave the United States without a case. The U.S. quarantine was new to international relations and to international law. Apart from the UN Charter, international law has no certain rule barring this kind of action in these circumstances. (Under traditional international law, the United States could presumably have rendered even a full blockade lawful by declaring war against Cuba.) The "freedom of the seas"—so far as it subsumes legal rules rather than a political slogan—was perhaps not seriously compromised by a limited blockade barring delivery of weapons of special character to one country in the novel context of "balance of terror." Under the UN Charter, it may be that the U.S. action was not clearly authorized; but, of course, major Soviet military buildup in Cuba, with purposes and effects far beyond the defense of Cuba, and deeply disturbing to stability in the hemisphere as well as to East-West relations, is even more likely a violation of the spirit—if not of some letter—of the Charter.

The legal issues under the Charter have also been less than clearly conceived. The principal issue of law, properly, is whether in the circumstances the blockade was a "threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence" of Cuba or of other nations, or "in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations" (Article 2, § 4). One may argue that the blockade, strictly speaking, involved no "use of force" within the meaning of the Charter, and that even the threats of force in the background, conditioned on legitimate demands, were minimal. One may argue, too, that any force involved was not against the territorial integrity or political independence of Cuba, or of Russia, or of the nations whose vessels were affected. Nor, it may be urged, was any force involved "incon-

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sistent with the purposes of the United Nations." The action taken had no aggressive purpose, but was designed, rather, to eliminate a potential threat to peace. Moreover, while not authorized by any organ of the United Nations, it was not unilateral either; it was taken pursuant to a resolution of the Organization of American States, a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter. This kind of regional organization furthers the purposes of the United Nations. Its interests and actions conform to the UN Charter, even if in the instant case the weapons and the vessels in question belonged to powers outside the region. The action here authorized was not inconsistent with what was contemplated for regional organizations; only "enforcement action"—a term suggesting something more than this limited blockade [1]—requires the prior authorization of the Security Council (Article 53).

Not wholly to the point has been the discussion of Article 51: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of . . . self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations. . . ." This article does not become relevant unless it is concluded that the U.S. action was contrary to Article 2(4) or some other provision of the Charter. Only then need one ask whether, despite such *prima facie* violation, the action of the United States is permissible under the exception provided by Article 51. Recognizing that Article 51 intended to reaffirm Article 2 and provide only a narrow exception permitting the use of military force if an armed attack occurs, one might say that, like Article 2, neither Article 51 nor any invisible radiations from it necessarily bar lesser action than actual fighting (for example, the quarantine) against threats of armed attack, against hostile, offensive armed preparations, against new strategic deployments disturbing to peace and stability. The "self-help" indulged by the United States was moderate: it involved no invasion of Cuban territory and no destruction; it was easy to terminate and undo; it was not unilateral, but done only after authorization by all the na-

[1] One may make something, perhaps, of the fact that another use in the Charter of the phrase "enforcement action" seems to distinguish it from "preventive action" (Article 2[5]); the blockade, in the circumstances, may be said to be more "preventive" than "enforcement."

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tions primarily concerned in a regional arrangement dedicated to the principles of the United Nations.

Some such argument can respectably be made. It would claim that the United States did not violate the Charter, but acted in accordance with an interpretation and necessary development of it in support of its basic principles. It might draw a line in the definition of "force" in Article 2 in the light of the new technology and the delicate balance of terror which it has wrought; in that context, beyond the powers of UN organs to improve, states might be permitted to take minimal, non-destructive, revocable measures — measures short of war, short of actual shooting, and therefore not likely to "escalate"—in order to preserve the defensive balance and to contribute to international stability. And even such moderate steps might be permissible, perhaps, only when authorized by a regional organization like the OAS, the special character of which was recognized, and special authority for it contemplated, when the Charter was being drafted. This might, also, draw a line in the definition of "enforcement action," permitting the OAS the kind of moderate measures taken in Cuba even without authorization of the Security Council.

Such development of the Charter is in the spirit of constitutional growth. And the acquiescence of the Soviet Union will help confirm this development. Some may think this justification, too, not warranted by the principles relevant to the interpretation of the Charter today; some may find even this justification dangerous, opening loopholes of unknown dimension. Nations, however, must justify their actions; and it is desirable that international law receive at least that homage, even if some will consider it the homage of hypocrisy. But it matters very much which justification is offered. In my view, the one suggested is intellectually respectable, and need not prove destructive of the fundamental principles and purposes of the Charter. Unfortunately, even some staunch supporters of the United Nations have seen fit, instead, to suggest new readings of the Charter which threaten to stretch it until it bursts. They have announced a doctrine in interpretation of Article 51 which would permit use of total force, unilaterally, in "anticipa-

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tory self-defense," or perhaps even as "reprisal" in "protection of vital interests."

The issue is not new. Already, in regard to Suez, voices were heard urging the need to recognize the right to use self-help in response to hostile array of force, to action against "vital" national interests, to violations of international law and justice. Otherwise, it was said, since international law is still primitive, international adjudication minimal, international enforcement of law non-existent, injustice would be rampant and go unrectified. At that time, however, most students of the Charter saw no basis for any such additional exceptions permitting the unilateral use of force. Now, in the case of Cuba, even erstwhile supporters of the Charter principle, when France, Great Britain, and Israel felt compelled to act to vindicate important national interests, seem prepared to abandon it to justify U.S. action in protection of important national interests.

Few would suggest that the Charter can mean only what it once meant. The Charter is a constituent document and cannot be read only in the light of what was said, or intended, or foreseen, even by the most gifted of its begetters. It "is a Constitution we are expounding," and it must be read in the light of what has happened and what the world has become since the Charter was written. The law, like the institutions of the United Nations, must grow to reflect changes in nations, in relations between nations, in the force available to affect relations between nations. But reinterpretation of the Charter is a dangerous and delicate process. It is hardly constructive "interpretation" to "develop" the Charter by eviscerating its fundamental principle—the prohibition of unilateral force. A lawyer wishing to justify tearing up article 2(4)—the heart of the Charter—could even argue that it was intended to apply only in circumstances which have not in fact remained: that self-help was outlawed only on the assumption that, in accordance with the original conception, the Big Powers would keep and maintain the peace; that it was not intended to apply at all to the Big Powers *inter se;* that the provisions against self-help were not intended to apply when Big Powers today (and smaller ones tomorrow) can launch sudden devastating attacks with obliterating weapons. The notion of *rebus sic stantibus*—

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that agreements are binding only so long as circumstances are as they existed or were contemplated at the time of the agreement—is a classic attempt at avoiding treaty obligations; maybe it can apply even to a treaty like the United Nations Charter. But the question is not whether some argument can be made in justification if one wishes to tear up the Charter. The question is rather whether the Charter principle against force is still relevant in the new circumstances.

Of course, there may be some who think that outlawing force in today's world is unrealistic, undesirable, even dangerous and immoral. Others may think this international law, or all international law, an idle irrelevance. If law makes no difference, it makes no difference what the law says. Specifically, many may question whether the law against the use of force has any political significance, whether it has really deterred or prevented any nation from the use of force. Though we must give to the new weapons the major credit for deterring war, it is not irrelevant to suggest that refraining from force which begins in fear may yet become a principle of behavior. In fact, situations not involving directly, or necessarily, the big powers and their big weapons, also have not irrupted into war. In fact, nations generally seem to have been acquiring the attitude that war "is not done"; surely, with notable but few exceptions, traditional war has ceased to figure in the diplomatic planning of nations. (The new substitutes—subversion, insurrection, civil war—also present serious problems, but not the scourge of war; what, if anything, law can do about them is a different and difficult inquiry.)

The United Nations supporter, in any event—even if partly as an act of faith—has believed in the importance of putting the prohibitions on war into the law of the United Nations. If, then, even in cold war and among terrible weapons, the law of the United Nations matters, the United Nations supporter who thinks the Charter had better be read differently than we read it before Cuba must see where his reading leads. Surely they misconceive both international law and the interests of the United States who say that international law and the UN Charter are all right, but they cannot stand in the way of important national in-

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terests. (They, too, would do well to attend, at least, to the uses of law even in the politics of power, and the importance of legality in Soviet policies.) They misconceive both the significance of the United Nations and the character of new war who suggest that the basic concept of the Charter—outlawing unilateral use of force—cannot apply in the day of modern weapons. It was that mild, old-fashioned Second World War which persuaded all nations that for the future national interests will have to be vindicated, or necessary change achieved, as well as can be by political means, but not by war and military self-help. They recognized the exception of self-defense in emergency, but limited to actual armed attack, which is clear, unambiguous, subject to proof, and not easily open to misinterpretation or fabrication. Surely today's weapons render it even more important that nations should not be allowed to cry "vital interests" or "anticipatory self-defense" and unleash the fury. It is precisely in the age of the major deterrent that nations should not be encouraged to strike first under pretext of prevention or pre-emption.

The argument that "anticipatory self-defense" is essential to United States defense is fallacious. The United States relies for its security on its retaliatory power, and primarily on its second strike capability. It does not expect that it would be able to anticipate an attack and it could not afford to be mistaken, to bring about total war by a "pre-emptive strike," if the Soviet Union were not in fact striking or preparing to strike. In all probability, then, only an actual take-off by Soviet planes or missiles would cause the United States to strike, and in that case the United States is not "anticipating" an armed attack, for the attack would have begun.

In fact, of course, for determining what the Charter means or should mean, the nuclear attack and the pre-emptive strike are not the relevant concerns. A nation planning all-out attack will not be deterred by the Charter, though it may well talk "anticipatory self-defense" to any left to listen. Nor does one prescribe rules for the nation threatened with such an attack. If a nation is satisfied that another is about to obliterate it, it will not wait. But it has to make that decision on its own awesome responsibility. Anticipation in that case may have to be practiced; it need not be preached. The Charter need not make a principle of it; the law need

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not authorize or encourage it. But surely that extreme hypothetical case beyond the realm of law should not be used to justify new rules for situations that do not involve the impending mortal thrust. Anticipatory self-defense as a rule of law has meaning only in less extreme cases. There, anticipatory self-defense, it should be clear, is a euphemism for "preventive war." The UN Charter does not authorize it. Nothing in international relations, including the new weapons, suggests that international society would be better if the Charter were changed—or read—to authorize it.

In any event, it should be clear, Cuba was not a case of "beating to the punch" someone who was about to strike. To say that whoever sets up "offensive weapons" justifies preemptive use of force would justify force by everyone everywhere. All nations are now faced by someone with power to strike them. Most weapons are "offensive" and could be used offensively. "Anticipatory self-defense," to be a meaningful extension, rather than a total rejection of any limitation on force, must surely entail some clear, present expectation of attack. Even a hundred years before the Charter, when war was legal, the right of self-defense was—said Secretary Webster in the *Caroline* case—limited to cases in which the "necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." And Webster's words were reaffirmed at Nürnberg.

If there were no other possible justification of the U.S. action than this destruction of the basic law of the Charter, one might do better, in effect, to plead "peccavimus," make some lame statement virtually admitting a violation, rather than to claim this new interpretation of the Charter. Indeed, lawyers who would justify military actions, whether in Suez, Goa, or Cuba, by exaggerated readings of Article 2 or of Article 51 may deal more serious blows to the United Nations and to the Charter than did these and other military actions themselves. One may recall, *mutatis mutandis*, what was said by the late Mr. Justice Jackson when the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to uphold the validity of a different military action:

> A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military emergency. . . . But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms

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> to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle. . . . The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes. All . . . are familiar with what Judge Cardozo described as 'the tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic.' A military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own image.

In fact, as we have seen, what the United States actually did does not require emasculation of the Charter to justify it. President Kennedy and his advisers had a better understanding, even of the legal issues, than have some international lawyers and some "friends" of the United Nations who have sought to justify the action. The President recognized, apparently, that to read Article 51 as permitting the unilateral use of force merely because another nation achieves some capacity to strike would jeopardize the Charter. He suggested a far more limited extension of the Charter. His action claimed only the right, in order to preserve international stability, to take moderate, non-destructive, revocable measures; and these (and even the limited, more active force which he threatened) he justified because they were taken following authorization by the Organization of American States.

United Nations supporters might still differ about Cuba. Most of them will probably follow President Kennedy's lead including his small extension of the Charter. But no one ought delude himself into thinking that one can "support the United Nations" while jeopardizing its basic advance in international law and the chief purpose of the UN Charter —the outlawing of war for national purposes. The obligation of nations to settle disputes peacefully, and the role of the United Nations in seeing that they do so, must inevitably decline if we expand the right of nations to use force in self-help. One does not support the United Nations by bringing

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back the day of "defensive" wars and "just" wars as each nation sees its needs of defense, its claims of justice.

Doubtless, internationalism—as a recognition of U.S. dependence and interdependence—is no longer open to question, and internationalist policies will inevitably permeate U.S. foreign relations. The wisdom of many internationalist attitudes will continue to be recognized; some of them are inevitable, as even skeptics have learned when they took on the responsibilities of government. In addition, the engagement of U.S. interests and prestige in the cold war, and the passionate desire of ultra-nationalists, even of isolationists, for some undefined "victory"—which might well consist of maintaining or converting attitudes of other nations—will assure substantial internationalism in the years ahead. That other unexplored phenomenon of American politics—isolationism combined with vehement paternalism in the Pacific—will also help assure a more general internationalism, as supporters of action in the Pacific bargain for the support of internationalists.

So far as one can foresee, American internationalism will continue to include support for the United Nations. This support has survived radical transformations in the Organization, and in relations between nations; it will probably not be seriously jeopardized by further change, even emotionally laden events like the seating of Chinese Communist representatives. But the place of the United Nations in U.S. foreign policy is not the article of faith it was in 1945, or even a firm habit acquired since. For those who see in the United Nations an important means toward the major ends of American foreign policy, there are lessons to be learned and applied. We must recognize that internationalism, as reflected in the United Nations, is hardly the common faith of the American citizen; that while he may have the hopes and aspirations and ideals of internationalism, he is not in the habit of its attitudes and is not adjusted to its frustrations. We will have to persuade increasing numbers of citizens that supporting the United Nations is not soft-headed, wild-eyed, long-haired; that it may or may not be idealistic, but is eminently realistic; that it may be principled, but is

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wholly practical; that it is not a subtle form of near-treason, but, on the contrary, the most effective way of promoting American national interest. And we may not be able to count heavily on general "support for the United Nations," but will have to sell every particular measure and program on its merits.

To persuade others we will have to persuade ourselves. To be persuaded we will have to be accurate. In sum, we must understand the United Nations. We will ourselves have to recognize—and insist on—the basic principle of order on which the United Nations rests: force must not be used unilaterally for national purposes except in the extreme, defined, provable emergency of an armed attack. This principle reflects a recognition that war is no longer tolerable, and that other means must be found or developed to adjust relations between states. This obligation is fundamental. On it depend the United Nations, internationalism, world peace, the interests and survival of this nation and of other nations. It is the cornerstone of any rule of law. It cannot be observed by some nations or on some days. If this principle is destroyed or eroded, all hopes for international order will be destroyed or eroded. We will have to understand, too, the United Nations institution, not as it was, but as it is. We will have to judge it not by some faith or theory, but in the acid of national interest, enlightened, in a context of other national interests both common and competing. We will have to see political interests (like those of the United States) and institutions (like the United Nations) not with the eyes of romance and nostalgia, but with the eyes of sober citizens seeking in a real world a society we can contemplate, not with a shudder, but with hope.

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THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF GENERAL DeGAULLE

THE prevailing mood in America today is one of irritation at General Charles de Gaulle, for he has blocked the admission of the United Kingdom to membership in the Common Market, which was in American opinion the next great forward step in achieving an effective Atlantic Community. Also under de Gaulle, France has been falling far short of fulfilling her commitments to NATO and has refused to support the Treaty limiting nuclear testing. His recent speeches proclaim a policy of independence, almost isolationism, for France.

Irritation is not confined to this country. Paul Henri Spaak, the much respected former Secretary-General of NATO and now Belgian Foreign Minister, has said with respect to General de Gaulle's press conference of January 14:

> It becomes clearer and clearer that January 14, 1963, is fated to go down in history as the 'black Monday' of both European policy and Atlantic policy. What occurred that day was something much more significant than the mere dooming of negotiations between Great Britain and the European Community. It was, in plain fact, an attack on the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community—an attack, that is, on the two most significant achievements of the free world since the end of the Second World War.[1]

While their public utterances have generally been discreet, ministers of state of many European countries, as well as U. S. officials, have spent sleepless nights wondering what can be done about General de Gaulle.

One proposal has been called that of the "empty chair." Since cohesive action of the Atlantic countries is so essential, why don't the other countries go ahead without France, leaving the French chair empty, when she does not wish to take part? That may sound like good bargaining practice, and in some cases perhaps it can and should be done. But

[1] *Foreign Affairs,* XLIV (1963), 611.

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from the point of view of creating an effective Atlantic Community, it offers no real solution. For France is a key country in Europe. NATO headquarters and many military installations and lines of communication are there. Her position in trade and finance is central, even more so since the establishment of the Common Market.

One should recognize also that de Gaulle is the authentic spokesman for the spirit of nationalism everywhere, which the movement for Western unity has to face and, in the long run, to convert. It is an unhappy turn of fate that the chief spokesman for this restrictive point of view is a person of such character and force, and of such great achievement.

To the thousands who have been asking, "What manner of man is this," the answer is becoming vividly clear. Actually it has been there for anyone to read in the three volumes of his own *Mémoires de Guerre*. He shares with Winston Churchill great facility of expression, richness of language, and clarity of thought. His speeches are brilliantly effective, delivered without text or notes.

In the very first page of his *Mémoires* he reveals the driving force of his life: his intense devotion to his country:

> All my life, I have created for myself a certain image of France, inspired as much by sentiment as by reason. I have pictured France as the Princess in a fairy tale or the Madonna of a fresco, dedicated to a high and unusual destiny. Instinctively, I feel that Providence has created France for extraordinary achievement or unique woes.
>
> If her action was ever marked by mediocrity, that was to me an absurd anomaly due to mistakes of Frenchmen, and not to the true spirit of France herself.
>
> But I am deeply convinced that France cannot be truly herself except in a front rank position, for only vast enterprises can fuse the French people into joint action despite their seething tendencies for dispersion. No matter how other countries may conduct themselves, France, being what she is, must keep her gaze high and carry herself erect to save herself from mortal danger. France is not France without her grandeur.
>
> That faith in France has grown with me. My father, a man of thought, of culture, of tradition, was impregnated with the sentiment of the dignity of France. He revealed its his-

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tory to me. My mother felt an overwhelming passion for France, equal to her religious piety. My three brothers, my sister, and I, myself, had by second nature a kind of anxious pride in our country.

Parallel to his faith in France has been General de Gaulle's faith in his own ability to head his country. This personal confidence sustained him during the war, in his uphill struggle against great odds to keep a French military force in being and to maintain French influence in Allied counsels. It appears strikingly in his memoirs in the account of his retirement as Chief of State in January 1946, when political opposition blocked him from carrying out the program he felt essential for French recovery. He believed that he was destined to be called back to power when France's need became sufficiently great. History seems certainly to have fulfilled his belief.

I

When this happened in May 1958, I was living in Paris as U. S. Representative on the NATO Council, and I wrote out a summary of what happened in those stirring days and months. I quote from it here in the hope that it may bring back something of the flavor of those events, which are so easy to forget as the scene shifts:

> When the Russian psychological offensive struck in 1957 (Sputnik and the Russian demand for a Summit meeting), France was the weakest point in the Western Alliance. Weighed down by the struggle in Algeria, she was unable to fulfill her military obligations to the Alliance; this was very serious in view of her pivotal position.
>
> Weakened by inflation and political instability, she was losing her gold and dollar reserves at a rate of over one billion dollars a year—and was seeking loans to keep going. The movement for a stronger and more integrated European economy was jeopardized by doubts whether France could meet her commitments in putting the Common Market into effect in January 1959.
>
> In backing a reasonable settlement of the quarrel with Tunisia, the Gaillard Government was thrown into the discard and followed by stop-gap efforts.
>
> The struggle in Algeria meanwhile was going from bad to worse, and, in the confusion, powerful military elements

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started taking things into their own hands. Committees of 'Public Safety' were formed. On the left, Socialists and Communists threatened joining in a popular front to be supported by strikes and uprising. The Paratroopers under Colonel Massu staged a 'dry run' invasion of Corsica. The country was on the brink of civil war.

Paris waited in anxiety—not knowing which day the 'Paras' might descend, followed by street barricades and bloodshed. Twenty thousand extra police were brought into Paris from the rest of the country, and patrolled the streets with tommy guns. There were some 'demonstrations,' and more were dreaded.

This was the scene to which General de Gaulle was recalled by the French Senate and Assembly at the unprecedented urging of President Coty. Backed by the armed forces, unwanted by the politicians, personally disliked by many, General de Gaulle still was recognized throughout France (usually with a resigned bow to fate) as the one man who could save France and bring order out of the Algerian tragedy.

In a few skillful and powerful moves, all within the legal and constitutional framework, he became the master of the situation. The Assembly granted him full powers, and then at his behest, adjourned! The spectre of civil war which had been only hours away on that historic day in May, began to recede.

Step by step since then, France has moved from its weakness towards a position of strength.

1. A new constitution has been written and [in a referendum] adopted by an unprecedented 80% vote in a vast outpouring of citizens.
2. The quarrel with Tunisia has been settled.
3. The African colonies have been given a chance to vote for independence. All but one stayed with France [at that time].
4. Algeria has been given a new and generous framework for existence—and the rebellion has at least been slowed down.
5. The Army has been withdrawn from its equivocal position on the Committees of Public Safety.
6. The drain of gold and dollars has stopped with restored confidence in the franc.
7. Elections are being held for a new Assembly in which it is clear that Communist influence will be greatly reduced.

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> All of this General de Gaulle has managed with extraordinary political skill, through a direct personal appeal to the people. Skeptical, disillusioned France is responding with fervent patriotism. A strong France is again a possibility; and that is the greatest present need of the Western Alliance.

This is an unvarnished record of those critical months. Harder to convey are the human reactions which went with the events: the anxieties of early 1958, when the fear of civil war was omnipresent; the relief as one step after another was crowned with success; the restoration of the morale of the people as patriotic pride was restored.

The events that followed are of more recent memory. The Algerian problem did not yield easily to treatment but has gradually been brought toward a more successful conclusion than most had dared hope, though not at all the conclusion that the military wanted, and expected, from de Gaulle. The African colonies finally voted for their independence, and have received it under conditions which kept most of them closely related to the French economy and culture. While they struggle to develop their own resources they are still supported by generous aid from France.

The hope for French economic recovery has been more than fulfilled. France is prosperous, stable, and solvent. The franc is strong, the gold and foreign exchange reserves of France are over four billion dollars, and foreign debt has been largely repaid. The economic planning program begun as the Monnet Plan, to which General de Gaulle gave his blessing as chief of government in 1946, continues in vigor.

To sum up, France, as a result of de Gaulle, is no longer a weak link in the NATO Alliance; she is strong, and this strengthening of France is an enormously important fact for the Alliance, though its importance is clouded today by doubts as to the relation of France to the Alliance.

Against this background there seem to be three principal questions we ought to think about in trying to reach a conclusion as to the whole picture and where present trends are taking us.

II

De Gaulle has been a great leader, and today he makes the important decisions of the French government, but is de

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Gaulle France? He is indubitably the spokesman for a substantial area of French opinion, but not by any means for all. France is still a democracy of free thought, and very jealous of remaining so.

To one living in France, there are evidences on every hand of the force of public opinion. It was vigorously expressed in the debates of the French Assembly on the *Force de Frappe* in 1959 and 1960. Today it appears in frank criticism of the regime both in the press and elsewhere. The dispute over the rising cost of living and proposed remedies is vocal and bitter. That General de Gaulle recognizes this is demonstrated by his incessant trips to the provinces to present his views directly to the people and maintain their continued support.

The brilliant recovery of France in the past five years has certainly been led by de Gaulle, but he did not work alone. I should like to testify to the presence in France of other able and public-spirited leaders. I think of Antoine Pinay, who as Minister of Finance sparked the austere economic recovery program with the aid of Wilfrid Baumgartner, Governor of the Bank of France and later Minister of Finance. I think of the devoted labors of the late Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet who jointly worked up the idea of the Common Market; of Jacques Rueff, who helped make the economic plan effective; and of the many highly competent civil servants who have so often saved the State from the blunders of the politicians.

It seems to me significant that the International Monetary Fund has just chosen as its executive director, to succeed the unique Per Jacobsson, Pierre Paul Schweitzer, Deputy Governor of the Bank of France and before that a member of the Finance Ministry. He was selected as the best man available for this influential post. I should add that in the affairs of the Fund, as in monetary affairs generally, France has been an effective and cooperative member.

I think of these people when the critical question is raised, "What will become of France after de Gaulle?" For France has its able leaders, who, under the new constitution, will have a better chance than before to make democracy work in France. Beside the new constitution, there is the less tangible but nevertheless real restoration of French morale and

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courage, and this will give strength to the country's future leadership.

III

That brings us back to the point where we started. How much have de Gaulle's actions blocked the stream of international cooperation? My own belief is that while the check is serious, it can be overcome. I base this belief largely on the evidence that the current of international cooperation in the Atlantic Community is today so broad and deep and powerful that it can flow around this obstacle.

A good illustration of this happened as long ago as 1954 in connection with the EDC. Following the creation of NATO in 1949, and a consequent full review of European defense needs, it became clear that a German contribution of armed forces was essential. To bring this about, without arousing fear among certain Allies and suspicion beyond the iron curtain, the EDC plan was devised. Under this plan, units of German forces were to be incorporated in larger Allied commands, thus avoiding any autonomous build-up of large German units. This plan was devised by the French. It was vigorously supported by the United States, by the United Kingdom, and others, only to be voted down by the French Assembly! This created a serious impasse, because the need for action was urgent.

What happened? Allied statesmen went to work and found another way to accomplish the purpose. First the mechanism of the WEU (Western European Union) was used to define by treaty certain limitations to the German military build-up, and then Germany was taken into NATO as a full member. This was certainly a more lasting solution because it faced up to, instead of dodging, the issue of accepting Germany into the Alliance. Thus the stream of international cooperation flowed on with only a brief interruption.

There have been other occasions, in the growth of the Atlantic Community and its various organs, when apparent deadlocks due to differing national interests, or prejudices, have been overcome by goodwill and ingenuity.

Admittedly the present setback is one of the most difficult that has arisen. It lies at the very heart of the movement to

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give wider scope to the beneficent principles of the European Economic Community. But many good men are working to find a solution, and already there is one spot of light at the end of the tunnel: the agreement to use the structure of the WEU as a regular meeting ground for the ministers of the Common Market with British representatives.

This move itself illustrates the number of channels which are now in existence for actual and potential cooperation. Despite the obstacles, progress is being made, step by step in many fields. Let me illustrate:

In NATO the infrastructure (the joint program for common services of communications, transportation, and logistics) is going steadily forward. Joint research and production and supply of improved weapons are moving ahead. The exchange of information and joint use of training facilities are improving. Scientific cooperation is broadening in scope. More important still, the NATO Council is conducting searching examinations of all proposals for future possible steps toward agreements with the Soviet.

In the twenty-one-nation OECD there is effective progress in joint programs for assistance to less developed countries; its Working Party Number Three devoted to financial cooperation is helpful in searching for solutions to balance of payments problems, including that of the United States. A number of important practical steps have resulted.

The EEC, while held up in one direction, is going ahead with its scheduled program of tariff reductions among the six (including France), has concluded associate relationships with Greece and Turkey, and is continuing to make one arrangement after another for extending benefits to certain African countries. It is persistently hammering away at the recalcitrant agricultural questions.

GATT with offices in Geneva, is today the center for active discussions on trade problems in preparation for what is termed the "Kennedy Round" of negotiations next year. The Trade Bill passed by the United States Congress last year has opened the way for a wide series

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of negotiations among the fifty members of GATT for reductions of tariffs as a stimulus to world trade. The American team under Christian Herter is vigorously at work in preliminary explorations both here and abroad.

These are only some of the many channels open for progress in international cooperation. They are evidence that the forward movement has not stopped because General de Gaulle has vetoed the admission of the United Kingdom into the Common Market.

Since the end of World War II the West has taken giant strides in many forms of cooperative effort usually in response to specific and pressing needs, and particularly in response to the terrible threat from the East.

IV

Today two things are happening which should give us pause for thought. The first is that *needs* appear to be less pressing: Europe has made an astounding economic recovery, but even more important, the threat from the East is less ominous; with the conclusion of the Treaty limiting nuclear testing, Russian military offensive action in Europe is less and less credible. The second point is that in the movement for coordination of policy, the easier things having been done, the next steps will be harder and will run afoul of more deeply imbedded selfish and national interests. To illustrate:

The admission of the United Kingdom to the Common Market involved just this sort of difficulty; it required more difficult adjustments than had been necessary among the more homogeneous Six. A further step involves the politics of agriculture, which no country on earth has yet solved satisfactorily for itself, let alone for its relations abroad. The "Chicken War" is a perfect case in point.

As another example, NATO has become increasingly concerned with adapting its strategy to nuclear weapons, a job more difficult than the management of traditional land armies.

Today's challenge is to get these highly difficult things done in the more relaxed international atmosphere of "détente."

General de Gaulle's opposition to further steps toward

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"integration," and the foregoing inherent difficulties, limit the amount of progress that can be made now in changing the administrative machinery of the Atlantic Community. This is not a propitious time for launching vast new projects for Atlantic organizations, or even for structural amendments. The present appears rather to be a time to consolidate the advances already made, to use more effectively the existing machinery of international cooperation. Indeed there are already in operation the mechanisms through which much more could be done by common effort to strengthen the military, economic, and political power of the West and raise the standard of living of its people. We have the mechanisms; we need the will to use them as vigorously and persistently as circumstances allow—in the hope that in time the powerful current of cooperation will dredge its way around the rocks of opposition.

V

This brings us to the great underlying political and psychological question: whether or not in France and elsewhere intense national patriotism, such as that which motivates General de Gaulle, can be expanded to a broader loyalty to the Atlantic Community.

Logic and reason say "yes," because it has become clear that our countries, by themselves, cannot prosper, or even survive, in today's world. But, unfortunately, there is another force to reckon with besides logic and reason—sentiment, which becomes especially powerful when it involves national patriotism. General de Gaulle, for instance, has admitted, as we have seen, that his patriotism is as much a matter of sentiment as of reason.

In the establishment of the United States, our forefathers faced something of this problem, but not as acutely, because our first thirteen states had not been long in existence, and loyalties to them were young and not very cohesive. But as we Americans look back over our history, we can see how events and wise leadership nourished our patriotism for the *United* States.

George Washington repeatedly recognized this problem. In 1783 he listed among his "pillars of independence":

> The prevalence of that pacific and friendly Disposition,

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> among the People of the United States, which will induce them to forget their local prejudices and policies, to make those mutual concessions which are requisite to the general prosperity, and, in some instances, to sacrifice their individual advantages to the interest of the Community.

So a new, wider patriotism for the Atlantic Community cannot be taken for granted just because it is logical and reasonable—and indeed necessary. It cannot be created overnight, nor even in twenty years. It needs to be nourished by leadership, by education, by contacts, and above all by successful experience, until patriotic people in all the countries of the Alliance, not only realize with their minds, but feel with their hearts, that the greater good for their own country requires the wider association and allegiance to the Atlantic Community.

This overriding principle has been simply and clearly expressed by a distinguished Frenchman in rejecting the de Gaulle thesis of independence. André François Poncet concludes an article in *Le Figaro* of October 4, 1963, as follows:

> Faced with a problematic and heavily clouded future, the greatest assurance lies in having sure friends and being a sure friend to them. True independence consists in choosing freely those on whom to depend and adhering faithfully to that choice.

W. RANDOLPH BURGESS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

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WAR COMES TO THE NETHERLANDS: SEPTEMBER 1939–MAY 1940

I

HITLER's decision to attack the Netherlands was part of a larger decision, which involved the offensive in the West. This larger decision came forth during September 1939. In the midst of the Polish campaign Hitler made up his mind that the attack on France should be mounted immediately after the defeat of the Poles. He evidently had not expected that his attack on Poland would provoke the British and French sufficiently for them to launch a large-scale attack on Germany. A break of diplomatic relations, economic sanctions, and perhaps a perfunctory declaration of war would—he thought—constitute the sole reaction to his first military venture. Anticipating continued Allied "bluffing," Hitler risked the temporary exposure of his Western Front, where approximately thirty-four mediocre German divisions faced some eighty-four French divisions during the Polish campaign.

It is not entirely clear why Hitler found it desirable at that moment to break the promising quiet of the "phony war." An analysis of the materials gathered by Jacobsen [1] leads to the conclusion that among his motives the dominant must have related to the state of military imbalance. During the fall of 1939 Hitler was so impressed by German military predominance that he felt "as it were constrained [*geradezu gezwungen*]" for that very reason to attack the Allies as soon as possible. Any delay might enable the Allies to improve on their "mess [*Schlamperei*]." Hitler persuaded himself that Allied "intransigence," as evidenced by the declaration of war of September 3, would make another Munich unlikely. Only a military defeat would bring "reason" to London and Paris—a defeat requiring German transit rights and bases in Holland and Belgium. In addition, despite his quite justifiable faith in his own military supremacy, Hitler

[1] H. A. Jacobsen, *Fall Gelb—der Kampf um den deutschen Operationsplan zur Westoffensive 1940* (Wiesbaden, 1957); H. A. Jacobsen (ed.), *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Westfeldzuges 1939–1940* (Berlin-Frankfurt, 1956).

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at the same time displayed considerable anxiety about the possibility of an Allied advance through the Low Countries into the Ruhr, his "Achilles' heel." In order to protect Germany's outlying industrial center, the occupation as soon as possible of as much as possible of Belgian and Dutch territory would be essential.[2]

In Nazi Germany the power of decision on war and peace was the *Führer*'s. Yet, the army, as "the sole body in . . . Germany that had known how to keep itself organizationally free from party interference," [3] was sufficiently indispensable to be able to pursue a variety of delaying tactics. The army did not want an immediate attack in the west. For political reasons, involving desperate maneuvering with regard to the internal balance in the Nazi state and the future of Germany, army circles preferred to postpone, or altogether avoid, full-scale war with the Allies. For military reasons they were against the offensive on the assumption that German forces would not be at their peak before the spring of 1940. As General Franz Halder, chief of the general staff of the army, confided to his diary, no high officer believed that an attack in the west could be a decisive success if launched in the fall of 1939. For example, an army group commander in the west, General W. von Leeb, addressed a memorandum to the high command of the army in which he cited the general desire for peace among Germans, condemned the prospective violation of Dutch and Belgian neutrality, and doubted Germany's ability to inflict an all-out defeat on France and Great

2 Hitler's motivations can be culled from such sources as his *Befehlsausgabe* of September 27, 1939, reported in the *Kriegstagebuch der Abteilung L (OKW)*; also, from his *Denkschrift* of October 9, 1939, a lengthy memorandum read to the service chiefs the next day. Both documents are cited in Jacobsen, *Fall Gelb*, 8–9, 12–23. Further insights can be obtained from Hitler's statements during the *Befehlsempfang* in his chancellery on November 23, 1939. (*Ibid.*, 59–64.)

As A. J. P. Taylor observed, "when Hitler talked to his generals, he talked for effect, not to reveal the workings of his mind." Since he knew only too well that the army distrusted him, his arguments often served to impress and frighten the generals. (A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* [New York, 1962], 250.) Accordingly, occasions like the *Befehlsempfang* must be treated very cautiously. Yet, Wheeler-Bennett found that in the October 9 memorandum Hitler gave his reasons for the western attack "with remarkably clear perception of the military strategic considerations." (J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power—the Germany Army in Politics, 1918–1945* [New York, 1954], 464.)

3 F. Neumann, *Behemoth* (New York, 1944), 382.

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Britain. On November 5, 1939, one hour before Hitler had to reach a final decision on the attack he had planned for November 12, the commander-in-chief of the army, General W. von Brauchitsch, called on him to describe the "deplorable" state of preparedness of the army.[4]

A tug of war about the date of attack evolved between the *Führer* and his reluctant military experts in the army high command. Hitler's decision-making became more individualistic than ever, and the army had to obtain information by way of the back door, through Hitler's military aides. As Gerhard Weinberg has observed, the high command of the army in those days did not know what military plans Hitler and his staff were working on, and vice versa.[5] Moreover, in the words of a German general, "several of Hitler's initiatives and decisions were not based on objective argument, but were intended to make clear to the high command that he and nobody but he was issuing orders." [6] As the army kept clamoring for delays, a serious crisis developed in October–November 1939 between an enraged Hitler and the military. Hitler considered the dismissal of von Brauchitsch, but no successor of a more agreeable frame of mind occurred to him among the Reichswehr generals upon whom he was dependent.[7]

The *Führer* finally decided to stage a mass "command reception" to resolve the "crisis of confidence" once and for all. On November 23, 1939, some two hundred officers were granted what Hitler called, an "insight into his world of thought." Among the features of his ninety-minute address were the reminder that Germany's military rebirth would

[4] Jacobsen, *Fall Gelb*, 10–13, 45–46.

[5] G. Weinberg, "Der deutsche Entschluss zum Angriff auf die Sowjetunion," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, I (1953), 307. For example, Hitler had told an aide on September 12, 1939, that immediately after the Polish victory he would launch an all-out attack against France. This was the first intimation of action in the west, and the "excited" aide immediately began to relay the news through various unofficial channels. Yet, only on September 25 did this information penetrate to the high command of the army, even though high army commanders had talked to the *Führer* on the very day of September 12. The official statement on the attack was given to the army only on September 27. (Jacobsen, *Fall Gelb*, 6–8.)

[6] H. Meier-Welcker, "Der Entschluss zum Anhalten der deutschen Panzertruppen in Flandern 1940," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, II (1954), 289; cf. Jacobsen, *Fall Gelb*, 9.

[7] *Ibid.*, 46–49.

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have been impossible without the Nazi party and the claim that his successful decisions had always been opposed; the doubters had always been more numerous than the believers.[8] After the "command reception" Hitler severely scolded von Brauchitsch and Halder in a private audience. Von Brauchitsch offered to resign, but this was refused. Tension was to remain at a high pitch until the spring of 1940, when victorious operations patched over the differences between the *Führer* and his generals.

The position of the army was unenviable. Old-fashioned Prussian gentlemen were being ordered by an upstart, who was their chief of state, to plan an attack which many considered politically unwise and militarily unsound, if not immoral. This caused doubts and even conflicts of conscience which led von Brauchitsch and Halder to talk about the elimination of Hitler. If the German army had been raised in the Balkans, Halder wrote afterwards, it would have attempted his assassination in 1939 or 1940. Halder depicted these months as a "ghastly and tormenting experience" in a psychological milieu which could not possibly be reconstructed for those who were not in the opposition role at the time. In order to support the army high command against Hitler, the three army group commanders in the west—Generals von Leeb, von Runstedt, and von Bock—met on November 9, 1939, without, however, being able to reach a common ground on opposition. The upshot was that the generals' opposition of 1939–1940 made itself felt chiefly through a variety of delaying tactics.[9] Operational plans were not finished in time, directives were sent in late, estimates about the morale of troops or the state of logistics were unduly pessimistic, and weather prognoses were never favorable. These tactics did contribute to delay Hitler, but they did not make him change his mind about the attack in the west.[10] As the spring of 1940 approached, army resistance diminished.

Hitler had not paid close attention to strategy in the west

8 The *Befehlsempfang*, as resurrected from various sources, is described by Jacobsen. (*Ibid.*, 59–64.)

9 The failures of the more activist army conspirators in this period are related by Wheeler-Bennett, 466–472.

10 Jacobsen, *Fall Gelb*, 25–26, 45–50.

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before his decision to attack there. Until the middle of October 1939, the German army's operational plan in the west was purely defensive. When a complete offensive plan was first produced by an uncooperative high command on October 19, 1939, it had amounted to an "unimaginative improvisation." [11] Hitler was quite aware of this insufficiency and on October 30, 1939, surprised his military advisers with the suggestion that the attack against France should feature an armored thrust through the Ardennes. This inventive "*Führer*-thought" was relayed to the high command of the army and far from enthusiastically received there. At approximately the same time General E. von Manstein—the "operations genius"—began to peddle his plan of attack to the high command, which also contained an armored *Schwerpunkt* (point of principal attack) through the Ardennes. While von Brauchitsch and Halder maintained their hostile attitude toward these plans throughout the winter, Hitler and von Manstein consulted behind their backs in February 1940 and discovered the similarities in their independently arrived at strategic inventions. A few days later, on February 18, Hitler imposed the Ardennes *Schwerpunkt* on the high command as the official strategy. This decision prepared the ground for the *Blitz* victory of 1940, since it directed the major German punch to the weakest part of the French defenses. Von Brauchitsch and Halder finally gave up their delaying efforts and devoted their considerable organizational talents to translating the Hitler-von Manstein idea into solid operational strategy.[12]

The decision to attack in the west had immediate consequences for the Netherlands. Successive German plans, from September 27, 1939, onward, all involved the violation of Dutch territory to a lesser or greater extent. Holland's century and more of peaceful neutrality was evidently coming to an end.[13] A preliminary plan, of September 27, 1939, called

[11] *Ibid.*, 2, 4, 32, 266–267.

[12] *Ibid.*, 51–52, 66, 69, 112–113, 116, 118, 147–149.

[13] As early as 1934 Hitler reportedly declared that he would require additional "space," including Flanders and Holland, to make Germany independent of any potential constellation directed against her. He boasted then that he would be able to push through to the Dutch coast "in less than eight hours." (H. Rauschning, *Hitler m'a dit* [Paris, 1939], 143–144, as quoted by C. T. de Jong, "L'attaque allemande sur la Hollande en 1940," *Revue*

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for an offensive through the southernmost tip of Holland, near Maastricht—with the hope, however, of a "political" solution which would make unnecessary formal German administration of any Dutch territory. The first *Plan Gelb* (the code name for the western offensive) of October 19, 1939, involved the occupation of all of Holland after a frontal attack on the Grebbe Line, the closest Dutch approximation to the Maginot Line. However, a few days later, about October 22, Hitler again seemed to favor a "political" solution without formal occupation. The second *Plan Gelb,* issued on October 29 and revised on November 4, mentioned only territory in the Maastricht area. On November 15, after extensive pressure by the *Luftwaffe,* a special "Holland-directive" was issued, in which the army was ordered to prepare with a minimum of forces for the occupation of a considerable portion of Holland—at least up to the Grebbe Line, but perhaps including the heart of the country, the "Fortress Holland." On January 17, 1940, Hitler revised the strategy with regard to Holland for the last time, and most drastically. The occupation of all of Holland was ordered, not with the two reserve divisions and the horse-cavalry brigade allocated previously to this sector, but with at least seven first-rate divisions. A most ingenious *Schwerpunkt* was devised, involving an armored thrust south of the Rhine and Maas rivers which would bypass the Grebbe Line. At about the same time Hitler decided that his most daring and most personal strategic invention, the unprecedented dropping of two air-borne divisions far behind the front, would take place in the very center of Holland—around The Hague and the bridges of Rotterdam, Dordrecht, and the Moerdijk. An armored division would race through the *Schwerpunkt* to relieve the air-borne divisions within two or three days, thus cutting off the center of Holland from any potential allied effort. Therefore, from the preliminary proposal of "non-occupational" occupation of the Maastricht area, the Dutch campaign developed into a spectacular showpiece of Hitler-

d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale, VI [1955], 2.) In a *Luftwaffe* document of August 25, 1938, Holland was considered a vital base against the Allies and the army was urged to prepare an attack against Holland. On May 23, 1939, Hitler told armed forces leaders that Holland and Belgium were the first defense zone of the Ruhr and would have to be occupied immediately if the Allies were to "intervene" in the war against Poland. (*Ibid.,* 2–3.)

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ian *Blitz* tactics, second only to the Ardennes-Sedan-Channel thrust by the bulk of the German army. Moreover, with the destruction of the heart of Rotterdam the *Luftwaffe* was to provide a major demonstration of aerial bombardment against urban populations, still very much a novelty in May 1940.[14]

While the high command, after von Brauchitsch's and Halder's initial opposition efforts, was settling down to the preparation of the new campaigns, the center of military resistance shifted to Colonel Hans Oster, deputy chief of German counterintelligence—"*ein Mann nach dem Herzen Gottes* [a man such as God meant men to be]," as one of the German resistance leaders described him.[15] Oster was not satisfied with mere delaying tactics, but had reached the conclusion that he could serve his country best by revealing military information to Germany's opponents. Thus, he took the full consequence of an anti-Hitlerian position and devoted his energies to promoting the failure of Germany's aggressive moves, and this at a time when ultimate German defeat was not generally expected. Such uncommon qualities in a Prussian officer had developed in a man whose spiritual home was said to be the Wilhelminian empire, whose personal loyalty had remained with William II. It is perhaps significant that Oster decided to play his "treacherous" role in favor primarily of the nation which had granted refuge to William II in 1918,[16] and whose neutrality was now to be violated by Hitler as a matter of "no consequence."[17]

Oster's key contact was his old friend, the then Major G. J. Sas, the Dutch military attaché in Berlin. Sas had been stationed in Berlin in 1936–1937, and was appointed for a second tour in March 1939, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Relations between the two officers had already been close in

14 Jacobsen, *Fall Gelb*, 8–9, 28, 38, 42, 54–57, 104–105, 161–165.

15 Fabian von Schlabrendorff, as quoted in Wheeler-Bennett, 472. According to Gerhard Ritter, Oster was "the soul of the military resistance," imbued with a fanatic anti-Nazi attitude dating back to the pre-1933 period. (Gerhard Ritter, *Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung* [Stuttgart, 1955], 183.)

16 This point was made by J. Vanwelkenhuyzen, "Die Niederlande und der 'Alarm' im Januar 1940," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, VIII (1960), 22.

17 Words used by Hitler during the *Befehlsempfang* of November 23, 1939. (Jacobsen, *Fall Gelb*, 62.)

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1936, with political undertones. For example, Sas had smuggled to him from Holland Hermann Rauschning's vehemently anti-Nazi book, *Die Revolution des Nihilismus,* at Oster's urgent request. As Wheeler-Bennett noted, "to Sas, Oster talked with a freedom and confidence which he gave to few, even within the ranks of his fellow conspirators. . . ." [18]

Immediately upon Sas' return to Berlin, in March 1939, Oster voiced his belief that war was inevitable. During the Polish campaign he revealed that the invasion of Belgium was being prepared by the operations division. Shortly thereafter came these fateful words: "My dear friend . . . now it is Holland's turn too." [19] On November 7, 1939, Sas—just back from a short trip to The Hague—found a note at his hotel from Oster, who asked for an immediate meeting. At lunch that day Oster told Sas that the Germans would attack Holland on November 12. Hitler cancelled the attack at the last minute, and this Oster also reported. From then on, Oster relayed to Sas every tentative date set for the attack on Holland as soon as it became known to him, including the final one in May 1940. In January he even managed to inform Sas about the final German strategy for the Dutch campaign, with the *Schwerpunkt* south of the big rivers and the rapid thrust aimed at Rotterdam.[20] On April 3, 1940, Oster announced that an invasion of Denmark and Norway would

18 Wheeler-Bennett, 495.

19 *Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940–1945* (The Hague, 1949–1956), Ic, pp. 208–209. (Hereafter referred to as *Enq.*)

The parliamentary commission which investigated wartime "governmental conduct [*regeringsbeleid*]" on all levels in the occupied country, London, and elsewhere filled nineteen volumes (30,000 pages) with the verbatim reports of the interrogations of 817 witnesses, the reproductions of 780 documents, and its own extensive summaries and conclusions. According to L. de Jong, the director of the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation, governmental affairs have never been so thoroughly investigated by the Dutch parliament. Moreover, "this inquiry provided source materials as lively and intensive as was never before available for any other period in our national history. . . ." On the other hand, de Jong insisted with much justification that the historian must exercise caution in using these unique reports. (L. de Jong, "De verslagen van de parlementaire enquête-commissie 'Regeringsbeleid 1940–1945' en hun waarde als historische bron," *Verslag van de Algemene Vergadering van het Historisch Genootschap* [1958], 26–57.) In the words of another Dutch historian, the reports represent "a gold mine of data," which, however, has not been mined for primarily historical purposes. (A. J. C. Rüter, *Rijden en Staken* [The Hague, 1960], VII.)

20 *Enq.,* Ic, pp. 209, 254.

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take place the following week. Two weeks later, he reported that an armored division was poised for the attack through the Dutch *Schwerpunkt,* and he appears to have mentioned the prospective employment of large numbers of paratroopers. Moreover, he warned Sas on several occasions that the Dutch should be prepared for the immediate blowing up of the Maas bridges, key targets of the offensive. On May 3 Oster revealed the final invasion date, May 10, and during the intervening week he saw Sas almost daily. On the evening of May 9 Oster confirmed that the final orders had been issued to the army at two o'clock that afternoon. The two dined together in a restaurant and then drove to the building housing the high command of the army. Oster went inside to inquire whether the orders had perhaps been retracted again, while Sas waited outside in the dark street. After twenty minutes Oster came out with the dreaded news: "The swine [Hitler] has left for the Western front; the end has really come now." [21] Sas managed one final telephone call to The Hague, virtually in the clear—"Tomorrow morning, at dawn!" [22]

It should be noted that other Germans were of assistance to the Dutch embassy, too. A former foreign office official, retired by the Nazis, frequently reported the same intelligence as Oster, but usually a few days later. Three days before the invasion he put a note into Sas' mail box, warning him that Holland was in immediate and most critical danger. Several still active foreign office officials gave important hints on several occasions.[23]

21 The "swine" actually did not go to the Western Front that night, but to his "eagle's nest" in the Bavarian Alps. (Wheeler-Bennett, 496.)

22 *Enq.*, Ic, pp. 210–213, 627; 2c, p. 559. Oster remained in office until April 1943. Although he had become suspect particularly after Sas' final call to The Hague had been intercepted by the *Gestapo,* army circles succeeded in keeping him out of trouble. He was implicated, however, in the July 20, 1944, affair and on April 9, 1945, he and his chief, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, were strangled to death. (*Enq.*, Ic, p. 213.) According to Gerhard Ritter, Oster's relations with Sas have been the object of "boundless, enraged criticism" even on the part of "otherwise sympathetic" German postwar observers. Ritter himself found Oster's leaks "basically useless," because they could not have been of assistance to the Dutch defense effort—a doubtful assumption by Ritter. (Ritter, 263–265.)

23 *Enq.*, Ic, pp. 625–626; 2c, p. 559. According to H. Rothfels, the former foreign office official was Count A. von Bernstorff, "who had resigned in protest to the regime." (H. Rothfels, *The German Opposition to Hitler* [Hinsdale, Illinois, 1948], 81–82.)

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It is characteristic of the tragedy of the German resistance that Oster's perfect intelligence procurement hardly benefitted the Dutch. For various reasons—high command delaying tactics, his own moods, the weather—Hitler postponed the western attack *twenty-nine* times between November 12, 1939, and May 10, 1940, often at the last minute.[24] As a result, the Dutch, informed by Oster of each proposed date of attack, were in effect "over-warned" and thoroughly confused. Moreover, the Dutch committed blunders in their defensive preparations and failed to apply properly the intelligence at their disposal. Sas' superiors in The Hague would not trust the credibility of a figure like Oster. The more detailed the information relayed by Sas was, the more the reliability of his source (described to Sas' superiors only as a high staff officer) was disputed. Sas was almost recalled from his post when he persisted in vouching for his informant, particularly after reporting that this informant was also planning the assassination of Hitler—and had told him, a foreign attaché, about it. No one could imagine that such a Prussian officer in fact existed. As the German invasion approached, Sas and his *bon traître* were increasingly ridiculed in The Hague.

II

The problems faced by the Netherlands government, as it prepared for the threatening German attack, were more conventional. Internal clashes did take place, but they did not concern basic ideological or foreign policy aims of the nation. Obstructionist or treasonable activities did not occur at the governmental level—and rarely, for that matter, at the non-governmental level.[25] The most serious clash took place between the defense minister and the supreme commander of land and naval forces, largely because of the incompatibility of their personalities. The most heated arguments concerned strategy, more precisely the deployment of ground forces in a defensive situation which hardly permitted workable solutions of any kind. The most delicate dilemma involved the limits of Holland's traditional policy of neutrality,

[24] Jacobsen, *Fall Gelb*, 141.

[25] Cf. L. de Jong, *De Duitse Vijfde Colonne in de Tweede Wereldoorlog* (Arnhem-Amsterdam, 1953).

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a policy which made effective defensive planning with potential allies impossible.

The defense minister in Premier D. J. de Geer's cabinet, which had taken office on August 10, 1939, was a general staff officer, Lt. Col. A. Q. H. Dijxhoorn. This energetic man, who enjoyed a reputation as a strategist, dominated the government in military matters even more than is customary for the specialist ministers in Dutch coalition cabinets. General I. H. Reynders, the supreme commander of land and naval forces—a position filled only in time of crisis, in this case as of August 28, 1939—was far from pleased to take orders from the defense ministry. Minister Dijxhoorn had served under Reynders earlier and at that time had not obtained a much coveted appointment to the directorship of the War College, perhaps because Reynders failed to recommend him. The presence of a powerful yet lower-ranking regular officer as head of the defense ministry was most irritating to the supreme commander. As another Dutch general observed, Reynders felt as if he had a jealous mother-in-law hovering about him.[26] Relations between Dijxhoorn and Reynders became so strained that routine communications between the defense ministry and supreme headquarters were affected.[27] Reynders was offended because the cabinet would not entrust to him discretionary powers in such fields as press censorship, travel restrictions, mobilization of civilian labor, and other matters affecting civilian rights. Finally, after a serious, if confused, argument about deployment of troops, Dijxhoorn provoked Reynders' resignation, effective February 6, 1940. The new supreme commander, retired General H. G. Winkelman, voiced his approval of the defense minister's strategic views before his appointment.[28]

26 *Enq.*, 1c, pp. 1, 110, 129.

27 Note, for example, *Enq.*, 1a, pp. 21–22.

28 *Enq.*, 1a, pp. 24–28, 95–101. Reynders had also managed to become unpopular with the royal house by ordering the "softening" of military news going to the palace, in order that the Queen "would not become so nervous." Prince Bernhard, among others, had been quite upset about this kind of censorship. (*Enq.*, 1a, pp. 89–90; 1c, pp. 219, 390.) In general, the inquiry commission has maintained the strictest secrecy on all matters affecting the royal house, and the Reynders incident constitutes one of the few "slips" in this respect. (Note, especially, Prince Bernhard's reported complaint, as cited in *Enq.*, 1c, p. 390.)

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Bitter disagreements on strategy, mainly between Dijxhoorn and Reynders, undoubtedly affected the Dutch defense posture in 1939–40. The major questions evolved around the location of the lines of main resistance to a German invasion—an Allied attack was not foreseen. North of the Rhine the most solid and most carefully prepared position was at the Grebbe Line (Grebbestelling), while in the southeast, below the Rhine and Maas rivers, the Peel Line (Peel-Raamstelling) had been far less elaborately built up. Without going into the complexities of the respective positions of Dijxhoorn and Reynders with regard to these lines, it must be noted that the inquiry commission concluded in 1949 that in view of the conditions of modern war and the actual strategy employed by the Germans, *any* really effective defense strategy would have required *large-scale* preparatory talks and planning with the Belgians and French. And this, of course, would have been in violation of the century-old Dutch policy of neutrality. Nevertheless, when the Germans launched their attack on May 10, 1940, they accompanied it with a note which accused the Dutch of serious violations of their neutrality policy, particularly with respect to collaboration between the Dutch and Allied-Belgian high commands.[29]

The inquiry commission seemed to deny this charge, mainly on the evidence of the total lack of coordination between Dutch and Allied-Belgian operations after May 10.[30] For example, the Dutch army commander in the southern part of the Netherlands inquired on May 11 how the liaison had been arranged with the French and Belgian forces which, he assumed, were to help in his sector. The Dutch supreme command had to inform him that nothing had been prepared in this respect and that he should improvise liaison wherever possible. He never succeeded in contacting the Belgian

[29] Other accusations in the German note were obviously fallacious, with the exception of those pertaining to the so-called Venlo incident. This incident, in November 1939, consisted of a series of encounters on Dutch soil between British intelligence officers and supposed anti-Nazi German officers, in the presence of a Dutch intelligence officer. The Germans were in fact Nazi agents who succeeded in setting up a trap which enabled them to capture the British officers. The Dutch intelligence chief had to resign as a result of this episode, which certainly involved the Dutch more thoroughly than was justifiable for a neutral nation.

[30] *Enq.*, 2a, p. 28.

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army, although it operated just a few miles away from him. A few French officers showed up intermittently at his headquarters, but they merely represented reconnaissance units on probing missions.[31] To cite another example, no preparations had been made for cooperation with Allied air forces. Thus, British aircraft were not able to land on Dutch airfields after May 10, apparently because Dutch refueling outlets would not fit British planes.[32]

Yet, the transcript of the postwar Dutch interrogations also points to undeniable evidence of actual consultations between the Dutch and French-Belgian military authorities before May 10, 1940. As early as 1937 or 1938 the Dutch intelligence chief talked to the chief of the French general staff, General M. Gamelin, in Paris and was informed that four French divisions would be available to assist the Dutch against a German attack.[33] The inquiry commission itself cited ex-Premier P. Reynaud of France, who wrote that there was an understanding with the Dutch supreme command, apparently in November 1939, pertaining to a French occupation of the Zeeland islands immediately after a German invasion. General Reynders, in a postwar comment, seemed to verify this point, even though he blamed it on an undesirable excess of energy on the part of the Dutch military attaché in Paris.[34] According to Reynders, this attaché was in "continuous" contact with the French general staff and became a kind of "messenger boy" for General Gamelin in the months before the invasion, which perhaps even induced him to leak the contents of a sealed letter deposited at the Dutch embassy in Paris, "to be opened on the day of attack."[35] The military attaché himself told the inquiry commission that he had conducted "a few conversations" with Gamelin, and that the Dutch defense minister as well as the minister of foreign affairs had indicated to him in November 1939 that these contacts were legitimate.[36] Just before the

[31] *Enq.*, 1b, p. 56.

[32] *Enq.*, 2a, p. 29.

[33] *Enq.*, 1c, p. 12.

[34] *Enq.*, 1b, p. 45.

[35] *Enq.*, 1c, p. 16. These sealed letters, describing Dutch defense plans, had been deposited in Paris, London, and Brussels—but not in Berlin. (*Enq.*, 1c, p. 212.)

[36] *Enq.*, 1c, p. 617.

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German invasion, in early April 1940, a high French military authority communicated with General Winkelman on the subject of strategy at the Peel Line, with the Paris attaché again acting as go-between.[37] The chief of operations of the Dutch army, General J. Wilson, recounted his "unofficial" contacts with the Belgian high command in April and May 1940, including a two-day tour through the Peel Line with the Belgian military attaché in The Hague.[38] According to a Belgian historian, this Belgian attaché was the only intermediary between the Belgian and Dutch armies, and maintained particularly close relations with the Dutch supreme commander, possibly without the knowledge of the Dutch cabinet.[39] In fact, the Dutch tried steadily but in vain from February until April 1940 to convince Belgian authorities to connect Belgian defense positions with the Dutch Peel Line, not only through the Belgian attaché in The Hague but also through the Dutch ambassador in Brussels and even through the French high command.[40]

When the inquiry commission asked the two supreme commanders whether these contacts had not in fact constituted violations of neutrality, their answers were quite similar. General Winkelman pointed to the "very odd" position of a military attaché: "He is, after all, nothing but a spy . . . and all countries have accepted this." Yet, military attachés' contacts are never "official," but inherently part of their attaché status. In General Reynders' view, military attachés must always maintain contact, but these contacts are always "non-official."[41] However, the Dutch military attaché in Paris told the inquiry commission that he himself did not

37 According to the inquiry commission, the Dutch told the French at that time that the Peel Line would not be defended for any length of time. However, the French Premier, P. Reynaud, and also General Gamelin wrote after the war that the Dutch had "deceived" the French and upset French strategy by their sudden withdrawal from the Peel Line. (*Enq.*, Ia, pp. 51–53, 61–63; Ib, pp. 42–45, 58; Ic, p. 82.)

38 *Enq.*, Ic, p. 117.

39 Vanwelkenhuyzen, 31.

40 Ministerie van Oorlog, Hoofdkwartier van de Generale Staf, Krijgsgeschiedkundige Afdeling, *Inleiding en algemeen overzicht van de gevechtsdagen van 10–19 Mei 1940* (The Hague, 1957), 49. (Hereafter referred to as *Inleiding*.) Cf., R. van Overstraeten, *Albert I—Léopold III, vingt ans de politique militaire belge, 1920–1940* (Bruges, 1949).

41 *Enq.*, Ic, pp. 16, 71.

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consider his talks with Gamelin quite proper in terms of Holland's neutral position.[42]

It is obvious that Dutch neutrality had its limits. The threat of German attack—communicated by Oster and demonstrated particularly by the Mechelen incident of January 10, 1940 [43]—was too clear, the need for consultation with potential allies too urgent, and the facility of communication through military attachés too readily available. Unfortunately, it must be stated emphatically that these pre-invasion contacts were by no means sufficiently intensive to be of real assistance to the Dutch defensive effort when the German assault began.[44]

III

The German attack on the Netherlands came early on Friday morning, May 10, 1940. General Winkelman submitted his request for capitulation on Tuesday afternoon, May 14. The *Blitzkrieg* was characterized by distinct patterns of events: Dutch intelligence failures, which offset Oster's efforts and ensured the essential element of surprise to the Germans; communications failures at Dutch supreme headquarters and elsewhere in the crucial early morning hours just before and after the attack, which were important for the initial success of the most delicate German operations; and finally, of course, the ineffectiveness of most Dutch defensive operations, particularly in the path of the German *Schwerpunkt*.

From late September or early October 1939, when Oster first revealed to Sas that a German attack on Holland was being prepared, The Hague was fed a continuous fare of

42 *Enq.*, 1c, p. 617.

43 The Mechelen incident resulted in the capture of German documents which seemed to prove the German intention to invade Belgium and Holland. (See below, n. 55.)

44 The Germans themselves tried to induce the Dutch to violate their neutrality. From November or December 1939 until the very eve of the invasion they made several rather clumsy attempts to urge a "Danish" policy on the Dutch, involving transit rights for German troops and "peaceful" occupation of Dutch territory. The Dutch rejected these feelers, without actually being aware to what extent they came from the highest German authorities. (*Enq.*, 1c, pp. 172, 270; 2a, pp. 20–24, 60–61; 2b, pp. 130–131, 136; 2c, p. 287.)

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Oster-Sas dispatches. And, almost from the very beginning, Supreme Commander Reynders refused to pay much attention to them. The invasion alarm of November 12, 1939, was still taken quite seriously and Sas, on a hurried visit to The Hague, was immediately received by the inner circle of the cabinet.[45] But, as this and other "leaked" attack dates were time after time cancelled by Hitler, Reynders became increasingly furious at Sas' "silly chatter" and his even sillier contact, and informed Sas "that he did not believe a word about it."[46] In January 1940, when Sas reported the final German *Schwerpunkt* plan, the Dutch intelligence chief and Reynders apparently discussed this strategy but dismissed it as too risky from the German point of view. This crucially important dispatch was put into Reynders' safe and seems to have been entirely neglected henceforth. Reynders' successor, Winkelman, maintained after the war that he was never told about it.[47] When Sas again mentioned the southern *Schwerpunkt* in a report which arrvied in The Hague two weeks before the actual attack, even this report never reached Winkelman but got lost somewhere "in channels." Four witnesses—including the postwar supreme commander and his intelligence chief—admitted to the inquiry commission that they had seen this particular report somewhere in the supreme headquarters files before May 1940. On the eve of the invasion two telephone calls were made between The Hague and Berlin in which Sas expressed his absolute certainty about the attack. Nevertheless, General Winkelman spent the fateful night in his own residence in a rather dis-

[45] As C. G. de Jong reported, all Western capitals seemed to know about the November 12 date, through Sas but also through such sources as the Italian and Belgian royal houses. (C. G. de Jong, 7.)

[46] *Enq.*, 1c, pp. 209–210.

[47] The intelligence chief admitted to the inquiry commission that he failed to inform Winkelman because he assumed that this was Reynders' duty, and also, he added, because in all armies "the operations division and the intelligence division have always been at odds with one another." Reynders did not remember discussing any such dispatch with the intelligence chief—perhaps, because he had always considered the intelligence chief too "wordy" and tried to work him out of his office as swiftly as possible. In any case, Winkelman claimed that he was first informed about the *Schwerpunkt* intelligence in 1948, by the inquiry commission. Winkelman told the commission that the Germans "invented" their Dutch *Schwerpunkt* in March 1940—being not aware, even at that time, that the Germans adopted this plan on January 17, 1940. (*Enq.*, 1b, pp. 136–137; 1c, pp. 253–254, 492–493.)

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tant suburb without a chauffeur or even a car at his disposal; the chief of operations and the chief of intelligence also went home.[48]

The inquiry commission attempted to find out the reasons for the failure on the part of the Dutch to make effective use of the intelligence procurement by Oster and Sas. Sas himself insisted that "nonchalance," and certainly not treason, was responsible, in addition to the prevailing opinion that he, Sas, had become "more or less neurotic."[49] General Reynders declared that he could simply not imagine that a high German staff officer would behave like Oster.[50] Moreover, Reynders found Sas incredibly tense and even "theatrical"—for example, when before the cabinet he took an oath that the German attack would come, or when he tried to talk to the Queen after finding himself not taken seriously by Reynders and the cabinet.[51] Reynders and others, in fact, suspected a German trap in the Oster leaks, as in the case of the Venlo incident.[52] Also the Dutch intelligence chief felt that Sas' source sounded so utterly "un-German" that he could not be considered reliable.[53]

48 *Enq.*, 1a, p. 111; 1b, pp. 121, 135; 1c, pp. 211–212, 625–628. On May 9, 1940, the Dutch intercepted the following cable from Amsterdam to an American newspaper: "Wise Willies [Germans] whispering bewitching hour Friday [May 10] dawn." (*Enq.*, 1b, pp. 105, 135.)

49 *Enq.*, 1c, pp. 213, 627.

50 The actual extent of disloyalty in Hitler's army during 1939–1940 was, of course, quite incredible. In the high command of the armed forces (OKW) departmental chiefs, such as Canaris (intelligence) and also General G. Thomas (economic and armaments branch), were plotting Hitler's downfall. In the high command of the army (OKH), the commander-in-chief and the chief of the general staff "were cognizant of, if not participant in, subversive conversations and activities . . . and never reported them to security authority." (Wheeler-Bennett, 457.) In fact, it took a long time until Hitler's political police became aware of the army's subversive activities—in a sense, until July 20, 1944. (Cf. *ibid.*, 475.)

51 Reynders stopped him at the palace gate.

52 *Enq.*, 1c, pp. 23, 208. In the same way, Danish official circles had doubted the Oster-Sas warning about the Danish invasion. (W. Hubatsch, *"Weserübung"—die deutsche Besetzung von Dänemark und Norwegen 1940* [Göttingen, 1960], 125.)

53 When the intelligence chief received Sas' final warning on the eve of the attack, he instructed his deputy to make a telephone call to the German air attaché. In the attaché's absence, his wife was asked whether the Germans would attack in the morning—and she denied this "in the most charming manner." Hereafter, the intelligence chief went home, while his deputy

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Two principal factors behind the Dutch intelligence failure must be cited. In the first place, the Dutch were "overwarned" due to the twenty-nine postponements ordered by Hitler.[54] In the second place, as Vanwelkenhuyzen has noted, Dutch intelligence analysis was based on the fundamental assumption, conscious or unconscious, that Holland would again escape the war. The temporary circumstances of World War I which had made the Germans reluctant to attack Holland apparently were elevated into permanent principles of international politics by Reynders *et al.* The intelligence officer's cocky "*Ze komen toch lekker niet*" was characteristic of the Dutch defense establishment's attitude in this period.[55] This attitude must also have played a role in the communications failures which occurred in the early hours of the German attack.

During the night of May 10–11, 1940, Dutch supreme headquarters was rather deserted, in spite of Sas' final warnings. Only the deputy chief of staff, Colonel M. van Alphen, had remained on duty, with some lower ranking officers. At 3 A.M. the first dispatches concerning German army crossings into Dutch territory seem to have reached van Alphen, yet a general alarm for all armed forces apparently was released by supreme headquarters only at 4:15 A.M. While the main German attack started at 3:55 A.M., special assault troops had moved into Holland as early as midnight.[56] The chief of operations, who apparently was to issue such a general alarm, was not called from his residence until after 3:45 A.M. and van Alphen, evidently, did not fill in for him. Also

apparently retired to the Trocadero Café with the typically Dutch exclamation: "*Ze komen toch lekker niet* [they're not coming anyhow]." (*Enq.*, 1b, pp. 121, 127; 1c, pp. 222, 251, 628.)

[54] Jacobsen, *Fall Gelb*, 141.

[55] Vanwelkenhuyzen, 20, 27–28. Note his description of the Mechelen incident of January 10, 1940, and the spreading of the resulting alarm from Belgium to Holland. As in the case of the Sas reports, Reynders did not "believe" in the authenticity of the Mechelen events, and—quite erroneously again—suspected a German trap. While the Belgians behaved as on the eve of invasion, the Dutch played it "cool." (*Ibid.*, 19–20, 29–36.) The Mechelen incident involved a light German plane which lost its way and made an emergency landing in Belgium in the night of January 10–11, 1940. The Belgians captured its two German occupants and authentic documents, partly burnt, containing German plans for the Western Front of the pre-January 17 period. (See also Jacobsen, *Fall Gelb*, 90–98.)

[56] *Inleiding*, 63.

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the air force was not warned immediately, reportedly because it was still too dark for fighter planes to operate. Since van Alphen, a widely respected officer, died before he could be heard by the inquiry commission, the mysterious delays that morning will probably never be explained. An understaffed operations section seems to have been a key factor, and one of the reasons for the understaffing reportedly was the failure to provide cots on which officers could sleep in their offices.[57] Another communications failure affected troops in the so-called Fortress Holland area, the western part of the Netherlands including the cities of Amsterdam, The Hague, and Rotterdam. On the eve of the attack, after Sas' warning, the supreme commander did issue a preliminary alarm to the troops on the German border, but he left it to the discretion of his other field commanders whether to issue the preliminary alarm in their sectors. The commandant of the Fortress Holland did not relay the preliminary alarm, apparently because he did not foresee immediate action in his sector and did not want to fatigue his troops needlessly. Moreover, through an unfortunate coincidence an order from the supreme command had arrived in the evening of May 9 which permitted certain emergency leaves, all of which had been cancelled on May 7.[58] As a result the targets of the two German air-borne divisions, all in the Fortress Holland, were guarded by troops which had not been told about the preliminary alarm and which had received the final alarm needlessly late because of the delay at supreme headquarters. While destruction along the German border had actually been carried out hours before the attack and the first German prisoners were captured around 3 A.M., the troops defending Holland's largest and most strategic bridges were literally overpowered in their beds by the paratroopers at about 5 A.M.[59]

These communications failures were particularly serious because of the tactics which were a feature of the *Blitzkrieg*.

[57] The Dutch army's official account, which was published in 1957, ignores this entire question of delay in communications, apparently on the ground that the exact time of receipt by supreme headquarters of the various messages from the field cannot be accurately determined anymore. (*Ibid.*)

[58] *Ibid.*, 36–37.

[59] *Enq.*, 1a, pp. 112–114; 1c, pp. 396, 528–529. *Inleiding*, 64.

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Hitlerian novelties were to affect the entire five-day war for Holland. Battles took place in widely scattered sectors: at the Grebbe Line; at the Peel Line; at the bridges of Rotterdam, Dordrecht, and the Moerdijk; around the airfields of The Hague and Rotterdam; and on the dike closing off the former Zuider Zee, the Afsluitdijk. In none of these sectors, with the significant exception of the Peel Line, did the Germans have an overwhelming superiority of manpower or even firepower. In most sectors temporary Dutch successes could have occurred, and some did in fact occur. Ultimate Dutch defeat was inevitable since additional German reserves could have been put into action within a few days or weeks, and particularly since the Germans were willing to employ large-scale bombardments of urban targets—in fact at Rotterdam, and by threat at Utrecht and elsewhere. The defeat took place within only five days because in the crucial sector, the *Schwerpunkt* in the south, the Germans were far superior in firepower, armor, and motorized equipment and because in all sectors the seven German divisions were backed by the immense tactical and psychological advantage of a well thought-out *Blitzkrieg* effort. The approximately nine or ten Dutch divisions, on the other hand, were badly trained, rather poorly led, and depended on unimaginative and even careless defensive preparations.

The most amazing German success was the air-borne capture of the two large Moerdijk bridges, the southern gateway to the Fortress Holland and the key link with the Allies. The Moerdijk sector seemed amply defended by two regiments of infantry with supporting artillery, further assisted by several heavy weapons companies whose machine guns were specifically deployed to thwart paratroop landings. No more than four companies of German paratroopers managed to overpower the unalarmed defenders, many of whom were captured in their billets. Moreover, the blowing-up mechanism of the Moerdijk bridges was not of the push-button, automatic type, for which bridges nearer the German border had been given priority. One hour was needed to blow up just one bridge span, and the Germans easily prevented this effort. Even more suprising than the capture of the Moerdijk bridges was the ability of the poorly equipped paratroopers to hold them until the Ninth armored division from

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the southern *Schwerpunkt* arrived in the late afternoon of May 12.[60] The only counterattack, by a Dutch frontier battalion, failed miserably. French armored vehicles were in the neighborhood, after an amazingly quick march through Belgium, but made no real effort in behalf of the bridges.[61] The next large bridge beyond the Moerdijk on the road to Rotterdam was at Dordrecht. A handful of German paratroopers met exceptionally confused defenders there. The Dordrecht commandant apparently used his troops to fight a Dutch battalion which had been sent to recapture the bridge, and later when the armored cars of the German *Schwerpunkt* forces approached, he stopped the Dutch fire on them because he thought that they were French vehicles.[62] The final target of the air-borne attack which had to clear the path to the center of the Fortress Holland were the two Maas bridges at Rotterdam. Some 200 air-borne soldiers, brought by twelve sea planes, captured these bridges and, reinforced later to a total of perhaps 500, held them until the Dutch capitulation against the 6,000 soldiers, mostly supply troops, of the Rotterdam garrison.[63]

The German ground attack on the Peel Line was characterized by a display of more old-fashioned tricks. The cru-

[60] *Ibid.*, 94, 236.

[61] *Enq.*, 1a, pp. 139–143; 1b, p. 172; 1c, pp. 155, 303–308, 322, 364–365, 488; 2a, pp. 56–57. On the French effort, cf. R. Villate, "L'entrée des Français en Belgique et en Hollande en Mai 1940," *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, III (1953), 60–76. Villate blames the Dutch for not permitting proper liaison and for generally poor tactics. In an earlier book, Lerecouvreux criticized the planning of the entire French effort in Holland, but mentioned one abortive attempt by French reconnaissance vehicles to regain the bridge. (M. Lerecouvreux, *L'armée Giraud en Hollande* [Paris, 1951], 51, 165.) The French commanding general, Giraud, apparently considered the general situation too threatening to mount a serious attack to displace the paratroopers, although Lerecouvreux seems to think that such an attempt would have been feasible. (*Ibid.*, 186, 375.)

[62] This officer had been given the Dordrecht post precisely because it had seemed out of any possible range of attack. He was the brother of Anton Mussert, the Dutch Nazi leader, and his wife was a member of the Nazi party, but no evidence about disloyalty on his part has been discovered. (*Enq.*, 1a, p. 142; 1c, pp. 310, 488, 542. Cf. L. de Jong, *De Duitse Vijfde Colonne*, 250.)

[63] *Enq.*, 1a, pp. 134–137; 1c, p. 370. Because of the communications failure at the headquarters of the Fortress Holland, the military commandant of Rotterdam had not received the preliminary alarm of May 9. The Rotterdam police, on the other hand, had been warned through department of justice channels. (*Inleiding*, 44.)

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cial railroad bridge of Gennep was supposed to be captured by an *Abwehr* team, disguised as eight German prisoners of war and three Dutch military policemen. Immediately afterwards, a German armored train was to cross the bridge and proceed into the nearby Peel Line. The team's mission ended in failure, since the strong Dutch bridge detachment took over the "prisoners" and prevented the "military policemen"—apparently not recognized—from doing any harm. The armored train came anyhow and passed, because the defenders initially regarded it as a Dutch train, and, when it was finally recognized as hostile, the non-automatic bridge detonators could not be attached in time. The surprise train rolled into the Peel Line and provided important support for the deep thrust of the Ninth armored division and a motorized SS division along the soft underbelly of the Dutch front.[64] The German ground attack on the Grebbe Line, on the other hand, resulted in the most conventional battle of the Dutch invasion. Two German infantry divisions, including a crack SS regiment, reached the Grebbe Line in the afternoon of May 10 and found four Dutch divisions deployed there. On the morning of May 14, the day of capitulation, they were about to launch their final attack when they noticed that the Dutch had pulled back to the Fortress Holland during the night. The intervening days saw fairly intensive fighting which killed some one thousand Dutch soldiers. Yet, Dutch morale turned out to be weak; numerous soldiers and even officers deserted and not a single counterattack ever really got started. The German troops' effort was also not too impressive in a situation where virtually no armor and little tactical air support was at their disposal, these weapons being reserved for the main thrust in the south.[65]

Another ambitious and imaginative German effort in the Dutch campaign, however, ended with a Dutch success. One German air-borne division—half of the German air-borne potential in the entire western offensive—was to capture the airfield of Rotterdam and three airfields around The Hague. After that, the governmental center of The Hague was to be occupied. The Germans did conquer the Rotterdam air-

[64] *Enq.*, 1b, pp. 181–182; 1c, pp. 324–330, 440, 537. *Inleiding*, 149.

[65] *Enq.*, 1a, pp. 125–133; 1b, pp. 138–139, 167; 1c, pp. 146, 343, 346–347, 418.

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field, but they were defeated near The Hague by the numerically far superior First army corps, the general reserve of the Dutch army, and never had a chance to take over the city. Elite paratroopers were routed by green Dutch soldiers, even though the Dutch were demoralized by unprecedented dive-bombing and general bombardments from the air. About one thousand paratroopers were captured and evacuated to England before the capitulation, while some three hundred German planes were destroyed. It made all the difference that the Dutch were prepared for this particular battle by the German air-borne attack on Oslo airport and the ensuing capture of the city of Oslo. As a result, considerable numbers of troops with heavy weapons and armored cars had been deployed near the Dutch airfields. With their superior firepower these troops managed to wipe out or isolate the lightly armed paratroopers within a few hours after they were dropped.[66] A second Dutch success occurred in the north, where the Germans attempted to enter the Fortress Holland over the Afsluitdijk. Fighting in modern, well fortified positions, numerically inferior Dutch troops held until the capitulation in spite of air and artillery bombardments and a frontal assault.[67]

What conclusions can be reached about the quality of Dutch defensive operations? In a report to von Brauchitsch of March 8, 1940, the commanding general of the German invasion army had predicted that the Dutch would be able to hold the Grebbe Line and fight off the air-borne attacks—provided that "the Dutch do not lose their head altogether." Moreover, he feared that the situation would become very difficult if Allied troops reached the Moerdijk before the German armored thrust, which he thought they would accomplish if they reacted with proper speed.[68] The Dutch, unfortunately, did "lose their heads" at the Moerdijk and

[66] *Inleiding*, 19, 73, 80, 154. *Enq.*, 1a, pp. 118–124; 2a, pp. 80–81; 2c, p. 382. Of course, Dutch army operations at the Grebbe Line and near the big bridges were handicapped by the fact that much of the strategic reserve was engaged in anti-air-borne operations elsewhere. Actually, according to German sources, the troops of the First army corps were fighting a mere two thousand paratroopers, since the remaining five thousand men plus heavy weapons of this air-borne division could not be landed after the initial failure to conquer the airfields around The Hague. (*Inleiding*, 71, 79.)

[67] *Enq.*, 1a, pp. 143–144.

[68] Jacobsen (ed.), *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte*, 114.

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the other bridges, and the abandonment of the Grebbe Line showed up all kinds of internal weaknesses of the army. Moreover, the Allies certainly did not react with proper speed, in any case not in Holland. As a United States military attaché reported from The Hague in May 1940, "Allied assistance to Holland was uncoordinated, ineffectual, and obviously perfunctory." [69] Of course, Anglo-French troops themselves were receiving a terrific beating in the days after May 10 by the main part of the German army, and Holland was their least worry.[70]

IV

While the battle was raging not far from the ministries, the Dutch government was reduced to playing the role of passive spectator and soon was driven into exile without being able to make proper arrangements for capitulation and rule by a foreign occupier.

At 9:15 P.M., on May 9, 1940, Defense Minister Dijxhoorn was told about Sas' call from Berlin which contained the final warning. Taking this information more seriously than many high army officers, he immediately informed General Winkelman and authorized the blowing up of certain bridges and other defensive measures near the German border even before the actual start of the invasion. At 10:30 P.M. Dijxhoorn joined Foreign Minister E. van Kleffens at the latter's residence, where a few other officials were already assembled, including the chief of staff of the army, the secretary-general of foreign affairs, and the director of the Queen's chancellery. Tensely the group wondered whether a German ultimatum would be forthcoming around midnight, as had been the case during the night of the invasion of Norway and Denmark. No ultimatum came. At 2 A.M. Dijxhoorn and several of the others decided to go to their respective offices. At 3 A.M. Dijxhoorn heard waves of planes flying over and at 3:30 A.M. he received the report that two Dutch airfields were being bombed.

[69] *Enq.*, 1b, p. 116.

[70] Note the devastating critique of the Allied effort of May–June 1940 by J. C. Cairns, "Great Britain and the Fall of France—a Study in Allied Disunity," *Journal of Modern History*, XXVII (1955), 365–409. The German *Schwerpunkt* in France produced the armored breakthrough at Sedan on May 13, 1940.

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Dijxhoorn immediately phoned the foreign minister and they agreed that the code-word should be sent to London, Paris, and Brussels. This code-word served to instruct the ambassadors in the three capitals to open the sealed letters deposited there, which contained information about Dutch defense strategy and pleas for assistance.[71] Only after this action, which in fact acknowledged the state of war, did they call the premier, who had spent the night at his residence. A full cabinet meeting was arranged for 5:30 A.M., at the premier's residence. The first item on the agenda was the drafting of a proclamation to the Dutch people in the name of the Queen. It was also decided to send the foreign minister and the minister of colonies to London and Paris to obtain military assistance and to discuss with Allied statesmen questions pertaining to Holland's colonial empire. The two ministers managed to leave in a light seaplane by 9 A.M. on a mission which was to be a complete failure as regards military aid.[72] The cabinet then moved from the premier's residence to the building housing the ministries of economic and social affairs. During the following days the ministers were to remain together in continuous informal session. They all slept "on the job," with the exception of the premier and the minister of education. The incredibly tense and confused cabinet atmosphere of these days is movingly described by, among others, Secretary-General H. Hirschfeld.[73] There were no real decisions to make. Military operations were conducted by supreme headquarters, and General Winkelman merely appeared to give his gloomy reports. The main problems before the cabinet turned out to be, all too soon, the final mode of coping with defeat: Should the royal house and the government go into exile? What governmental authority should remain behind to arrange capitulation and the transition to the rule of the conqueror? No formal decisions were reached on any of these questions.

Communication between the royal house and the cabinet was not always effective during the days of battle. Possibly

[71] By 4:15 A.M., the secretary-general of foreign affairs had the Dutch ambassador in London on the phone. Unfortunately, he had forgotten the code-word, so—as a substitute—the ambassador asked him for the name of his (the secretary-general's) youngest daughter. (*Enq.*, 2c, p. 666.)

[72] *Enq.*, 1c, p. 292; 2a, pp. 63, 68–69.

[73] *Enq.*, 2a, pp. 366–367.

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on May 11, the second day of the invasion, but in any case by May 12, the cabinet discussed the necessity of the royal family's departure. The Queen, however, desired no cabinet interference whatsoever with the movements of Crown Princess Juliana and her family, and felt that her own departure should take place, if at all, only after the advice of both the cabinet and the supreme commander. Princess Juliana, Prince Bernhard, and their children left for England on the evening of May 12, without the knowledge of the cabinet, and after an adventurous trip in an armored car of the Netherlands Bank through areas still partially held by German paratroopers. In the early morning of May 13, the day before the capitulation, the Queen decided to leave The Hague after the urging of both the defense minister and the supreme commander. Surrounded by officers with drawn pistols, she drove through territory still potentially infested with paratroopers and boarded a British destroyer at Hoek van Holland. Only at sea did the Queen decide to go to England, and not to the Zeeland islands where the Dutch army was expected to make its last stand.[74]

The cabinet meeting in the early morning of May 13 was dominated by the threatening collapse of the Dutch defense effort. For hours, that morning, the ministers tried in vain to reach a decision. When they finally left The Hague, at 12:30 P.M., they went by stages, first to the port of Hoek van Holland. It was not until then, it appears, that the final move to England was decided upon. Again, Hirschfeld's description of the departure atmosphere is most revealing.[75] Premier de Geer was wavering until the very end and so nervous that he hardly managed to dial a number on the telephone. Two ministers did not leave The Hague at first, refusing the trip to Hoek van Holland mainly because of the bad impression which a "flight" of the government would create. A desperate call by the premier changed their mind in the last minute, and the complete cabinet sailed for London, also on a British destroyer, in the late evening of May 13. The ministers had specifically agreed not to take their wives and children along, so as not to look like "safety-minded emigrants." This decision constituted a consider-

[74] *Enq.*, 2a, pp. 64–66, 86–88, 92–93; 2c, pp. 75, 266–267.

[75] *Enq.*, 2c, p. 368.

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able personal sacrifice, a separation of more than five years from their families.[76] Unfortunately, the cabinet also did not take along even the most essential civil servants and no documents except a few code-books. Although numerous Dutchmen, including, for example, the chief of staff of the army and the commanding officer of the navy, at the time considered the cabinet's departure an act of cowardice, the inquiry commission termed it a historic and most admirable decision for the survival of the Netherlands.[77]

The government did not find much time for the problems of governmental authority which were bound to arise in Holland after its departure. From Hoek van Holland the supreme commander was given rather vague instructions on how to end the war, and several ministers apparently felt that the secretaries-general automatically would assume certain powers in their respective departments in the absence of the ministers. However, the last two ministers to leave decided on a more formal transfer of power just before they themselves departed from The Hague. Without instructions from the Queen or premier, they "handed over" civil and military jurisdiction to General Winkelman before the hastily assembled body of secretaries-general and announced that the latter would henceforth receive their orders from the general. In England the two ministers informally mentioned their action to the Queen and the rest of the cabinet, and everybody seemed to approve. However, no formal cabinet decision or royal decree ever came forth in this matter. Thus, Winkelman's "rule" was based on a last minute improvisation on the part of two ministers.[78]

Equally abrupt was the cabinet's treatment of parliament.

[76] *Enq.*, 2a, pp. 97–99, 103–109; 2c, pp. 89, 117. On the other hand, certain intelligence officers and ministry of justice officials were permitted to leave with their families because their names had appeared on a captured German list of "violently" anti-Nazi Dutchmen. (*Enq.*, 2c, p. 436.)

[77] *Enq.*, 2a, pp. 109, 262; 2c, pp. 89, 374. In France a bitter dispute developed in June 1940 between the army and the cabinet concerning the desirability of the government's going into exile. The French army won out with its preference for a "total armistice." (Cf. L. Marin, "Gouvernement et commandement—conflicts, différends, immixtions qui ont pesé sur l'armistice de Juin 1940," *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, III (1952), 1–28.)

[78] In the inquiry commission's words, "every care was taken to act as improperly as possible." (*Enq.*, 2a, pp. 111–113; 2c, pp. 120, 153.)

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A regularly scheduled meeting of the Second Chamber was to be held in the afternoon of May 10, the day of the invasion. Since no quorum could be secured, the thirty-eight members present heard a short address by the presiding officer and disbanded. No member of the government was in attendance. There was no contact between the cabinet and the parliament during the hectic days of war, and the presiding officer of the Second Chamber was informed about the cabinet's departure merely by a letter from the secretary-general of the ministry of the interior. The inquiry commission felt that the government should have attempted to collaborate as closely as possible with the parliament to demonstrate the unity of the Dutch nation. The commission also suggested that it might have been wise to take a representative part of the parliament along to London.[79]

Supreme Commander Winkelman's "rule" began in the evening of May 13, after the cabinet had boarded the British destroyer. A last-minute instruction, phoned from the quay, ordered him "to continue the struggle to the utmost," but, significantly, "with avoidance of unnecessary sacrifices." [80] It developed that his surrender decision was far from automatic and involved unforeseen dilemmas relating to all-out bombardment of cities. Moreover, the general did in fact assume significant civil and military powers, after the capitulation, which were to last until the arrival of the German civilian regime on May 29.

By the morning of May 14 the defense situation was extremely critical on many fronts. To make matters worse, the army commandant of Rotterdam informed Winkelman at 10:30 A.M. that he had received a German ultimatum. If the city would not surrender within two hours, it would be subjected to massive bombardment from the air. Winkelman refused the ultimatum on the grounds that it was written on a mere scrap of paper, not properly signed and com-

[79] The Belgian parliament, on the day of invasion, adopted several emergency decrees for war and occupation after a lengthy session attended by the cabinet. The Norwegian government received formal powers from its parliament before going into exile. However, the Belgians had the experiences of World War I at their disposal, and the Norwegian campaign lasted for almost two months before the government was forced to leave the country. (*Enq.*, 2a, pp. 72–77; 2b, pp. 152–154; 2c, pp. 526–527.)

[80] *Enq.*, 2a, p. 107.

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posed in peculiar idiom ("in een raar taaltje"), half German, half Dutch. However, he promised that he would seriously consider a more official looking ultimatum. The refusal message was brougt to the rendezvous point, a captured Rotterdam bridge, at 12:15 P.M. and a German emissary accepted it at 12:35 P.M., five minutes after the ultimatum had expired. At 1:20 P.M. a new, more proper ultimatum was delivered by the Germans, which was to expire three hours later. At about the same time, a similar ultimatum with regard to the city of Utrecht reached Winkelman. Then, at 1:30 P.M.—ten minutes later!—the large-scale bombardment of Rotterdam began.[81]

The resulting destruction of the heart of Holland's third-largest city, with relatively heavy civilian casualties, naturally caused much discussion during and after the war. The commandant of the Dutch forces in Rotterdam told the inquiry commission that the German air force, for reasons of its own, carried out the bombardment although it knew quite well that the second German ultimatum had not expired. The mayor of Rotterdam, on the other hand, blamed Winkelman for delaying his answer to the first ultimatum until the very last minute, and thought that this ultimatum had been technically in accordance with the rules of war. The foreign ministry's legal adviser supported the mayor's position before the inquiry commission; diplomatic custom, he thought, does not frown upon unsigned documents in such circumstances. At the same time, the legal adviser recognized the possibility of a trick—a "Köpenickiade"—on the part of lower German officers, and, anyhow, the German army had been willing to write a second ultimatum. Winkelman's only defense was that he had needed time to reflect on this situation of a quite unprecedented nature. The commission emphasized that the real German intentions in the affair would probably never be known and admitted that it had no final answers on the subject of aerial blackmail against cities.[82]

Winkelman surrendered Rotterdam after the bombard-

81 *Enq.*, 2a, pp. 121–122.

82 *Enq.*, 2a, pp. 122–126, 133–134; 2c, p. 468. Note the conflicting analyses by H. A. Jacobsen, "Der deutsche Luftangriff auf Rotterdam," *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, VIII (May 1958), and by J. L. Hartog, "Het Bombardement van Rotterdam op 14 Mei 1940," *De Gids* (April 1959).

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ment, between 3 P.M. and 4 P.M. Then, having received the Utrecht ultimatum and having been informed about the French army's decision to leave Dutch soil, he decided at approximately 5 P.M. that the capitulation of Netherlands armed forces—not including the overseas contingents—could no longer be delayed. To effectuate the capitulation Winkelman teletyped all field commanders to send an emissary to the respective German commandant in each sector. Winkelman also sent an emissary to the German ambassador, who had been interned in a hotel in The Hague, and shortly after 7 P.M. the Dutch radio carried the capitulation statement. At 5 A.M. the next morning, May 15, a German emissary appeared at Winkelman's headquarters and instructed him to be at the Rotterdam bridge at 8:20 A.M. There, surrounded by the smouldering ruins of the doomed city, he signed the formal surrender after obtaining some minor concessions from the Germans.[83]

From May 15 until May 29 Winkelman continued to "rule" with the official consent of the German army. He issued various orders to the secretaries-general and the demobilizing armed forces, and even appointed new secretaries-general, including a "non-Aryan." [84] Although the German ambassador and the German army apparently attempted to keep civil rule in the hands of the Dutch authorities, one of Hitler's lieutenants, the Austrian A. Seyss-Inquart, took over civil jurisdiction as "Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands Territories" on May 29. As Winkelman stepped down, he instructed the secretaries-general to remain in their posts. He permitted them to attend Seyss-Inquart's inauguration—but not the ensuing luncheon—on the condition that nothing derogatory would be said there about the Queen or about Dutch prewar neutrality policies. This condition was accepted by the Germans. For weeks Winkelman continued to give behind-the-scenes advice to Dutch civil servants. He defined what was improper economic collaboration and again told high officials not to dine with Germans. As late as June 27, 1940, he issued a statement in which he pointed out "er-

[83] *Enq.*, 2a, pp. 126–127; 2c, p. 103.

[84] *Enq.*, 2c, p. 175. The "non-Aryan," Dr. H. Hirschfeld, had already been secretary-general of one ministry; Winkelman gave him a second ministry. Note Winkelman's view of his own powers in *Enq.*, 2a, p. 116.

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rors" in a speech by Seyss-Inquart with respect to the "flight" of the cabinet and the causes of the Rotterdam bombardment. Such statements were circularized throughout the Netherlands through regular departmental channels, to the great chagrin of Seyss-Inquart.[85]

While the supreme commander conducted himself in such exemplary fashion, the Queen and cabinet began their exile in England. After a last telephone conversation between the foreign minister in London and his secretary-general in The Hague—carried out, strangely enough, a few hours after the capitulation [86]—all official communication with the Netherlands ceased. The government, at least in retrospect, had gone into exile for several excellent reasons: to keep the Germans from exploiting its presence in the occupied country; to rule over the non-occupied portions of the Netherlands in Asia and the Western Hemisphere; to organize the remaining Dutch military potential in coordination with the Allied war effort (the greatest part of the Dutch navy and merchant marine, large capital resources, and a few troops had escaped); and finally, to secure the Netherlands adequate representation at the peace table.[87]

Conditions were quite difficult in London initially. A typical "emigrants-milieu" prevailed, with all kinds of problems facing middle-aged and elderly men suddenly separated from their families in strange surroundings. The ministers sat around their hotel lobby "discussing governmental affairs." There were no facilities during these early days at the Grosvenor Hotel; correspondence and decrees had to be put on hotel stationery, and there was no copy of the Constitution and not even a "Fruintje," the Dutch legal code. It was fortunate that a Dutch business establishment, the large Unilever branch in London, was able to provide administrative assistance after a while.

More serious were doubts about prospects in the war. After many decades of neutrality, the exiles suddenly had to become part of a wartime alliance, an alliance on the brink of defeat. Defeatism was rampant among all the exile governments in London that summer. Premier de Geer could only

85 *Enq.*, 2a, pp. 142–144; 2b, pp. 163–164; 2c, pp. 105, 174–175, 369–370.

86 *Enq.*, 2c, p. 69.

87 *Enq.*, 2a, p. 115.

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foresee centuries of German hegemony in Europe—and in consequence spectacularly defected back to occupied Holland via Lisbon. Defense Minister Dijxhoorn provided "crystal-clear" proof to his colleagues that the Allies would have to lose the war. In August 1940 a majority of the cabinet, despairing of the British cause, voted to move the government to the Dutch East Indies. This was vetoed by the Queen, partly for climatic reasons. Defeatism began to disappear only after the Battle of Britain and after P. Gerbrandy—"*le petit* Clémenceau," as Churchill called him—replaced de Geer as premier. The Gerbrandy appointment was particularly favored by Queen Wilhelmina, whose determined faith in Allied victory contributed considerably to making the Dutch Government-in-Exile a respected body in London.[88]

War came to the Netherlands because Hitler considered Dutch territory essential to his campaign in the west. The final German plan of attack, of January 17, 1940, was imaginative and involved strong forces, which, however, were numerically inferior to the Dutch. The Germans were further handicapped by the obstructionist tactics of the generals and particularly by the unprecedented activities of Colonel Oster. If Dutch defense preparations had been reasonably adequate, there might have been a chance for a partial, temporary success—holding at the Grebbe Line and at the Moerdijk and the other bridges.

The inadequacy of the Dutch defense effort had many causes. The prevailing mood in Western democracies during the thirties discouraged military build-up and strategic thinking to an extent that must have been a great stimulus to Hitler's expansionist schemes, and this mood was especially evident in the Netherlands where no war had been fought in more than a century. Also, traditions of neutrality were strong enough in Holland to make effective collaboration with allies impossible, although these traditions did not prevent preliminary talks and exchanges of information (which may have been more provocative than useful). The crucial

88 *Enq.*, 1a, pp. 192, 195; 2a, pp. 152–156; 2c, p. 256. According to one minister, the Queen was so confident and strong-minded in the face of her at first defeatist cabinet that the proper constitutional relationship between monarch and cabinet was upset thereby. Dr. L. de Jong made this same point even more emphatically. (*Enq.*, 2c, pp. 163, 413.)

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winter months of 1939–1940 were not fully exploited to catch up on defense lags, partly because the bitterness of the Dijxhoorn-Reynders clash prevented wholehearted adoption of a definitive defense strategy. Equally unexploited was the windfall of the Oster-Sas dispatches, a failure which is explained by the underlying Dutch belief that "it cannot happen here" and by the odd circumstances of Oster's leaks. Hitler was probably not aware how confusing his delays were to Dutch intelligence and Oster was certainly not playing a double game. Yet, in view of the experiences of the Venlo incident it is not altogether surprising that the credibility of Sas' *bon traître* diminished as the number of postponed attacks increased. Finally, the communications failures during the night of May 9–10 illustrated again how unexpected the invasion still was and how unrealistically the Dutch military had anticipated the battle.

In spite of these many failures, the Queen and the cabinet, in the midst of the confusion of rapidly approaching defeat, did reach the proper decision on the supremely delicate question of exile. Moreover, the hastily improvised transfer of powers to the supreme commander and the secretaries-general turned out to be workable, as Winkelman and the top civil servants attempted valiantly to save what could be saved. In any case, even if the coming of war found the Netherlands sadly unprepared, the five long years of occupation were to demonstrate convincingly how a society can develop unforeseen reservoirs of physical and spiritual strength to sustain a sudden blow.

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AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND THE USSR IN THE GREEK ARENA, 1944–1947 *

IF we choose American foreign policy as the main point of focus, and view it from the Greek vantage point, the diplomacy preceding the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine can be most meaningfully summed up in four phases stretching from 1944 to March 1947.

During this period, it should be noted, Greece served as a testing ground for Great Power cooperation and non-cooperation, as a laboratory for several international experiments, some of which were tried out later elsewhere, in Vietnam, Laos, and the Congo, for instance. Thus, after that small peninsular state—part Mediterranean, part Balkan—became the object of a sort of sphere of influence arrangement,[1] attempts were made, under American auspices, to deal with Greece under a system of Great Power concert,[2] and this approach was reverted to, later in the game, by the communists who proposed neutralization of Greece under a Great Power guarantee. Also featured in the process were the maintenance, by one of the Great Powers concerned, of token troops in the target arena; economic and financial support and advice, together with recommendations for reforms; cooperation of one Great Power in the reorganization of the armed forces of Greece; and naval movements.[3] Other features—then rather novel, now familiar—at times characterized the situation: limited warfare by stimulation of subversion and revolution; a challenge to the monopoly of the coercive

* The author is indebted to the American Philosophical Society's Penrose Fund and to Columbia University for the funds that enabled him to carry out the required research in the archives of the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Royal Hellenic Embassies in Washington, London, and Paris, as well as to consult political personalities involved in the process summarized in this article.

1 S. G. Xydis, "The Secret Anglo-Soviet Agreement on the Balkans of October, 1944," *Journal of Central European Affairs,* XV (1955), 248–71.

2 S. G. Xydis, "The Yalta Declaration in Greece," *American Slavic and East European Review,* XX (1961), 6–24.

3 S. G. Xydis, "The Genesis of the Sixth Fleet," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings,* LXXXIV (1958), 41–50.

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power of the target small state; irregular warfare that involved providing arms to the guerrilla groups; the "privileged sanctuary"; moral support of these groups through international broadcasting and the press.

Finally, three times in 1946, the "Greek Question" served to test Great Power unanimity in the newborn United Nations and the efficacy of that organization as an instrument for settling international disputes and as a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of the common ends subscribed to in the Charter. The debates in the Security Council revealed the extent to which the United Nations could be used for symbolic warfare, for promotion of state interests, and for the expansion of influence and control or maintenance of the *status quo* by one Great Power against another or by a small power against neighboring states enjoying the support of another Great Power.

PHASE I (1944)

The first of the four phases leading to the Truman Doctrine started out against a background of United States recognition—shortly after Pearl Harbor—of Britain's primary responsibility in the Mediterranean Theater of war operations, hence in Greek affairs as well. Lend-Lease, furnished to Greece only from mid-1942 on, was channeled mainly through the British. Before Pearl Harbor, the United States was hampered by the neutrality legislation from taking any action to aid Greece.

British paramountcy in Greek affairs started out unilaterally, through the guarantee of April 13, 1939, and then assumed a bilateral character with the Anglo-Greek wartime alliance of March 9, 1942. Throughout the war it was the British Government that furnished support both to the Greek Government-in-Exile and the resistance groups in Greece.

Insuring that the relationship with Britain would continue after the war was one of the objectives pursued but not reached by the Greek Government-in-Exile during this phase. In Greece itself, the communist-led resistance group of the National Liberation Front (EAM) started challenging its pro-Western opponents in Greece, especially after Stalingrad and El Alamein.

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As for the U.S.S.R., until mid-1941 it was inhibited by the Nazi-Soviet pact from taking any active interest in Greek affairs, though early that year the Communist party of Greece (KKE) had sought to bring the U.S.S.R. into the balance for a mediated peace between Greece and Fascist Italy. Then, after Hitler's attack, the U.S.S.R. was primarily preoccupied with dealing with the aggressor until the tide of war started turning in its favor. By early 1944, the U.S.S.R., whose armies were about to descend into the Balkans, started challenging the British position in Greece. Soviets and communists criticized the British role in Greek affairs and attempted to undermine, intimidate, and overthrow the Government-in-Exile and to set up another one in Greece proper that would be under communist control via the EAM.

Responding to this challenge as well as to pleas on the part of the exile government, Britain proposed to the U.S.S.R. an arrangement for defining respective spheres in the Balkans, with British paramountcy maintained in Greece. The U.S.S.R. assented in principle but inquired what were the views of the United States with regard to such an arrangement.

Militarily indifferent to the entire Balkan and east European region, the United States showed no desire to take part in any understanding of this sort. It deplored the British-Soviet procedure under study and proposed the establishment of consultative machinery. Finally, however, it acquiesced in the conclusion of a British-Soviet arrangement, stressing that it should be only for the duration of the war and should be tried out for a period of three months.

No British-Soviet agreement followed immediately and, shortly after the United States assent, the U.S.S.R., in an ambiguous move, recalled its ambassador to the Greek Government-in-Exile and sent a military mission to join the resistance forces in Greece. Nevertheless, this did not result in a corresponding rise of Soviet activities in Greek affairs or in a diminution of the British position in Greece. On the contrary, the communist and allied groups decided to participate in a new Greek government set up in Egypt, and their irregular forces subordinated themselves to British command. Finally, early in October, British troops, in a token force, landed in Greece.

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The Churchill-Stalin agreement on the Balkans, reached at Moscow, October 9, 1944, defined in percentages their respective spheres of strategic and political responsibility in the Balkans, although without a clearly defined duration. Greece remained within the British sphere.

In December 1944, however, the communist uprising in Greece put to the test Britain's determination to preserve even this limited Balkan foothold. Churchill ordered energetic action to maintain it. The U.S.S.R., *qua* government, stayed neutral. So did the United States, for about three weeks. It then reverted to support of the British in their efforts to reach a political settlement of the revolt. In Greece itself, both pro-Western and pro-Communist elements agreed on the need for internationally supervised electoral processes to decide the future constitution and government. The December revolt, however, prevented political, financial, and economic stabilization and recovery.

Thus the first phase of the interplay of Great Power policies concerning Greece came to a close with the paramountcy of Britain over Greece still recognized by the U.S.S.R., but only for the time being.

At this stage of United States abstention from Balkan affairs, the U.S.S.R. got by far the best of the Balkan bargain: potential control over an area of 280,000 square miles in central and southeastern Europe with a population of about 38 million (Yugoslavia and Albania are included in these figures). Britain, on the other hand, maintained its position in Greece with its prewar territory of about 50,000 square miles restored and its population of about 7 million.

PHASE II (1945)

The second phase started out with the United States awakening, as it were, to the alarming prospects of British-Soviet "power politics" in Europe, of which the communist revolt in Greece was but one shocking symptom. Through the Yalta Declaration on the liberated countries of Europe, it signified its intention to step into the picture, at least until some sort of equilibrium and normalcy was restored in Europe. It hoped to ensure concerted action of the Big

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Three for the recovery of the war-torn continent both economically and politically.

By subscribing to the Yalta Declaration, Britain and the U.S.S.R. recognized in principle the legitimacy of America's interest in European affairs. The U.S.S.R., however, opposed the idea of Big Three supervision of elections in the liberated countries of Europe as a means of implementing the agreement. And in spite of the Yalta Declaration, neither Britain nor the U.S.S.R. considered that this Three-Power instrument had invalidated their agreement of October 1944 concerning the Balkans. The U.S.S.R. consolidated its hold over Rumania, in spite of United States protests. Britain rejected a United States proposal for setting up in Greece a Three-Power economic mission, arguing, in effect, that this would entail the extension of Soviet political influence into that country.

With V-E Day approaching, the U.S.S.R. again rejected Britain's proposal of late April for joint Big Three supervision of the electoral processes in Greece. Concurrently, there were signs that the U.S.S.R. not only was averse to seeing the Yalta Declaration applied but that it regarded the Churchill-Stalin agreement of October 9, 1944, as a purely wartime expedient, not a tacit sphere of influence arrangement of longer, even postwar, validity. This suggested it would withdraw its recognition of British paramountcy in Greece.

After V-E Day Britain turned to the United States with the same proposal it had made to the U.S.S.R. The United States, then studying means for implementing the Yalta Declaration, felt that in the part of the world that centered around Greece it should play the role of an "active mediator" between the other two Great Powers, reorient its policy toward Greece, and demonstrate in this manner its determination to play in the postwar world an international role commensurate with its strength and commitments. Accordingly, it agreed with the British proposal. It also decided to furnish an Export-Import Bank credit to Greece. The Greek Government agreed to the proposed international procedure concerning elections and was apprised of the United States intention to provide a loan.

At the Potsdam Conference, the United States, as Britain

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had done before, invited the U.S.S.R. to participate in supervising or observing the elections in Greece; but the U.S.S.R., for the third time, rejected the invitation and came up instead with charges that Greece was pursuing policies that were a threat to peace.

In spite of the Soviet refusal to act in concert with the other two powers, the United States and Britain (joined by France) went ahead with the plan for implementing the Yalta Declaration. Thus, for a very particular purpose, and jointly with two other powers, the United States made its debut on the Greek scene, while the U.S.S.R., *qua* government, remained outside the picture.

On the other hand, partly because of Soviet refusal to act in concert with Britain and the United States, an American proposal for a Big Three investigation of incidents said to have occurred on the Greek-Yugoslav border shortly before the Potsdam Conference was not realized.

By December 1945, Soviet war by proxy against Greece and Britain-in-Greece was in the making. The Politburo of the KKE resolved to organize a guerrilla force in the mountain areas of Greece. The reappearance of the U.S.S.R. on the Greek scene, with the appointment of a Soviet Ambassador to Athens, accompanied this decision. The Soviet policy of trying to oust Britain from the only non-communist country in the Balkans had now reached a point of no return. In the pursuit of its objective, the U.S.S.R. found most valuable, first, the legacy of political, social, and economic disintegration that Nazi Germany had bequeathed to Greece; and, second, the traditional rivalries between the Balkan states which were also inspired by the zeal of communist neophytes who were eager to give moral and material assistance to the policy of the U.S.S.R. toward Greece.

But by now, too, firmly convinced that the U.S.S.R. was out to get Greece—and Turkey—into its orbit, United States policy hardened in opposition. The first United States naval visit to Athens, in December 1945, was one portent. Another was the granting of an Export-Import Bank credit of $25 million, with the publicized implication of more to come, if economic and political stabilization were achieved. The United States also offered expert advice.

On its side, Britain sought to devise means for the eco-

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nomic and financial stabilization of Greece, with American officials attending the Anglo-Greek conversations. The result of this effort, which proved to be the last major one of Britain to bolster Greece and maintain its own position there, was the Anglo-Greek Convention of January 24, 1946, dealing with various economic and financial matters but containing no agreed solution as to the respective contributions of the two governments to the upkeep of the Greek armed forces.

By the end of this second phase, the Great Power struggle for Greece was on, with Britain maintaining its presence, with the United States starting to take certain measures of its own in support of Greece, and with the U.S.S.R. trying to undermine both British presence and British and American efforts to bolster Greece, with the aim of substituting Soviet hegemony for Britain's—before effective intervention on the part of the United States.

PHASE III (January to August 1946)

When the U.S.S.R. charged before the UN Security Council late in January 1946 that the presence of British troops in Greece was no longer necessary and constituted a potential threat to world peace, it publicly challenged British paramountcy in that country and at the same time denounced in effect the Churchill-Stalin agreement of October 1944, which it had disregarded since the end of the war in Europe.

Britain rejected the Soviet charge as absurd. The United States did not support the Soviet contention and upheld the British presence in Greece, albeit lukewarmly. The Security Council did not call for the withdrawal of the British troops from that country.

Concurrently, the United States set up a naval force in the Mediterranean. The goodwill visit to Athens of the battleship *Missouri* in April, a decision made public early the previous month, symbolized the growing interest of the United States in Greece and focused the attention of the Greek people on this interest and the power that lay behind it.

The internationally-observed Greek elections of March 31, 1946, revealed that the pro-Soviet and communist groups in Greece constituted a minority among the Greek people.

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They brought to an end British, American, and French action aimed at implementing the Yalta Declaration in Greece, although an Allied mission remained in Greece to help in the revision of the electoral registers.

The U.S.S.R. refused to accept the validity of the international mission's findings on the elections, or to acknowledge the representative character of the Parliament and the legitimacy and authority of the government that emerged from these elections. So did the Communist party of Greece and its allies, who had boycotted the elections.

By this time, communist sedition, decided upon since December 1945, was flaring up in the rural areas especially of northern Greece, challenging from within the new government's authority. Soon, too, there were signs that the northern neighbors of Greece—Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria —were providing a "privileged sanctuary" to the armed bands operating in Greece and were furnishing them material and moral aid. At the same time, in connection with the peace settlements, Bulgaria presented its not unexpected claim to the northern Greek province of Western Thrace.

These attitudes and operations of the U.S.S.R., the Balkan communist regimes, and the Greek communists were accompanied by Soviet army and naval movements in the region up to the Black Sea, by troop movements by Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria along the northern frontiers of Greece, and also by a press and radio campaign directed against Greece, Britain and, since May, against the United States as well.

During this third phase, the Greek government, through Parliament, passed stringent measures against the growing disturbances of public order; pressed for continuation of British sterling support of the armed forces; and sought to promote before the Council of Foreign Ministers and at the Peace Conference the Greek claims for Northern Epirus and a rectification of the Greek-Bulgarian frontier, thus contributing along traditional, pre-communist Balkan lines to the existing tension. Finally, it sought to find out from Britain and the United States what further aid Greece might expect for relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.

Britain, in response to these inquiries, was dilatory on the matter of continued sterling aid to the Greek armed forces

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and expressed reluctance to undertake any further financial and economic commitments. It continued advising recourse to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and certain UN agencies. It also saw no objection to the Greek government's applying to the United States for aid in recovery and reconstruction. The United States, when approached, revealed that it was planning post-UNRRA aid. It, too, advised resort to the International Bank for Reconstruction. It undertook no further commitment, but did not slam the door shut.

Thus, at the end of the third phase, in mid-1946, the position of Greece between the three Great Powers appeared to be in the balance. Britain, although the beneficiary of a substantial United States credit, did not feel at all sure it wished to bear the costs of maintaining its paramountcy in Greece. The United States appeared unprepared to act jointly with Britain in bolstering Greece, much less to take over the responsibilities Britain had exercised until then in Greece. Meanwhile, the Soviet war by proxy against Greece was gathering momentum.

PHASE IV (August 1946–March 1947)

The fourth and final phase of the march toward aid to Greece under the Truman Doctrine began on August 2, 1946, with the announcement of the plan for the novel appearance of American naval-air power in the western Mediterranean, which may have been connected with a not-unexpectable move of the U.S.S.R. in the eastern Mediterranean, the Soviet note of August 7 on the Turkish Straits. During this acute eastern Mediterranean crisis, relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. reached a point where expectations of war in the not-too-remote future accompanied American determination to oppose further Soviet expansion. And, behind the scenes, there were indications of American reluctance to face the costs of blocking the progress of the communists in China.

One paramount result of this new situation was that United States relations with Britain in the eastern Mediterranean became closer. Naturally, so did those of the United States with Greece. This new U.S.-British relationship fea-

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tured American, not British, leadership in countering the pressure of the U.S.S.R. against Turkey and Greece through diplomatic channels, a "war of nerves," and the Ukrainian complaint in the UN Security Council. It also was expressed in renewed public approval by the United States of the presence of British troops in Greece, and in U.S.-British decisions behind the scenes in September to revitalize the Combined Chiefs of Staff of World War II and have it prepare plans of a global character for the contingency of World War III.

In this new setting of Great Power relations, the chief signs made by the United States with regard to Greece outnumbered by far those made in the previous phases. In more or less in chronological order, they were:

(1) Maintenance, together with Britain, of unofficial observers for the Greek plebiscite of September 1.
(2) Naval-air goodwill visits to Greek waters in September and November–December.
(3) A $45 million credit for Greek merchant shipping (the purchase of *Liberty* ships).
(4) "Right to be heard" support of Greece at the Peace Conference in the face of strong Soviet and satellite opposition. Advice to, and procedural support of, the Greek delegation at the Conference, up to a certain point.
(5) Submission to the Peace Conference of a proposal falling short of the Greek demand for a rectification of the Greek-Bulgarian border but also aimed at ensuring the security of Greece on that border by demilitarization of it—in certain respects—on the Bulgarian side.
(6) Moral (verbal) support of Greece in the UN Security Council during the debate on the "Ukrainian Complaint," by the denial of Soviet and Ukrainian charges that the Greek submission of claims at the Peace Conference was evidence of an aggressive intent.
(7) Two army surplus credits additional to the first one of May 1946, bringing the total of such credits to $45 million.
(8) Granting of a short-term loan of $10,800,000 through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
(9) Expressions of willingness to help Greece in the realization of Italian reparations through an Export-Import Bank credit for the purchase of raw materials.
(10) Dispatch of an economic mission to Greece (Porter

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mission) to study the economic and financial situation on the spot.

(11) Statements that the independence and territorial integrity of Greece were of vital interest to the United States, including promises of support even if the UN Security Council were paralyzed by a veto.

(12) For the first time, American initiation of direct advice on Greek political affairs, a British function until then.

(13) Expressions of intent to furnish not only post-UNRRA aid but also general economic aid, as well as support in materiel and supplies of the Greek Army, provided a coalition government were set up.

(14) Advice on the appropriate procedure for requesting aid mentioned in the previous paragraph.

(15) Approval of the transfer to Greece of certain Lend-Lease military supplies originally furnished to Britain.

(16) Submission to the UN Security Council of a resolution for setting up a commission to investigate on the spot frontier incidents and the situation along the northern borders of Greece.

(17) Expression of willingness to furnish military materiel and supplies to the Greek Army through British channels.

While American measures regarding Greece during this phase were following a rising curve, as it were, those of Britain followed a falling one, but with certain exceptions during the height of the crisis at the early stage of this last phase.

These measures consisted of:

(1) Maintenance, together with the United States, of unofficial observers for the Greek plebiscite of September 1.

(2) Continued partial substantive and procedural support of the Greek claims at the peace settlement.

(3) Assumption of the sterling expenses of the Greek armed forces until March 31, 1947, that is, until the end of the Greek Fiscal Year 1946.

(4) Assurances concerning the territorial integrity of Greece.

(5) Continued direct advice on Greek political affairs.

(6) Withdrawal of one British Division from Greece, and statement of intent to reduce by half the last remaining one in Greece.

(7) Naval maneuvers in Greek waters.

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(8) Dilatory action concerning Greek requests for sterling support of a desired increase in the strength of the Greek Army.
(9) Assent to Greek démarches with the United States concerning the army problem.
(10) Advice to the Greek government to address itself to the United States for future aid.

By late summer of 1946, Britain had the impression that the United States had informally agreed to carry part of the financial burden of aid to Greece, and it was aware that the United States regarded the oil resources and strategic location of the Near and Middle East as of vital importance.

Throughout this phase, the U.S.S.R., together with its adherents beyond the Soviet borders, continued its violent verbal political warfare against the United States, Britain, and Greece in various international political forums and through press and radio. Indeed, the Soviet press and radio systematically—and as a warning—sought to denigrate as "imperialism" and "colonialism" the character of American intentions toward Greece. Through its verbal assaults, the U.S.S.R., together with its adherents beyond the Soviet borders, sought to encourage its henchmen in the Balkan and Greek arenas by justifying before world opinion their armed struggle against the Greek government, the legitimacy of which it continued to dispute.

Moreover, at the height of the August crisis in the Mediterranean, the U.S.S.R. recalled its Ambassador from Athens, without, however, severing diplomatic relations. Not until five months later did it send him back to Greece. Altogether, Soviet and communist propaganda throughout the world sought to discredit the Greek Parliament as unrepresentative, and to undermine the authority and prestige of the Greek government as well as its morale and that of the non- and anti-communist political forces in Greece.

At the outset of this fourth and final phase, the U.S.S.R. found itself colliding head on with the United States in the Greek arena, instead of only with Britain as before. The debate on the "Ukrainian Complaint" in September, as compared to the debate on the Soviet recourse to the United Nations in January, demonstrated this clearly. To this novel challenge, the U.S.S.R. responded by vetoing, on September

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20, the United States proposal for setting up a Security Council Commission to examine, on the spot, the incidents along Greece's northern borders.

On its side, the Greek government, as a result of the situation developing in northern Greece, sought to increase the strength of the Greek Army and appealed to the British for sterling support. Moreover, after the FAO report on Greece, the Greek government started a new round of appeals for economic and financial support from Britain and the United States, with growing emphasis on the latter. Concurrently, at the peace settlement, Greece tenaciously pressed forward its claims. So did Bulgaria with its own, as did Yugoslavia in the matter of "Aegean Macedonia" (Greek Macedonia), in what appeared, together with the guerrilla warfare in northern Greece, as a new threat to Greek territorial integrity.

As a result of the external and internal pressures, Greece finally resorted to the UN Security Council in December, compaining, *inter alia,* of the threat to its territorial integrity because of the combined activities of the Greek, Yugoslav, and Albanian communists in, or close to, northern Greece.

The U.S.S.R. by now, however, was not unaware of the "rising curve" of U.S. measures since the great majority of these were public knowledge. Indeed, press reports, denied by the United States, had predicted the disptach of American troops to Greece. The U.S.S.R.'s problem, therefore, was, more than ever before, how to prevent the United States from taking further measures in the Greek arena; how to speed up the growing disengagement of Britain; and how to assist its adherents in Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria in their efforts to overthrow the Greek government and set up a "People's Republic" in the last non-communist country of the Balkans.

To deal with these problems, the U.S.S.R. resorted to a strategy of flexible defense whose tactics were carried out either by itself or by its Balkan adherents:

(1) Late in October, it expressed public opposition to any strengthening of the Greek Army.
(2) In December it acquiesced in a compromise resolution setting up a UN Security Council Commission to investigate the Greek border incidents even on Balkan satellite territory.

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(3) When this Commission was set up, it sought to delay its work and to divert it from the investigation of the border incidents, with the cooperation of its supporters on the Commission. It used this forum, too, for its violent propaganda campaign against the Greek government.

(4) Covertly, on the regional, Balkan plane, the three northern neighbors of Greece, evidently with Soviet approval, continued providing material and moral aid to the communist-led bands active in northern Greece.

(5) On the lowest, local plane, the Greek arena, while communist-led bands intensified their sedition in the rural areas of northern Greece and formally set up their "Democratic Army," in Athens and the urban areas, EAM—the mouthpiece of the Communist party of Greece—proposed the establishment of a neutral Greece within the UN framework, with the withdrawal of foreign troops from Greece, the prohibition of foreign bases there, and constitutional and political measures, the acceptance of which would have led to the desired "People's Republic of Greece."

Final acquiescence of the U.S.S.R. in certain amendments to the peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, and other former satellites of Hitler led to the conclusion of these treaties and juridically closed the question of the Greek claim for a rectification of the Greek-Bulgarian border and of the Bulgarian claim for Western Thrace. The question of the southern border of Albania, on the other hand, remained in suspense. This juridical conclusion of the state of war also brought to a formal end the Anglo-Greek wartime agreement of March 9, 1942.

Meanwhile, the establishment of the UN Commission did not solve the financial, economic, or military problems of Greece for fiscal year 1947. Hence the Greek government made continued efforts to get economic aid from the United States and the Greek Premier visited Washington late in December of 1946. Until the last moment, the Greek government addressed itself to Britain for aid to the Greek armed forces.

In order to prevent the United States from aiding Greece, did the U.S.S.R., in a final effort, put out feelers to Britain for negotiating some agreement about spheres of influence in Europe, with the United States left out of the picture?

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Slender evidence exists of such a new delaying, divisive and diversionary tactic on the eve of the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Britain, however, knew that by now the United States was aware of a vital interest in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Near and Middle East; that the United States—and American public opinion—felt that the U.S.S.R. had long since overstepped the limits of the American policy of forbearance and trust that had reached its zenith late in 1944; and that the United States was determined to put a halt to further Soviet expansion, even at the risk of war.

Hence, on February 21, 1947, Britain, without the knowledge of the Greek government, informed the United States it could no longer bear the burden of aid to Greece (and Turkey) for the fiscal year 1947 starting April 1, and probably for several more years to come, estimating that the United States would step in, take over, and thus "contain" the U.S.S.R. in that part of the world. Britain's estimate proved correct. On February 28, the United States informed Greece it intended to furnish this aid.

Thus, with the Truman Doctrine, the dual Soviet strategy of relaxation and delay in negotiations on the highest level coupled with intensified action on the regional and local communist plane failed to prevent American entrance in the Greek theatre and to bring Greece into the Soviet orbit. For this greater failure, the successes of the U.S.S.R. in the regional and local arena—on the clandestine and subversive plane—were, ironically, largely responsible.

CONCLUSION

The great American decision of 1947 was preceded, from the very eve of the Yalta Conference, by a series of political, economic, and other measures with regard to Greece, which—as far as the United States was concerned—were of a quite insignificant, marginal character, especially when viewed discretely and from the point of view of the Greek diplomatic archives. These measures, however, in their progressive totality, led the United States, imperceptibly perhaps to itself, but quite perceptibly to Britain and the U.S.S.R., into a position that made the decision to aid Greece—and Turkey—wellnigh inevitable.

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Of course, the process summarized here was part of that total global change brought about during World War II and was connected with the problem of the establishment of new conditions for peace. It took place within a world political setting that differed markedly from the prewar period, first, because of the fact that, in response to Nazi Germany's aggression against its European neighbors, the United States and the U.S.S.R. were drawn into the European picture; and, second, because World War II specifically destroyed, among other things, the equilibrium that existed in 1939 with regard to the Great Powers, the Balkans, and the Near East by bringing about the eclipse of three important elements in this prewar equilibrium: Germany, Italy, and France. With the Truman Doctrine the basis was set for a new postwar balance.

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REVIEWS

Anti-Intellectualism in American Life. By RICHARD HOFSTADTER. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1963.—ix, 434, xiii pp. $6.95.

Mr. Hofstadter calls his book "a personal book, whose factual details are organized and dominated by my views," "rather impulsive and by necessity only fragmentary." This is a plea in avoidance he should not make. His study is a serious analysis of an important component of American culture, and he cannot justly by-pass serious criticism. This is too much like Byron's plea that *Hours of Idleness* should be dealt with gently because it was the work of the lighter hours of a young man. Mr. Hofstadter is a scholar and must be taken seriously.

The volume is a compound of lectures given at varying times at six different colleges, a mode that has had an unfortunate effect both on the organization of the study and on Mr. Hofstadter's prose. In previous studies he has written with distinction; the present one is not only heavy and diffuse but suffers from an uncertain distribution of emphasis.

The work falls into five unequal divisions. The introduction and the conclusion define the theme and indicate its present meaning. The intermediate portions sketch the history of anti-intellectualism in religion, politics, business and industry, and education. Most of the study concerns the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The most valuable chapter is the second, in which the author distinguishes between intelligence, or the use of experience, skill, memory, and training for immediate and pragmatic ends; and intellect, or the critical reason. Intelligence is among "the animal virtues"; intellect is not. Intellect "examines, ponders, wonders, theorizes, criticizes, imagines," "looks for the meanings of situations as a whole [wholes?]." Society, he contends, values the intellectual only as he can be used, and is at the same time suspicious of intellectualism. These are valuable distinctions; unfortunately Mr. Hofstadter seems to forget them as his book goes on.

Thus his concluding chapters seem to identify the intellectuals principally with expressive literary persons. Mr. Van Wyck Brooks is, for example, quoted at length; and on pages 430–431 a list of twenty-seven persons, apparently suggested by Marcus Cunliffe, somehow proves the "alienation" of the clerisy. The majority of these are "writers," and among those who are not,

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distinction or peculiarity of style seems to be a component of choice (for example, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Thorstein Veblen, and William James). A list made up, say, of Vannevar Bush, Jerome Bruner, Aaron Copland, I. I. Rabi, Paul Tillich, Marjorie Nicolson, Robert Maynard Hutchins, Sidney Hook, Henry Steele Commager, Father Walter J. Ong, S.J., the staff members of the Astrophysical Observatory of the Smithsonian Institution, and the staff members of the Brookings Institute, all, I suggest, influential members of the "clerisy," would scarcely exhibit "alienation" or suggest it in the same way. It is possible to be so bemused by the vulgarity of the *Reader's Digest* and the vogue of television as to overlook the influence of *Daedalus* and the meaning of some seven Shakespeare festivals in the summer of 1963. I do not see that Mr. Hofstadter's list is anything but partial, and I suggest that the second list represents intellect that "examines, ponders, wonders, theorizes, criticizes, imagines," and also that the second group has considerable influence and that the members of it do not exhibit the self-pity characteristic of literary sensibility. If I have misunderstood Mr. Hofstadter's examples, I am sorry.

But the truth is it is a little difficult to follow Mr. Hofstadter's distinctions or rather his failure to keep his own distinctions. Thus toward the end of his discussion of anti-intellectualism in politics he pictures Teddy Roosevelt (a kind of pseudo-intellectual, I take it) as "rather quick to turn on his intellectual friends for what might have been considered marginal differences of opinion, and to dress himself as a stuffed-shirt Americanist when confronted with heterodox ideas." Mr. Hofstadter has earlier lamented the passage of the gentleman as an influential force in public life. But I am a little troubled to make out the difference between the behavior of President Theodore Roosevelt, who was commonly thought of as a gentleman but whose conduct Mr. Hofstadter apparently identifies as anti-intellectualism, from the behavior of President John Adams, who certainly falls within the range of gentleman-presidents Mr. Hofstadter uses as a base line. "Honest John" also wrapped himself in the toga of true-blue Americanism, distrusted Tom Paine, Gallatin, Priestley, Thomas Cooper, Thomas Jefferson (until late in life), and the Du Pont family, failed to veto the infamous Alien and Sedition acts, and said not only that "we have too many French philosophers already," but also that "learned academies have disorganized the world, and are incompatible with social order."

I think the difficulty is that Mr. Hofstadter has attempted too little and too much. A single study on anti-intellectualism in religion, for example, could have been sound and rewarding.

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Depending for guidance in large degree on William G. McLoughlin's admirable studies of evangelicalism and revivalism, Mr. Hofstadter traces a "revolt against modernity" in religion that runs from the demand for an uneducated ministry in the piney woods through the Scopes trial in Tennessee. So far as he goes, all is well, but his treatment of a complex subject is quite insufficient. He devotes a sketchy six pages to the vast problem of anti-intellectualism in the American Roman Catholic church. The names of Joseph Smith, Brigham Young, the Fox sisters, Mary Baker G. Eddy, and "Judge" Rutherford do not appear in the index, and the intricate problems of the relation of Mormonism, Spiritualism, Christian Science, and Jehovah's Witnesses to theological ideas are never discussed. One is at a loss to know whether the return upon ritualism in many Protestant sects is evidence for or against anti-intellectualism. In the political section, which reduces the gentleman to a "marginal role" by the mid-nineteenth century, no discussion appears of the distinguished intellectual contributions of Southern senators and congressmen to the support of science and education or to the theory of politics, and I doubt that either Senator Hayne of South Carolina or Senator Davis of Mississippi filled merely marginal roles. Most astonishing is Mr. Hofstadter's failure to deal with newspaper, magazine, and popular book as influential sources of anti-intellectualism, although these would seem to be great and influential forces. A great novel like *Uncle Tom's Cabin* appeals to a sense of moral outrage but not, as *The Scarlet Letter* does, to a question of ethical philosophy, and inferior novels like *Ten Nights in a Bar-Room, Barriers Burned Away, St. Elmo,* and *The Winning of Barbara Worth* not only elevated sentimentality into a virtue but tended to identify intellect and culture with depravity.

Mr. Hofstadter, in sum, has tried to condense four studies into one, and to defend himself by saying that these are "my views." But the rigor of historical scholarship cannot be thus evaded. Each of the four areas surveyed requires a vaster and more subtle analysis than Mr. Hofstadter gives it. His book is often suggestive, but it is not up to his usual high standard.

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Popular Education and Democratic Thought in America. By RUSH WELTER. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1962.—xiii, 473 pp. $8.50.

American education throughout its history has been inspired

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by the ideal of democracy. It has always been believed that the education of every individual provides the surest guarantee for the preservation of democracy. Based at first on the notion that knowledge is virtue and later by the belief that knowledge is power, the democratic concept was defined for his countrymen by George Washington. In his Farewell Address Washington urged the people to promote "as an object of primary importance institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened." The same idea was repeated by all the successors to the presidency, as may be gathered in a Bulletin issued by the U. S. Office of Education under the title *Expressions on Education by Builders of American Democracy* (1941).

Professor Welter has undertaken in the volume under review to explore "the idea of education in its essentially political applications and functions." To this end he analyzed the statements and ideas of statesmen, politicians, and political and social scientists on the relationship of education and political thought. On the whole he has very little to say on formal education for the obvious reason that until this century that relationship was implicit and indirect so far as school education was concerned. It was not until the Progressive movement in education and in politics of the early decades of this century that direct efforts began to be made to cultivate in future citizens an understanding of their political, social, and economic environment.

It becomes obvious that Professor Welter's sources are concerned about the intelligent understanding by the adult electorate of their political and economic problems and the relation of government to their solution. In an age when "democracy" and "freedom" are so much in the minds and on the lips of so many people it is interesting to note that the problems have changed from time to time and the concepts of the place of government and of the individual in a democracy have changed with them. The movement has been from the elitism of the republican period through Jacksonian elevation of the individual to group organizations, to Progressivism and direct participation, and again to the managerial theory and a new form of elitism trained for leadership.

Dr. Welter has meticulously traced the progress of democratic ideas in education and politics as expressed at different stages of American history. These ideas he has presented as sponsored by different groups—colonial, republican, conservative, liberal, farmer and labor organizations, middle classes, Progressives, business leaders, and political scientists. The work is fully docu-

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mented in nearly fifty pages of notes and a Bibliography of works having relevance to each of the four parts into which the book is divided.

At a time when democracy is being challenged, it is important to learn from its history in this country that there can never be a one-to-one relationship between popular education and political thought. Provided that there is universal commitment to the ideals of education and democracy, the essence of the democratic ideal is agreement to disagree. How much can be attained through education, despite the optimism that prevailed through the nineteenth century, is now open to doubt. The trend of thought in the present century, influenced by the study of psychology, psychiatry, and public opinion, is that individuals are more influenced by personal and group interests, by prejudice, by habitual ways of thinking than by reason and intelligent understanding of political issues. Professor Welter's meticulous analysis will contribute to a better understanding of American political and social history. American political thought and practice have wavered between the idea of government by an elite of educated and understanding leaders and the idea of participation by the people enlightened by their leaders.

I. L. KANDEL

WESTPORT, CONNECTICUT

Changes in the Location of Manufacturing in the United States Since 1929. By VICTOR R. FUCHS. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1962.—xx, 566 pp. $10.00.

This monograph is the first publication sponsored by the Committee on Analysis of Economic Census Data of the Social Science Research Council. Using the Census of Industry data (published and unpublished) for 1929, 1947, and 1954, the analysis depicts the changes in location of manufacturing activity in the United States for the periods 1929–54 and 1947–54 and attempts to isolate the causal factors behind the changes.

Value added and employment are the measures of manufacturing activity employed in the analysis and the results of the study are presented in both geographic and industrial terms. The geography of location change is given for manufacturing as a whole, for individual industries, and for market-oriented and labor-oriented industries, while the relation of industrial characteristics to location change is presented for major industry groups and individual industries.

Overall the study finds that the net interstate change of all manufacturing activity from 1929 to 1954 does not differ sub-

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stantially from that of the previous twenty-five years. The net change in employment from 1929–54 was 1.25 million jobs, or 8.5 per cent of the United States total, while the percentage net change for the period 1904–29 was 11.4. Since 1929, the general direction of change has been southward and westward. Comparative percentage gains and losses (the difference between an area's growth and U.S. average growth) by region for 1929–54 for employment (the differences between employment and value added are not great) were: New England—27.0, Middle Atlantic —11.6, East North Central—1.9, West North Central + 9.2, South Atlantic + 13.3, East South Central + 13.0, West South Central + 29.0, Mountain + 12.4, and Pacific + 38.6.

Five possible causes of location change not explained by differences in industrial structure are examined by multiple regression analysis: wage levels, extent of unionization, climate, space, and the catching-up hypothesis. The "... results provide some support for the hypotheses that the absence of unions, a mild climate, and low population density have been factors favorable to the growth of manufacturing since 1929, while the opposite conditions have been associated with comparative loss of manufacturing" (p. 94).

Examined from the industry side it is found that those industries of greatest mobility (the extent to which an industry is located differently in one year as compared with an earlier year) possess one or more of the following characteristics: low wage levels, high concentration of ownership, and substantial growth.

The discussion of the role of consumer demand as a location determinant will not bring an end to the debate about the significance of this factor. The conclusion here (pp. 162–163) is that

> . . . demand has not been a major determinant of locational change 1929–54. We infer this, first, because market-oriented industries are only a small part of total manufacturing, and, second, because a significant portion of the changes in demand which did occur should properly be considered as the result of the redistribution of manufacturing rather than its cause.

Many more significant findings about specific states and industries are provided in this study. All of its findings relevant to location theory will receive and deserve careful attention, while its more general implications should be noted by those public bodies engaged in the competitive race for more industry. Much wasted effort and resources could be saved if their efforts were inspired by a better understanding of real locational determinants rather than imagined ones.

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Two final points: The impact of the federal government on industrial location through its contract placement policies, particularly by the Defense Department, is nowhere mentioned. Measurement of this determinant may be difficult but its significance may be great. Finally, the author's *obiter dicta* about the superiority of states over metropolitan areas as units of analysis is not convincing.

ALAN K. CAMPBELL

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The Other Side of the River: Red China Today. By EDGAR SNOW. New York, Random House, 1962.—xvi, 810 pp. $10.00.

An aeon ago (June 1936), after walking across the broken hills of northern Shensi and penetrating a civil war blockade, Edgar Snow entered the straggling village of Pao-an, not far south of the Great Wall. There a large part of what remained of the Chinese Red Army had ended a historic trek across China known as the Long March and created a legend of indestructibility. *Red Star Over China,* Snow's classic report on the Chinese Communist insurgents, then sustained largely by discipline, idealism, and political formulae, was first published the following year, in 1937. In June 1960, Edgar Snow flew half-way around the world from Geneva via Moscow and landed at Peking airport in a Soviet turbojet manned by a Chinese crew. *The Other Side of the River,* his new report on a five-month stay in China, is more than a reportorial survey but less than a classic.

Produced under the improbable joint sponsorship of Bennett Cerf (Random House), Gardner Cowles (*Look*), Mao Tse-tung, and Chou En-lai, this 800-page giant is at least three books intermingled. The first is an encyclopedic summary by a professional reporter who traveled 12,000 miles in China, revisited fourteen of that country's twenty-two provinces and nineteen major cities, interviewed hundreds of Chinese, filled notebooks, observed, compared, and absorbed atmospherics. The second is Snow's summary of much of the basic literature, both academic and travel, on contemporary China now available in English. The third comprises *obiter dicta:* Edgar Snow's cosmic thoughts about the human species and its present dilemmas. The resulting composite work reflects prodigious labor, a lack of critical discrimination (notable especially in the mass of unevaluated statistical data presented), and an apparent unwillingness to condense drafts in the interests of intelligible communication. Statistics aside, the volume contains surprisingly few errors of fact.

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"The place is still China and the civilization is still Chinese, but nothing of the old has been left untouched and nothing of the new is complete. All is transition and transition often seems to be all." Essentially, *The Other Side of the River* presents an assessment of Chinese communism on its own terms, with a sympathetic awareness of both the political and the personal dimensions of violent revolution. Snow's political outlook is old-fashioned liberal (he dislikes bureaucratic cant, warmongers, big capitalists, Mr. Joseph Alsop, and the Central Intelligence Agency), marked by manifest respect for what organized political power has accomplished in China, and by irritation at official American obtuseness in confronting Asian realities. Aware that the Chinese peasant has always toiled, usually suffered, and often starved in the past, Snow estimates that the present Peking government is, on balance, supported more by consent than by coercion. As the first of the resident American correspondents who knew China in prewar days to revisit that country, Snow is fortunate in having baselines for comparison, unfortunate in having definite emotional involvements in China. Despite patches of pedestrian prose, the book has the distinct merit of projecting China as a real place where, despite manifold changes, relics of the neolithic past survive (Sir Victor Sassoon's suite at the Cathay Hotel on the Bund in Shanghai, Colonel David D. Barrett's photograph in a museum at Yenan). On balance, this book is a very useful source for individuals who know more than the author about contemporary China, since it contains valuable factual data not available elsewhere (biographical details on K'o Ch'ing-shih, mayor of Shanghai, for example). Other readers would be well advised to take Mr. Snow's hearty and generally rosy picture with caution.

For students of politics and policy, *The Other Side of the River* is significant both for what it explains of Peking's distinctive style of political action and for what it implies, but does not make explicit, about the psychological chasm separating Peking and Washington. A high-ranking Chinese Communist told Snow: "There were 50,000 of us at the start of Chiang Kai-shek's counterrevolution in 1927. After the killings there were only 10,000 left. Today there are about 800 of us—survivors of all the years between. By and large the country is being run and for some years will be run by those 800." That is as candid a definition as one is likely to get of "democratic centralism" in China and of the key role still played by the Long March men. These veterans, the men who have survived, are cool, confident, experienced in China, and pragmatic about Chinese problems. At the pinnacle, the Politburo elite is composed of men who

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have worked closely with Mao Tse-tung for many years. Despite the 1954–55 splintering (the purge of Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih, and others), despite the efforts of Western Pekingologists to derive simplistic explanations of the Chinese political process through analysis of an alleged "struggle for power in the Politburo," there has been no open split in the top command for twenty-five years. Since 1949, despite gargantuan economic problems, the veterans have registered major accomplishments in mobilizing China's population for political purposes through a distinctive combination of persuasion, toughness, austerity, "study," and a variety of Boy Scout-YMCA enthusiasm which mystifies Russian and Eastern European comrades. "Everyone was much in earnest," Mr. Snow accurately reports.

On his return to the United States, after nine hours with Mao Tse-tung and long interviews on substantive topics with Chou En-lai, Edgar Snow was treated like a pariah by the Department of State. That fact proves nothing but suggests one dismal dimension of the present Sino-American impasse. The men in power at Peking have admittedly been shaped by a narrow background of experience and by deep prejudices against Western, and especially American, "imperialism." At the same time, many of the men now holding top authority in Washington have also been shaped by a rather narrow background of education and experience which makes them singularly unqualified to comprehend the varieties of national frustration which bred communism in China, especially during the Japanese invasion. Intelligence, political sense, decision-making ability, personal assurance, patriotism: these qualities exist both in the Executive Mansion and in the Forbidden City. But nothing in the real experience of American political leaders has prepared them for effective communication with—or confinement of—a Chinese elite whose doctrine holds that "people are more important than weapons" and which now boldly projects the People's Republic of China as standard-bearer for the poor and non-white of the world against the *status quo* prudence of Washington, and possibly of Moscow as well.

HOWARD L. BOORMAN

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The Asian Century: A History of Modern Nationalism in Asia. By JAN ROMEIN in collaboration with Jan Erik Romein. Translated by R. T. Clark, with a forward by K. M. Panikkar. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1962. —448 pp. $7.50.

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Asia in the European Age, 1498–1955. By MICHAEL EDWARDES. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.—351 pp., maps. $8.50.

These are ambitious books. They deal with vast areas and complex problems over long spans of time. Michael Edwardes treats the establishment of Europe's colonial empires, the effects of imperialism on Asian nations stretching from India all the way to Japan, and the forces which caused the dissolution of Western empires. In 320 pages he generalizes 350 years of Asia's colonial history. Jan Romein assays a much wider area, all the lands from Egypt eastward, but limits his time span essentially to the last sixty years. He surveys modern Asian nationalism in 400 tightly written pages.

Both books seem designed to enlighten a general public eager to understand the perplexing world in which we live today. Mr. Romein, Professor of Theoretical History at the University of Amsterdam, is the more successful synthesizer. He is the better master of his subject, has reflected more deeply upon the significance of Asia's emancipation, and has divided his book into shorter and more coherent time sequences than has Mr. Edwardes.

Both writers perceive the phenomenon of colonialism followed by liberation as part of a broad historic movement in which Europe first transformed itself through the Renaissance and the industrial and scientific revolutions, and then introduced these same processes to the peoples of Asia. It is Professor Romein's thesis that

> The awakening of Asia . . . is, as it were, the appearance in Asia of this process of departure [from the 'common human pattern' of mankind] which was originally confined to Europe. . . . Thereby Asia took the most significant step forward on the road to the unity of mankind, the prospect of whose realization now lies before us. In the place of the centuries-old Asia a new Asian century opens before us.

Mr. Edwardes, an English scholar, traveler, and commentator, seems less optimistic. To him "The positive impact of the West was limited; the whole affair a clash of numerically insignificant minorities. The inheritors of Western power in Asia are about as far away from the tradition-oriented majorities as the men they have displaced." "The battle now," he concludes, "is between those who hope to synthesize a new and peculiarly Asian form of democracy, and those who represent the old absolutism refurbished in a Communist disguise. The offensive is still . . . against the West, and the prize is . . . the freedom of the world."

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The central subject of each book is the manner in which European colonialism created in Asian nations a knowledge of Western civilization, started the process of modernization, and generated forces of nationalism which eventually forced colonialism out. Mr. Edwardes gives a more systematic account of the establishment of empire than does Professor Romein, and is at his best in dealing with Britain's empire and Indian nationalism. At times his treatment of other empires is superficial.

As a historian, I find both books disappointing. Neither European author seems able to capture and reflect the thinking of Asian leaders. This is surprising since so many Asian nationalists have written memoirs and since there is an abundance of nationalistic literature which might have been drawn upon. Neither writer makes much effort to analyze the societies with which they deal. They can scarcely believe that the societies of India, China, Indonesia, and Japan were fundamentally alike. Yet in analyzing Asian responses to the West they pay scant attention to internal factors such as underlying value systems, religion, social structure, and political and economic organization in any of the Asian nations with which they deal. Both seem to view Asian societies as essentially static with no internal thrusts toward change.

This static concept is implicit in Professor Romein's thesis quoted above. Mr. Edwardes is explicit in this view when he states (p. 194) that before the work of "Cultural Scientists," by which he means the work of Western scholars in uncovering Asia's past,

> Asia was history-less, its people unable to observe the historical process, because they were unaware of its existence. But as soon as the educated classes became conscious of the movements of fluctuation and decay within their own civilizations, they were able to view the overwhelming and apparently unshakable superiority of the West as just another 'time of troubles.' . . . Having accepted the West's discovery of history, Asians, lacking a philosophy of history of their own, accepted the universal application of these laws [of historical growth].

True, some Asian cultures are weak in a sense of history, but China, at least, has one of the most historically minded of cultures. The Chinese had an intimate knowledge of their past, a strong historical tradition, and a thoroughly developed philosophy of history in which the concepts of fluctuation, decay, and regeneration were central. Here is exposed the risk and presumption of attempting to generalize about Asia.

Do we demand that history be accurate in its presentation of fact, or may we be tolerant of numerous errors of detail when a

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writer ambitiously undertakes a vast, complicated, and important subject? For example, Mr. Edwardes states (p. 40) that the Manchu dynasty, which ruled China during most of the period with which he deals, was of Mongol origin. He says that Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the first leader of the Chinese Communist party, was the father of Chou En-lai (p. 258). He also asserts (p. 238) that Ch'en Tu-hsiu's "anti-nationalism still remains at the core of Chinese Communism." This will astonish students of Chinese Communism. He interprets Western policy in China at the time of the suppression of the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion as desiring a weak and pliable Manchu emperor to facilitate the West's plans for exploitation of the Celestial empire (p. 192). This simplistic explanation ignores the careful study by Professor Mary Wright of Yale University of the actual policy of the foreign powers, particularly British policy in the 1860's when Britain held the ring so the Chinese state might regenerate itself. Unhappily, one could pile up many more examples of the writer's carelessness or his ignorance of scholarly research on China.

Professor Romein's view of history is much more sophisticated than that of Mr. Edwardes, but seems strongly influenced by Lenin's theory of imperialism. American readers will thus have the opportunity to learn that during World War I "for the first time the United States had the power as well as the desire to carry out a grand scale policy of imperialism in Asia. . . . 'Dollar imperialism,' as it is called, appeared at the outset benevolent enough . . . but none the less another wild beast bent on plunder was ravaging the Asian garden" (pp. 105–106). To this reviewer, Professor Romein exhibits a favorable bias toward Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communist cause and an antipathy toward the United States and the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek. This colors his entire exposition of China during the 1920's and 1930's, an account which is also, unfortunately, riddled with errors of fact. American readers may be surprised to learn that during the period of Japan's aggression in China after 1937 neither Europe nor America put the slightest obstacle in the way of the fascist rulers of Japan (p. 223). One wonders what Pearl Harbor was all about. Probably a typographical error explains the statement (p. 322) that "Only the Soviet Union sent any significant aid to China in the years 1937 to 1946."

Is the author purposely evasive about who was the aggressor in the Korean War? Somehow it just began on the morning of June 25, 1950. He has accepted the North Korean myth concerning the background of Kim Il-sung, which seeks to identify the present Communist leader with an earlier patriot of the same name. He states (p. 351) that Kim Il-sung, born in 1912, fled to China

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because of his participation in the anti-Japanese revolution in Seoul in March 1919. A precocious seven-year old revolutionary, indeed! It is a matter for regret that the University of California Press did not get the assistance of the University's outstanding faculty of experts on Asia to help Professor Romein correct at least the factual errors in his thought-provoking account of Asian nationalism, a task to which he says he has devoted more than thirty years.

Thus both these books raise acutely the issue whether or not a historian should undertake a subject so broad that he cannot master the factual details. This is an old quarrel between generalizers and specialists, the ones who gaze on the forest and the ones who inspect the trees. As a specializer eager to discern valid generalizations about Asian history, I regret to have to conclude that neither book strengthens the case for the generalists.

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Power and International Relations. By INIS L. CLAUDE, JR. New York, Random House, 1962.—x, 320 pp. $4.50.

The author of this important book envisages his task as objective analysis and criticism of different systems for managing power, but he acknowledges some predisposition to view with "special favor and sympathy" the system of collective security (p. 10) which he places between two other possible systems, those of balance of power and world government on the criterion of "degree of centralization of power and authority" (pp. 9, 94).

One may question whether this analysis of the possible systems for managing power is exhaustive. The criterion of degree of cultural or ideological homogeneity, facilitating persuasion in lieu of coercion, might also be considered. The idea of managing power by inducing universal acceptance of a religion or ideology, which aims directly at the values and intentions of the wielders of power, rather than at their capabilities, has been the hope of Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Cosmopolitanism, Democracy, and Communism. While no such ideology has ever actually controlled political power universally, neither has there ever been an actually universal empire or other form of world government. It cannot be denied, however, that the ideas of both the universal church and the universal state have had great influence in history and that each has had wide, though not universal exemplifications. A fourfold classification may, therefore, be suggested in which a balance of power may be converted into

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an over-centralized hegemony or empire, eventually disintegrating and leaving ideological structures, as in the transitions from the Roman Empire to the Medieval Church, from the British Empire to the Commonwealth, and, in Communist theory, from the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to the voluntary Communist society after the "withering away of the state." A balance of power system may, on the other hand, move toward international organization or confederation, facilitating more abundant communication and more rapid convergence of ideologies, in time providing the basis for a more stable federalistic structure, resting on law and opinion rather than coercion. The transition in the United States from confederation to federation and in the world from the International Unions, the Hague System, and the League of Nations, to the United Nations illustrate this process. As any of these systems for managing power is possible, a more general concept of the world as a *field,* in which the seeds of all exist, may be more useful for analysis because it could deal with the conditions of transition from one to another.

In his lucid exposition of the balance of power concept, Claude makes it clear that few writers on the subject knew precisely what they were talking about. Those who in recent times have favored it in the name of "realism" have apparently had a less clear concept in mind than those who, like President Wilson, with a more genuine sense of reality, opposed it. Claude prefers to interpret the balance of power as a decentralized system for managing power in international relations by self-interested efforts of each government or of one (the balancer) to maintain equilibrium (p. 42, but see p. 88) and he does not consider it an effective system either for preventing war or for preserving the independence of states, less so now than in other periods of history. Neither automatic reaction nor calculated action by states, individually or in limited alliances, he thinks, can maintain stability in a shrinking and interdependent world, of universal vulnerability and high tensions resulting from the destructive potentialities of modern weapons. Under these conditions war has ceased to be an instrument of rational policy and, furthermore, the Constitution and public opinion in some major states inhibit the rapid and risky decisions, without regard for legal or moral principles, which have been essential for efficient power balancing.

Claude quotes from Hans J. Morgenthau, A. J. P. Taylor, and other exponents of the balance of power to demonstrate that they use the term without clear definition. It sometimes means a *condition* or *situation,* either of equal power, or of unequal power, among the major states; sometimes a *policy* of a state or of

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an alliance for maintaining equality or gaining superiority; sometimes a *system* for managing power by states acting individually or in alliances; and a "*symbol* of realistic and prudent concern with the problems of power in international relations" (p. 37). Sometimes the term refers to an *inevitable* condition of international relations and sometimes to a *desirable* policy or system for managing those relations. The fluidity with which these self-styled "realists" move from treating the balance of power as what is, always has been, and always will be, to what ought to be in the national interest has disturbed a number of critics.

Writers on international relations in general have been remarkably free from concern about precision in defining, and consistency in using, their key terms. As a consequence their inferences and generalizations have not been convincing. If Claude's criticism increases awareness among them of these prime virtues of science, progress toward a useful discipline of international relations may be more rapid.

In dealing with collective security, Claude makes it clear that the architects of the League of Nations, like the advocates of the League to Enforce Peace and most of the peace planners of the preceding three centuries, had in mind a system for managing power. President Wilson contemplated the League of Nations as a means not only for mobilizing world opinion against aggression, but for mobilizing military and naval power against it. "Far from denying the fact of power [as he has been accused of doing] Wilson faced up to it and tried to deal with it, exhibiting a creative energy rare in the annals of statesmanship" (p. 106). He recognized that balance of power theory faces the dilemma that to deter effectively in a bipolar system not equality but preponderance of power is necessary, but if that preponderance exists in any state or alliance it could be used for aggression. Each side cannot be more powerful than the other. Even in a multilateral system *ad hoc* coalitions may not deter because the potential aggressor may doubt whether the coalition will form. Such systems, therefore, usually function by war to defeat the aggressor. Collective security, he hoped, would solve the dilemma by assuring preponderance of power in the community as a whole, through international organization to implement advance commitments of its members.

Claude finds that the concept of collective security, like that of balance of power, has suffered from the disposition of statesmen and even scholars to avoid precise definition of terms. It has been used to refer to collective defense alliances like NATO or indeed to any type of active participation in international relations, in contrast to "isolationism." He points out that the

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political expediency of the moment induced Wilson when in France, which had identified security with alliances, to treat the League of Nations as an alliance. But in the United States, which was predisposed against "entangling alliances," he sharply differentiated it from alliances and from the balance of power.

Though criticizing these ambiguities, Claude admits that the germs of collective security exist in a balance of power system, because the latter implies that each state perceives the importance to itself of stability of the whole. But they differ in that a balance of power system gives such an imperfect definition of the aggressor and such imperfect assurance of overwhelming preponderance of power against it, that it cannot function effectively as a deterrent against war. Collective security, on the other hand, as defined by Secretary of State Hull, "is not an alliance against a combination of other nations but against any aggressor. It is an alliance not for war but for peace" (p. 145).

By defining aggression abstractly and organizing the community as a whole to oppose it, collective security has greater capacity to deter, but it faces the difficulty that the definition and implementing procedures may be so inadequate that potential aggressors will not be convinced that states actually will fulfill their collective security obligations. The definition of aggression should be so precise that all states will recognize when it occurs and so well adapted to the world situation that each will perceive that its security will be reduced if any state, which becomes an aggressor within the definition, is not stopped. Furthermore, power must be so distributed that a preponderance can always be collected against the aggressor. Collective security cannot work in a bipolar world in situations involving major interests of one or both sides, as illustrated in the Hungarian Situation of 1956.

In his critique of collective security Claude asserts that it failed to become effective in the League of Nations, because of United States abstention and European reluctance, and in the United Nations because of the veto and the failure to agree on a collective security force, and especially because of the emergence of cold war, bipolarizing the world and encouraging development of collective defense arrangements by-passing the United Nations. In his discussion the author places the blame equally on the United States and the Soviet Union, both of which suffered from "reciprocal mistrust."

While Claude may be right in saying that collective security cannot work in a bipolar world, in case major great power interests are involved, he might have given more attention to the extent to which it has worked in stopping lesser hostilities during

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the League period and even more in the United Nations period, partly, but not entirely, because each great power wants to keep the other from "muscling in" (p. 190). The effectiveness of United Nations actions in Iran, Indonesia, Palestine, Kashmir, Suez, Lebanon, Congo, and West Irian gives evidence that collective security is more relevant today than the book suggests.

As for world government, Claude sees no "realistic prospect" of its establishment "in our time" (p. 208). The significance of the concept lies, he thinks, in its wide-spread acceptance as the theoretically correct solution to the problem of the management of power. On this proposition, however, Claude entertains doubt. Does world government imply monopoly of physical power by central authority? Does it imply that central authority should deal only with states, that it should deal directly with individuals in some matters, or that it should deal primarily with dissident minorities, factions, or other groups?

He notes that government in any sense has not been a sure guaranty of peace. He cites Karl Deutsch's empirical research, which concluded that among the several "security communities" studied, "peace without government tended to be more secure than peace with government" (pp. 214–215). He also refers to the frequency of civil war within states (p. 220) and to the doubt by many scholars of either the feasibility or the desirability of a permanent monopoly of force within states, much less in the world. If this is true of the government of national communities it is more true of the management of the international community. They differ so substantially in the conditions they face, that analogy should be used with caution.

The conclusion of this important book is that neither balance of power, collective security, nor world government contains the key to the solution of the problem of managing power in international relations. Elements of all have some applicability, and "the United Nations may serve as a means by which the world may not only transform but even transcend the balance of power system" (p. 284).

QUINCY WRIGHT

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The Long Polar Watch: Canada and the Defense of North America. By MELVIN CONANT. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1962.—xii, 204 pp. $5.00.

Melvin Conant's wise and sober survey of Canada's role in the defense of North America was written before the Kennedy-

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Khrushchev row over Cuba and before the election of 1963 unhorsed the Diefenbaker government and returned the Liberals, under Lester B. Pearson, to power. The first of these incidents greatly widened the largely irrational Canadian animus against unilateral action by the United States. The second restored common sense to Canada's defense role in both NORAD and NATO. Pearson is now working out an agreement with Washington for the use of defensive nuclear weapons by Canada's components in these two forces.

The Cuban incident's impact on Canadian public opinion together with Mr. Pearson's determination to go ahead is proof of his political courage. Mr. Conant quotes Canada's late prime minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King, over a generation ago, that "a strong and dominant national feeling is not a luxury in Canada, it is a necessity. Without it, this country cannot exist." Canada is in 1963 more riven by dissension and divergent purposes than it has ever been before in peace time. A noisy and emotional minority in English-speaking Canada joins hands with a strong majority sentiment in French Canada against the acceptance by Canada of nuclear arms. But, over and beyond that cleavage, the country is being savaged by conflicting opinions about how to cope with unemployment, which runs at the highest rate of any Western developed country, how to cope with the continued influx of foreign capital (from the United States, for example), and, above all, how to hold the country together at all as Quebec separatists and crypto-separatists inflame the traditional isolationism of French Canada.

Mr. Conant lucidly and dispassionately suggests that Canada's defense role in the future is almost certain to cost more than it does now. He adds that the country can well afford larger sums. That is true, but any substantial increase in defense spending is, and will for some time remain, a political impossibility. The confusion, the bewilderment of the public, duly noted by Mr. Conant, is increased by muddy thinking and basic divisions of purpose. I do not know how long it will be possible for Canada to dissipate the resources it is ready to spend on defense for the maintenance of three arms: army, navy, and air force, each one with an overloaded headquarters establishment which leaves far too little for what might be called "the front line."

Some simplification of objectives, upon which public opinion could focus, is sorely needed and should be possible once the nation gets into some mood of sanity that will admit that this country must accept the urgent strategic necessity that North America must be defended and that it must stop being picayune about the predominant role the United States must play in it.

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This book gives all the facts and emphasizes realities. It is the best thing written on the subject.

GEORGE V. FERGUSON

MONTREAL, CANADA

American Diplomacy and Emergent Patterns. By KENNETH W. THOMPSON. New York, New York University Press, 1962. —xx, 273 pp. $4.50.

A vice-president of the Rockefeller Foundation, Kenneth W. Thompson offers a thoughtful, jargon-free survey of the challenges to American diplomacy in the midst of the contemporary tensions, ideological revolutions, and thermonuclear balance of terror that comprise the international scene. He starts with a mention of the mutual distrust of scholars and the practitioners of foreign affairs, and presents the point of view of each group: decisions in diplomacy must be weighed carefully so that the commitment of resources is commensurate with the objective; meanwhile there should be examination of the theory and practice that relate moral principles to the imperatives of successful foreign policy.

This book contains a lively account of the origins and development of the career principle for the State Department and Foreign Service. A landmark was the Rogers Act of 1924 under which the diplomatic and consular services were fused by executive orders issued by President Hoover. World War II brought added functions, yet many officers were interned in enemy countries and sad administrative consequences resulted from "President Roosevelt's tendency of reducing the Department of State to a 'cipher' " (p. 86). The author's selection of facts leaves something to be desired. No mention is made of the loss to state of specialized professionals to the military draft or of the recruitment of personnel under the Manpower Act of 1946. There is illuminating discussion of the forces that brought about the Wriston reforms of 1954, producing an interchangeability of the foreign and home service officers, and of the relative merits and needs for generalists and specialists. It is stated that "the uniqueness of American professionalism (in diplomacy) is its breadth."

The author properly places emphasis on the constitutional position of the President and his relationships with the Secretary of State, concluding that "Franklin D. Roosevelt may have presumed too much in assuming that he could be his own secretary, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, at the opposite extreme, may have delegated a larger part of his burdens to John Foster Dulles than was justified." He goes on to anticipate inevitable disappoint-

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ment if the President expects that a secretary of political stature as great as his own will help in the augmentation of his own power, citing the classic example of Wilson and Bryan. The reader is left to judge for himself whether Roosevelt's appointment of Hull and Truman's designation of Byrnes, with the prestige attaching to those two veterans of Capitol Hill, benefitted the respective administrations. Certainly Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy decided not to appoint Taft or Adlai Stevenson to the Secretaryship.

Philosophically, Mr. Thompson, contrasting the old and the new diplomacy, insists that "we must remember as much of the past as will make us creative in the future." He adds that the speed of modern diplomacy sometimes generates friction. Thus one calls to mind conditional commitments perhaps based on hasty assumptions that fundamental agreement had been reached, giving rise to subsequent recriminations or disillusionment, as may result from the no-invasion-of-Cuba pledge. Technological revolutions multiplying the speed and publicity of communications have been accompanied by political and ideological revolutions involving increasingly articulate masses and the confrontation of two political orders. The new diplomacy may not bring peace and understanding; the author deplores that "the new diplomacy has extended the practice of bringing an issue to a head, of throwing a problem before the entire world community, and of raising to a white heat the emotional aspects of any rivalry" (p. 165).

Commenting upon the risk that ambassadors may become merely the persons on the receiving end of a cable, so that their independence of judgment may disappear along with their capacity to shape foreign policy, the author declares that "evidence of an opposing trend is clear, however, particularly in the present administration." To the reviewer, the evidence is mixed. Trouble shooting trips by the Vice-President to the Far East, the Middle East, and Germany, negotiations abroad by the Secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce, Defense, Agriculture, and the Attorney General; flying trips by the Secretary of State, a former Secretary, the Undersecretaries, by Assistant Secretaries Williams and Harriman, and by White House representatives Bowles, Rostow, Berle, Salinger, Goodwin, Schlesinger, and Feldman may leave the impression with foreign officials that matters of delicacy and importance are not entrusted to ambassadors, be they professional or political.

The volume concludes by pointing out that our present diplomacy is asked, in an atmosphere of crisis, to bridge the chasm between East and West and between the Northern and Southern

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Hemispheres. Issues which are raised include disarmament as a means to achieve peace, the United Nations as a forum, the possibility of internal change within the Soviet Union, and a reciprocal pulling back of Russian and American military forces "to a position of strategic reserve." Surprisingly, there is no mention of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The author pin-points the responsibility for our own leadership: "It remains for the President to give content to national aims and policies, to educate the people both in ends and means." His last opinion, that the institutions of contemporary diplomacy are sufficient to the day, is more reassuring than one would expect from the preceding pages.

WILLARD F. BARBER

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

The Common Market Today—And Tomorrow. By MICHAEL SHANKS AND JOHN LAMBERT. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.—253 pp.

With so many books recently written on the Common Market it is not entirely clear what purpose is served by a book such as this one. Written by two able journalists, Michael Shanks, Industrial Editor of the *Financial Times* of London, and John Lambert, writer for the Agence Europe, a daily reporting agency on Common Market activities, it suffers from the inherent defects of journalism without enjoying its compensating advantages: it is too condensed, hurried, and dispersed to be other than superficial; it is relatively innocent of either economic or political theory, or much even in the way of statistical backbone, hence it is impressionistic, anecdotal, and often oversimplified; its conclusions, while liberal and apparently "sensible," are generally trite and commonplace—without necessarily, for this reason, being correct; yet sadly enough, being a book, it inevitably lacks the one main virtue of journalism—being up to date. The book was "written at great speed in a situation of rapid and bewildering change." Unfortunately it was concluded six months before the French veto on British admission to the Common Market which made the chief concern of the book—why and on what terms Britain should enter the Common Market—irrelevant for the time being.

The book is strongest in its factual historical description of the actual day-to-day functioning of the EEC, of its gradual development, and of the negotiation of its major crises. It is weakest when it attempts to generalize, as the following quotations may suggest:

> It would be easy for Europe to stay sitting tight behind the wall

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> of the common external tariff, the tariff which has been the symbol of her unity so far. But to do this would be to condemn the Common Market for the introverted, selfish 'rich man's club' which its enemies accuse it of being.
>
> . . . Congressional opposition to U. S. tariff cuts will be very strong. . . . It is essential that Europe should do all it can to help President Kennedy to win his battle with the protectionists in Congress, for on his success may depend the future of the west.
>
> . . . the European Economic Community . . . offers one of the world's best hopes for ending the appalling division between rich and poor which disfigures the international landscape of our age.
>
> France's negotiators played their cards with brilliant opportunism, with the result that they won for their country a highly privileged position in the Common Market. The French approach, essentially, was to see how the clauses of the Treaty of Rome could be twisted to suit France's interest before she signed them. The British, more honest but less intelligent, looked at the clauses to see which of them Britain could reasonably sign as they stood.

Having said this much in criticism, one must add that, as journalism, it is probably a superior piece of work. It brings the story of Britain and the Community *nearly* up to date, and for the most part, it conveys a correct general impression of the issues. Its conclusions, while lacking in any great depth, or insight, are usually sensible enough.

The short bibliography appended to the book mentions only five books, four of them British, one of them an English translation of a very slight book by a Frenchman. Two of those mentioned, by Kitzinger and by Pinder, seem to me to be vastly superior to the book here reviewed, if not quite so nearly topical.

There is no indication in the book that its writers are aware of the vast literature on the subject prepared on the Continent or in the United States. Thus even in reproving British insularity the writers give one more melancholy example of how it works.

EMILE BENOIT

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle. By LUDWIG DEHIO. Translated from the German by Charles Fulman. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1962.—ix, 295, viii pp. $5.95.

Nothing could be more natural than for a German historian to ask himself, after 1945, what went wrong? The answer, in

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briefest form, lies in the German failure to understand "the fusion of the old European main tendency with the new global tendency" (p. 256), more simply in the destruction of the European state system. That system grew out of the erosion of the medieval structure and managed to maintain itself against repeated attempts to destroy it until our time, when the German bid for hegemony finally succeeded, albeit not in the intended fashion.

The system was characterized by an internal equilibrium—a precarious one to be sure, hence the title of the book—among its major members, and Dehio proceeds to analyze the attempts made at various times by one or another of them to alter the state of equilibrium in its own favor by subjugating the rest. There were six such attempts, two Spanish (Charles V and Philip II), two French (Louis XIV and Napoleon), and the last two German (the two world wars of our time). It will be noted that the list makes no mention of either England or Russia. There is reason for this, which is in fact the central theme of the book: the failure in all cases was due to the intervention of elements extraneous to the system, a role which fell in the first instance to the Turks, whose place was thereafter taken by Russia; but in all cases save the first England always appears as the chief rescuer or culprit in preserving the system. England's position has been unique, for if she, like others, sought to promote her own interest, the best defense of that interest has been synonymous with the existence of the system as such; the balance of power has had for Britain a very special significance. And what has made it possible for her to play her role with success derives from that other unique characteristic of her being a maritime, instead of a land, power. Even as her power declined her place has been taken by the United States, thereby confirming the supremacy of naval power.

Russia is surely a land power, and it is precisely the fact that the final destruction of the European system has created a condition where again land power (Russia) confronts sea power (the United States), that creates the poignancy of the present situation, for there is now no room for a new equilibrium on the former model. Also the present state of civilization (technique, as used by Dehio, in contrast with culture) is unprecedented, raising the question of the applicability of historical precedent.

The breadth, the simplicity one might say, of such an interpretation is to a point fascinating, but it suffers from the shortcoming inseparable from the attempt to compress too complex a reality into too neat a mold. Thus Dehio's interpretation of the roles of the United States and of Russia, to cite but one major

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example, must be viewed with a critical eye. There is nevertheless considerable value in the attempt to introduce order in a very large segment of historical experience, for this makes for stimulating insights. There are not a few in these pages; if the result is a rather mixed bag, it is also one that contains a rich haul.

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

BARNARD COLLEGE

On Revolution. By HANNAH ARENDT. New York, The Viking Press, 1963.—343 pp. $6.50.

Hannah Arendt, who has given us insightful studies of the crucial political problems of our time, now presents her reflections on the theme of revolution. She argues that since nuclear weapons have now rendered war unjustifiable and, perhaps, impossible, revolution has become even more important than it has been during the past two centuries. "In the contest that divides the world today and in which so much is at stake," she warns, "those will probably win who understand revolution" (p. 8).

Miss Arendt believes that the modern concept of revolution—the sense of a radically new beginning in the course of history, combined with the aim of attaining freedom for the many—emerged only during the American and French Revolutions. It is, therefore, to comparison and contrast of these two revolutions that she devotes most of her attention. By "freedom" she means not merely liberation from arbitrary or oppressive rule, the negative safeguards of the rights to life, liberty, and property (which could have been achieved under constitutional monarchy), but rather "positive freedom," the experience of being politically active. She argues that from the outset of the American Revolution its leaders understood that rebellion and violence were only the first and less important part of their task. Their central preoccupation was the constructive work of creating an enduring republic in which the citizens would be able to take part in the discussions and decisions of the public realm.

In France, however, under the pressure of pity for the demands of the impoverished masses (fortunately absent from the American scene), the revolutionists lost interest in establishing a constitution that would sustain a free polity and turned their attention to "the social question," to efforts to use the state's power to eliminate the misery and want of the people. These efforts failed, Miss Arendt argues, as they must always fail, since the battle against poverty can be won only on the field of technological advances; "nothing could be more obsolete than to attempt

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to liberate mankind from poverty by political means; nothing could be more futile and dangerous" (p. 110). Many students of twentieth-century politics will, I think, regard these conclusions as exaggerated, in view of the significant role that political means, along with scientific and technological advances, have played in the struggle to eliminate mass poverty in western Europe and the United States. Moreover, if Miss Arendt's view is correct, the prospect for revolution in our time is virtually hopeless, because most of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America—the areas where revolutions are most likely to occur—are still immersed in conditions of mass poverty which, as she admits, revolutionary leaders can hardly ignore.

If revolutionary leaders in these countries are told that they must select one of two alternatives—creating a political structure that will embody freedom, or using political means to further technological progress and to deal with mass poverty—they may well conclude that they must choose the second path. The ironic outcome of Miss Arendt's impassioned plea for remembrance of the American revolutionary experience, which she finds has been all but ignored by later revolutionaries, would thus be to persuade the leaders of underdeveloped nations that the situation in colonial America was so peculiarly fortunate that the American experience has no relevance to their problems.

Miss Arendt supports the thesis propounded by conservatives since Burke (a thesis which, during the last two decades, has received a new lease on life as a result of our horror of totalitarianism and its consequences) that the French Revolution and all later revolutions, which have modeled themselves upon it, have ended in terror and absolute disaster, while the American Revolution was "triumphantly successful" (p. 49). She also accepts, in large measure, the recently popular but untenable view that the doctrines of Rousseau played an important role in the failure of the French Revolution and its degeneration into terror and Napoleonic dictatorship. I find it curious that she should adopt this interpretation, since her own masters in political thought and practice—the ancient Greeks and Romans—were also Rousseau's idols, and since so many of her political prejudices are strikingly similar to those of Rousseau: her hostility to "society" and to the pursuit of wealth as a social goal, her belief that public freedom and the pursuit of private happiness are incompatible, her emphasis on political participation as the central element in the concept of freedom, her advocacy of confederation as the solution to the problem of governing large states, and her negative attitudes toward political parties, representation, and government by a small group of "rulers" or "experts."

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Miss Arendt's only criticism of the American Founding Fathers is that they failed to provide the revolutionary spirit with a lasting institution; that is, they did not incorporate into the Constitution the "elementary republics," the townships and the town-hall meetings, which had been the seed-bed of the Revolution and of the state and federal constitutions. Only Jefferson expressed concern because the new political structure did not give to the people, but only to their representatives, the opportunity to engage in the positive activities of freedom—"expressing, discussing, and deciding." Miss Arendt also notes that in every revolution since 1789 a new form of government—a structure of communes, councils, or soviets—amazingly similar to Jefferson's "elementary republics" was spontaneously created by the men who made the revolution, and that these new organs of popular participation were systematically and often ruthlessly liquidated by the leaders of the revolutionary parties. Her vision of the good polity is, to me, a rather frightening prospect; representative bodies and political parties would give way to a structure of councils in which the members of the primary bodies would be "those few from all walks of life who have a taste for public freedom and cannot be 'happy' without it"; these self-selected enthusiasts for the tasks of political action and for the public happiness would choose one or more of their members as deputies to the next higher council, and this process would be continued to the top of the pyramid. General suffrage as we know it today would disappear, and the great majority excluded from "the right to be heard in the conduct of the business of the republic" would then possess "one of the most important negative liberties we have enjoyed since the end of the ancient world, namely, freedom from politics" (p. 284).

In this volume I find, along with a number of penetrating insights and provocative ideas, a disturbing tendency to treat facts and texts cavalierly and to set forth sweeping generalizations on the basis of limited evidence.

On page 29 Miss Arendt says that Machiavelli "was the first to think about the possibility of founding a permanent, lasting, enduring body politic"; this is a startling statement in view of Machiavelli's endlessly repeated view that no body politic, no matter how well constructed or how stable—not even his ideal, the Roman Republic—can endure or escape the inexorable cycle of growth, prosperity, corruption, and disintegration. On page 71 she argues that Rousseau's insistence that it would "be absurd for the will to bind itself for the future" anticipated "the instability and faithlessness of revolutionary governments as well as justifying the old fateful conviction of the nation-state that

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treaties are binding only so long as they serve the so-called national interest"; the context indicates that this is a highly questionable interpretation. In the passage cited Rousseau is arguing, against Hobbes and others, that a people cannot promise to obey for all time a particular man or group of men; the sovereign people cannot say, " 'What he will tomorrow, I too shall will' because it is absurd for the will to bind itself for the future, nor is it incumbent on any will to consent to anything that is not for the good of the being who wills" (*Social Contract,* II, 1; Cole trans., p. 20). On page 11 Miss Arendt says that "in the words of Rousseau" necessity is the all-coercing force which will "force men to be free." Here she is referring to one of the best known passages in the *Social Contract;* whether or not we agree with Rousseau, we can see that he is not arguing that "necessity" will force men to be free; he is saying that if a citizen breaks a law that he himself has participated in making, "on lui forcera d'être libre," that is, the magistrate charged with executing the law will compel him to obey (or punish his disobedience) and so "will force him to be free."

On page 186 the author states that Locke "was convinced that only an 'appeal to God in Heaven' could help those who came out of the 'state of nature' and were about to lay down the fundamental law of a civil society"; the footnote refers to Section 86 of the First Treatise on Government and to Section 20 of the Second Treatise. In the first passage, which deals with the right to property and with man's right to use other creatures for his self-preservation, there is no mention of the creation of a civil society or of an "appeal to God in Heaven" (cf. Laslett, ed., pp. 222–23); in the second passage there is no reference to establishing a civil society, and the term "appeal to heaven," which does appear, has its usual meaning in Locke—the right of revolution when violence and injury are inflicted upon the citizens by the rulers (cf. Laslett, ed., pp. 299–300).

On page 244 Miss Arendt states that Rousseau's teachings demanded "the elimination of all differences and distinctions, including the difference between people and government"; however, there is no distinction on which Rousseau insisted so strongly and so frequently as that between the people—the sovereign and the only maker of law—and the government—the executor of the law. It is passages like these—and others could be cited—in Miss Arendt's book that raise doubts in my mind about the soundness of her facts and interpretations on many other matters in which I possess no special competence.

HERBERT A. DEANE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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The Democratic Prospect. By CHARLES FRANKEL. New York and Evanston, Harper & Row, 1962.—xii, 222 pp. $4.00.

This is a very civilized and enjoyable little book. The author writes with style, wit, and perception about the nature of democracy and the challenges that confront it today.

His argument may be summarized thus: We live in a period of "political malaise." Americans in particular are in a disillusioned mood because of the discrepancy between the traditional ideals of democracy and the harsh facts of modern society. One ideal, the consent of the governed, is hard to make meaningful even in so-called "voluntary associations," which are large and virtually compulsory, and do not *feel* democratic. A second ideal, that of the open society, is contradicted by the domination of public discussion by the mass media and by the growth of technical knowledge which confuses the citizen. As for the autonomous individual, which is a third ideal, in work and leisure alike man is disciplined by machines and organization, so that he doesn't *feel* autonomous. Similarly, social conditions have been altered so drastically by science and bureaucracy that the fourth ideal, of responsible government, seems daily more remote.

The initial doubt which arises from the author's thesis is: have the democratic ideals ever been very closely realized; or, alternatively, has the rhetoric ever coincided with reality? The author notes this point, and makes some allowance for it, but not enough, I think. A second and more serious point almost escapes his attention: in what sense can we be said to have the same ideals of democracy that moved Locke, Jefferson, Mill, and others? Professor Frankel is a philosopher, and should be admirably equipped to deal rigorously with this preliminary and fundamental question. Lacking such rigorous logic, the writing at times tends to drift into somewhat nebulous, though beautifully phrased, generalities. Yet, as the author notes, "the air is thin in the land of higher generalities" (p. 27).

I am not sure what the ideals of democracy are, and I suspect many other people are also uncertain. It is therefore important that books like this should try to define these ideals (or principles), and to work out their practical application. Moreover, any discussion of modern democracy must start with the urban, industrial, scientific, organized, affluent, and literate society in which we live. If it cannot speak to this environment, democracy will have less and less relevance to our lives, however relevant it may or may not be to "less developed" countries. Professor Frankel is acutely aware of this, and is wonderfully sensitive to the problems which our society presents, and he is

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very good indeed on such matters as the role of the technical expert or the reasons for the welfare state.

A great deal of the "malaise" is, I think, not political at all. That is, it does not arise because our image of democracy is out of accord with reality. It would emerge (and is emerging) in any kind of political system with an urban, industrial, affluent social reality. Man is not really adjusted to this kind of life yet, and is almost certain to be nostalgic, fumbling, disillusioned, and even neurotic, for a long time to come.

Nevertheless, Professor Frankel is quite right to investigate the implications for democracy of our modern "social conditions" (and the vice versa implications). He has made a skillful preliminary diagnosis that needs now to be explored in more depth and detail. He has sketched many stimulating and pertinent prescriptions for improvement, ranging from schemes of decentralization to care of the aged. All these, too, need to be brought to the forefront of professional and public debate.

In the end, one doubts whether we can or should endow any democracy with a clear or constant "sense of purpose." Democracy is not that kind of ideology or system. American preoccupation with national goals and purposes in recent years is fascinating to the outsider. Out of the soul-searching and ferment of ideas, many good books are emerging. This is one of the best—humane, literate, hopeful, restrained, and almost Socratic.

H. B. MAYO

UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO

Tocqueville and the Old Regime. By RICHARD HERR. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962.—142 pp. $3.50.

The Social and Political Thought of Alexis de Tocqueville. By JACK LIVELY. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962.—263 pp. $4.00.

Two more voices have joined the large and swelling chorus singing of Alexis de Tocqueville. His increasingly frequent appearance in the repertories of recent scholarly *opera* is largely due to his own varied activities. A careful and imaginative historian; an incisive, polemical, and sometimes prophetic political and social critic; a practicing though often ineffectual politician —Tocqueville was all these things. By the very multiplicity of his roles, he represents a formidable challenge to analysts. Analysts Richard Herr and Jack Lively have recognized and avoided the danger of treating any one aspect of the man without regard for the whole.

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The objectives of the two monographs are different. Richard Herr is essentially concerned with the delicate problem of examining the factors involved in the composition and consequences of a specific work, *The Old Regime and the Revolution.* Jack Lively, on the other hand, writes a critical exposition of Tocqueville's thought on such subjects as liberty, democracy (social and political), centralization, religion, and revolution. Despite the disparity of objectives, the two authors tend to meet at many intermediate points. To explain the origins, content, and implications of the *Old Regime,* Herr necessarily investigates the personal circumstances of Tocqueville's life, yet properly injects the premises and substance of *Democracy in America* and other works. Lively concentrates on Tocqueville's concepts, but is not averse to introducing biographical details to help clarify Tocqueville's meaning and intentions.

The scholarship of Herr and Lively appears to be impeccable; Lively, unlike Herr, has appended an exhaustive bibliography of primary sources and a highly selective one of secondary works. Both authors recognize that many of their conclusions must remain tentative until J. P. Mayer finishes his edition of Tocqueville's unpublished papers.

Lively's section on centralization is provocative. Not only does he explore Tocqueville's publications dealing with French, American, and English institutions and attitudes, but he brings Tocqueville's correspondence, the historical record, Mill's pronouncements, and the like, to bear on the validity and clarity of Tocqueville's thought. Lively might have made more of the passing reflection that "once the ultras came into power, very little more was heard from them of the evils of centralisation" (p. 156). When in power, parties everywhere have been notorious in pressing for administrative centralization as a virtuous principle, and then repudiating the principle and deploring the practice when out of power. The chapter on religion has two merits: the well-argued case showing Tocqueville's appreciation of the social utility of religion, and the equally commendable ability of Lively to discern the essence of French Catholicism.

Herr is especially strong in assessing the relationship between the *Old Regime* and its author's background, temperament, and political and philosophical views. Briefly but cogently, Herr also uses the *Old Regime* as a foil for surveying subsequent French political life. From Herr's account, as well as from Lively's, Tocqueville emerges as a reliable "prophet" on many fundamental problems of 1962 (and perhaps even of 1984). The limitations of the hero, however, are clearly considered and explicitly recounted.

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Both books are stronger on content than they are on style. Lively especially is turgid and tortured; Herr, frighteningly close to sentimental in his opening chapter.

DONALD J. HARVEY

HUNTER COLLEGE

Anatomy of Britain. By ANTHONY SAMPSON. London, Hodder & Stoughton, and New York, Harper and Row, 1962.—xiv, 662 pp. 35 sh., $6.95.

This is a big book on a big subject. The author, a journalist who for three years wrote a "top people's" gossip column in the *Observer,* has set as his task nothing less than the depiction of the essential workings of Britain—"who runs it and how, how they got there, and how they are changing." Though he relies to some extent on scholarly evidence, he has written a highly personal book, based largely on interviews with the two hundred persons he believes either run the country or typify the kind of people that do. The result is a guided tour of the major power groups in Britain today, ranging from the familiar traditional institutions such as the aristocracy, Paraliament, the universities, the law, and the armed forces, to newer, less known, less prestigious (but equally influential) elements such as corporations, accountants, scientists, insurance, and advertising. All this in thirty-eight stations of the cruise and, as the author proudly notes, 50,000 facts.

Although books of this sort are often written off as thin and journalistic, it would be a mistake to do so in this case. Certainly there are the usual faults of the genre: the looseness of structure, factual inaccuracies, overreliance on description at the expense of explanation, and the habit of letting colorful personalities sum up institutions. Insufficient attention is given to the role of ordinary people and to the special character and difficulties of life outside of London. But these faults are compensated for by the scope of the book, its essential rightness of judgments, its ability to convey a vivid and cumulative sense of how institutions atrophy, and, perhaps most important, by the sustained pursuit of a few big themes. Many of the ideas are not new (Bagehot, after all, asked the same questions ninety years ago); but seldom in recent times have they been spelled out with such a sense of urgency and concreteness.

Much of the book is devoted to examining the popular notion that power in contemporary Britain rests with a small, close-knit, homogeneous circle of Old Boys—the much-advertised "Establishment"—who share the same class background, education,

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clubs, attitudes, and even the same relatives. While he affirms, and amply demonstrates, the existence of such a network in the older professions and traditional institutions, Sampson nevertheless finds the real rulers of the country anything but united in a conspiracy of power. He discerns, in fact, "not a single Establishment but a ring of Establishments, with slender connections." The picture he draws is akin to C. P. Snow's two cultures, except that for Sampson the world of power is bifurcated into the petrifying older estates (aristocrats, politicians, bankers), with their inadequate amateurism and antique rituals, their suspicion of change and their disdain for science and commerce, and the newer, more dynamic meritocrats and entrepreneurs (scientists, managers, developers)—more professional, classless, ruthless, and "American" in their outlook. A wide gulf—of skills, education, social esteem—separates the two groups of "top people" and seriously hinders Britain in its attempt to face facts and rediscover its purpose in the aftermath of empire. The responsibility for this malaise, Sampson believes, lies chiefly with "the few thousand managers of our society who have failed to absorb and communicate new challenges and new ideas" (p. 638).

What is to be done? The author is convinced that the solution lies in bringing together the two sets of rulers, in marrying the best qualities of the older and newer estates, as Snow would humanize the scientist and empiricize the humanist. But he is vague as to how this can be done, or where to begin. Unlike left-wing critics of British society, such as Anthony Crosland, Sampson does not advocate specific remedies or list priorities. He is content to stop with a convincing diagnosis and let others prescribe for the future. It is all very well to hope that the need to come to grips with the Common Market will provide the stimulus for a reshaping of British habits, but there remains the task of harnessing the instinct for survival to concrete programs. In laying bare the problem of the loss of *élan vital,* Sampson has rendered a signal service. Let us hope that others will follow his lead and point the way to a solution.

JAMES B. CHRISTOPH
OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

Democracy and the Cost of Politics in Britain. By WILLIAM B. GWYN. London, The Athlone Press, 1962.—vii, 256 pp. $5.60.

This book is primarily a careful study of election expenses of Members of Parliament in the period 1832–1918. These include

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the costs of "corrupt and uncorrupt," legal and illegal, practices, and Mr. Gwyn is careful to distinguish between these pairs of concepts. Secondarily, it is concerned with two different paths to help the Victorian politician with his "towering election expenditure" pay these costs. One route was the attempt to end corruption on the constituency level and to establish legal limitations on electoral expenses; the other was the help offered by the political parties and some pressure groups in providing the wherewithal to meet these costs.

A brief introductory chapter on the cost of a parliamentary career before 1832 adumbrates the continuously changing role of the M.P., a fact that the British are again very conscious of in their current attempts—on a very different basis because of very different problems—to re-establish the importance of the Member of Parliament. The Tudor period had brought an end to the medieval system of payment of knights and burgesses, for a seat in the House of Commons had become more attractive and men had become more willing to serve at their own expense.

> Beginning in the reign of Charles II and lasting until the dawn of the nineteenth century, for a sizeable part of the House of Commons payment continued in the form of financial rewards, termed by their enemies 'corruption', by which the Governments of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries strove to maintain something like party discipline. . . .

In the first Parliament of George I (1714), in addition to army and naval officers, who at this period might be subject to government pressure, 270 members held offices, pensions, and sinecures. By 1833, apart from the naval and army officers, only sixty M.P.'s were receiving public money, and of these sixty, thirty-six belonged to the ministry, with only four receiving pensions or sinecures. However, the costs of elections had skyrocketed because of the "corruptibility of the electorate and the willingness of the candidates to take advantage of it."

After the Reform Bill of 1832, the struggle to control government patronage and government favors to M.P.'s is replaced by the struggle to control the election expenditures of the M.P.'s and their grant of favors to constituents in election campaigns. Mr. Gwyn studies the costs of elections and describes the various attempts made to secure legislation designed both to cut down legitimate election expenses and to end the varying forms of corruption.

The unpaid M.P. was for the most part bearing his own costs, and Mr. Gwyn's figures indicate that it was a heavy financial burden which could be borne only by men with substantial private incomes. He briefly summarizes the results so far known of

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the contributions of the respective political parties, Liberals and Conservatives, in helping candidates to pay these expenses, and shows that their contribution was minimal. He then studies the finances of the Irish Nationalist movement and the financing of working-class representatives. Their funds were used not only for election expenses, but also to provide stipends for Members, who, when elected, had no income to pay their living expenses.

Two chapters follow logically: one on the struggle leading to the Osborne Judgment, and one on the movement for payment of Members.

In concluding his study of the fight against corruption in the constituencies, Mr. Gwyn also explains the title of his book, for he assigns to democracy rather than to legislation the success in curbing corruption in elections: "Men are now bribed by words rather than money, a system which, if less lucrative to the voter in the short run, appears on the whole to work to his advantage, and has the additional merit of sparing the finances of the candidate and his supporters" (p. 92). However, in an "Epilogue: 1918–1959," he reveals a new problem shaping up, the further increase in the costliness of this electoral process in reaching large numbers of electors if not directly for the candidate, at least for his supporters and for the political parties. This problem he does not adequately relate to his earlier point about "bribed by words."

An appendix provides a useful table showing the value of the pound sterling in terms of the cost of living from 1701 to 1954.

The electoral process in the nineteenth century has been the subject of some excellent studies in recent years by Norman Gash, G. Kitson Clark, H. J. Hanham, and most recently by Cornelius O'Leary. This volume, too, makes its contribution in its careful analysis of the evidence in the *Parliamentary Papers* and in contemporary accounts.

MADELINE R. ROBINTON

BROOKLYN COLLEGE

Capital Punishment and British Politics: The British Movement to Abolish the Death Penalty, 1945–1957. By JAMES B. CHRISTOPH. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1962. –202 pp. $4.00.

Capital Punishment and British Politics is a case study of the British political process cast in the mold of S. K. Bailey's *Congress Makes a Law.* It is a modest and unpretentious study, carefully researched and clearly presented, which is designed to illuminate how public policy was made during the period from

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1945 to 1957 on the emotionally charged issue of capital punishment. I think most readers will consider that the author was successful in accomplishing his purpose.

The primary concern of the author is British politics, not capital punishment. The choice of this atypical issue as the vehicle for a study of contemporary British parliamentary politics is explained, in part, by the author's expressed belief "that more can be learned by examining [a political system] under stress than from the search after the average case" (p. 8). While there is no doubt that this issue produced considerable embarrassment for both Labor and Conservative governments, the author's own account hardly supports the notion that the issue produced serious stress within the British political system. A sounder justification for the study appears in the final chapter of the book. Mr. Christoph suggests that "political opportunities and methods are often conditioned by the nature of the subject matter at issue" (p. 171). The peculiar nature of this issue-non-economic, emotional, traditionally considered a matter of conscience, and divorced from partisan considerations—did raise different problems, did lead to different strategies and techniques of leadership, and did produce a pattern of political conflict that was quite distinct from those generated by the partisan issues, domestic and international, which have been the major concern of most other recent studies of British politics. This study serves as a useful reminder of the qualifications which must hedge generalizations about even such well known subjects as British political party discipline and the relative weight of Cabinet, Commons, and Lords in policy-making.

The bulk of the book is concerned with a description of the controversy over capital punishment. A final chapter sums up the implications of the study for British politics. The conceptual scheme is indicated by the author's comment in this last chapter (p. 190):

> A paradigm of the forces at work . . . would have to include the four-cornered relationship between (1) the structure of government; (2) pressure group behavior; (3) the weight of public opinion, and (4) the events of history, including the formulation of the classic cases for and against capital punishment and the murder cases that called them into play.

Perhaps an even better statement of the book's descriptive scheme would be the formulation of "ideas, institutions, interests and individuals" set forth by Pendleton Herring and elaborated by a generation of American political scientists since that time. Writing within this tradition, Mr. Christoph also seems

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conscious of Bentleyan maxims concerning the raw materials of politics and generally confines himself to reporting the activities of determinate groups of people.

The weaknesses of Mr. Christoph's study arise, I think, from his rather literal following of this mode of analysis, though they are likely to appear to the reader as failures of exposition and literary style. Although the peculiar emotional qualities of the ideas associated with capital punishment are mentioned frequently in the text and much attention is given to their consequences, the ideas remain an unexplained and unanalyzed "given." What they mean in human terms, the tone of thought and expression associated with them, their relation to other ideas, their rationale, and the reasons for the tendency of those pro and con the death penalty to group themselves within the Conservative and Labor parties are not satisfactorily dealt with by the author's invocation of such words as "conscience" and "tradition."

Something of the same sort can be said of the treatment of the key personalities involved in the conflict. They are figures viewed from a distance. Their motives are mentioned and their behavior described, but (with the possible exception of Nigel Nicolson, a sometime abolitionist Tory MP) they remain singularly shadowy. Mr. Christoph's conscientious group analysis of politics seems to discourage him from taking a close look at the complexities of ideas and personalities which bore so heavily on the controversy and its equivocal result. This study, in other words, has its limits, but within these limits it is an excellent essay.

LANE DAVIS

UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

The Organizational Society: An Analysis and a Theory. By ROBERT PRESTHUS. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1962.—xii, 323, xv pp. $6.00.

The problem of the impact of bureaucracy on modern society is a topic of unquestioned importance which often seems to be discussed almost everywhere except in the professional behavioral science literature. Professor Presthus's book is therefore especially welcome because it deals very competently with an extremely important topic which has all too often been left to the literary *raconteur* or cocktail conversationalist. Starting with a discussion of the general characteristics of large-scale organizations, Professor Presthus documents the increasing prevalence of

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such organizations, and the consequent tendency for society itself to become permeated with bureaucratic characteristics. The result is an "organizational society," characterized by extreme pressures on individuals to adapt to bureaucratic characteristics, pressures which range far beyond the confines of particular organizations because bureaucracy is inescapable in the normal course of life whether one is apparently a member of such an organization or not. These pressures, in turn, induce certain patterns of personal adjustment to the "organizational society" —patterns which, because of the universality of the situations to which they are responses, themselves become general and thus have ultimate consequences for the ability of the society to cope with certain types of problems. Presthus distinguishes three modes of personal adjustment: upward mobility, indifference, and ambivalence. The "upward-mobile" accepts the bureaucratic ideology, but his attempts to climb the organizational ladder lead to a compulsive conformity which bears an uneasy affinity to certain "authoritarian personality" characteristics. The "indifferent," in contrast, displaces his goals to other than organizational objectives, and thus "serves time" in the organization, without motivation. The "ambivalent" desires status rewards, but, because he rejects bureaucratic values, seeks such rewards through individualistic innovation rather than through upward mobility in an organization. The difficulty is that there is increasingly no place for the ambivalent in the organizational society. As bureaucracy becomes more pervasive, he is unable to escape domination by upward-mobiles. The end result, argues Presthus, is a growing lack of ability in society to cope with the realities of a changing world through innovation. It is not so much that innovation is becoming organized; it is the way in which it is becoming organized. Creative and intelligent people are being subjected to hierarchies dominated by upward-mobiles with essentially managerial personalities, to the detriment of society.

The argument is powerful. Professor Presthus makes a very good case, and bases it on existing empirical findings. As the subtitle suggests, the book is "an analysis" of such findings, and then "a theory" based on an extension of these findings. Though the author does go beyond his data in his interpretations, his argument is always empirical. One could check it, partially or totally, by scientific procedures. This book is an excellent example of a soundly based "thesis," well and convincingly supported.

One can easily criticize a work of this type. It occasionally suffers from interdisciplinary problems; sociologists and psychol-

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ogists will find the discussion of socialization rather elementary and not very enlightening. Very little attention is given causal mechanisms other than personal adjustment, in linking bureaucracy to society. The implications of the pyramidal structure of bureaucracy for occupational structure and opportunities may well be such as to "organize" society much more effectively than the mechanism Professor Presthus discusses does. The most serious difficulty that this reviewer encountered, however, was an unobtrusive tendency toward reification throughout the book, The argument, for example, suggests three *aspects of personal adjustment* to bureaucracy. But somehow the "upward-mobiles," "indifferents," and "ambivalents" emerge as *concrete types of people.* As a result, the analysis at times seems a bit overdrawn. One suspects that people are actually *predominantly* one of these types, with lesser tendencies toward the other two orientations always present in the same person. Despite these minor difficulties, however, this book is exceptionally good. It also reads very well. It certainly must be read, and should probably be owned, by anyone interested in complex organizations, or the structure of modern industrial society.

STANLEY H. UDY, JR.

YALE UNIVERSITY

The Emerging City: Myth and Reality. By SCOTT GREER. New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.—vi, 232 pp. $5.75.

This book perhaps should not be reviewed by anyone with a background in physical planning, for it epitomizes those aspects of sociology which architects and planners find exasperating. It employs a terminology so encapsulated as to be all but unintelligible to the outsider. It applies this terminology to the portentous analyses of problems which appear either simple or obvious. It resolutely avoids making specific value judgements while ridiculing those who, by the very nature of their profession, are forced to. And finally, behind a mask of objectivity, it conceals a quite un-neutral commitment to a policy of laissez-faire, to the Social Darwinism which has engulfed so many areas of thought today.

Mr. Greer's book confronts us with a series of elliptical arguments. Contrary to what must appear to everyone in the field of urban planning as plain fact, we are informed that "there is little danger that the central city will become a ghost town . . . those who cry 'Danger' . . . have perhaps retained too great a loyalty to earlier images of the city" (p. 199). This, in a book

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whose first chapter is entitled "The City in Crisis." Again, we are told that, "though the proponents of change frequently resort to crying 'wolf!,' the metropolis is in no serious danger of disintegration" (p. 189). Yet the book purports to examine this "serious danger"; and closes with a chapter called "The Changing Image of the City," which seems to this reviewer to accept the faceless conurbation which is, precisely, the disintegration of the city.

The urbanists get short shrift at Mr. Greer's hands. Their response to "problems of the Metropolis" has been "complex and muddled" (p. 179). He perceives two kinds of response, both of them mistaken. One is that of "the ideologists of return." The others (Geddes, Mumford, and the whole Garden-City-Greenbelt school) are the "utopians of dispersion." Aside from a terminology which seems to deny "ideology" to the second category, one wonders what other alternatives Mr. Greer envisages. It may very well be that most architects and planners are as mistaken in their approach as Jane Jacobs' recent book has pungently accused them of being. But if the policies of "return" and "dispersion" are *both* wrong, what is to be done? Mr. Greer's answer seems to be: stasis. But the policy of stasis is what has led to the situation which caused him to write this book.

In other passages, the author seems to be fighting both the urbanists and his sociological colleagues. Through them we have been "led to speak disparagingly of metropolitan neighborhoods as 'dormitories' and 'bedroom communities.'" What is at issue here—terminology or the social reality it describes? At another point Mr. Greer says that "to make generalizations about a modern city in terms of night-time statistics is to provide wrong answers to questions nobody wants answered" (p. 218). Are only "daylight" statistics to be considered valid then? Apparently so, for, according to the author, "what people do at night when asleep throws little light upon the more important daylight activities of urbanites." A formulation less clarifying than this seems hard to imagine, unless it be the one which follow immediately: "the concept of a residential area as only a kind of shelf upon which the dormant body is stored overnight is a remarkable achievement of the sociological imagination."

Despite its scholarly pretensions, the book abounds in ambiguities of this sort. Despite the jacket's claim of "new insight," it offers neither the factual base nor the coherent analysis upon which to base such a claim.

JAMES MARSTON FITCH

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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Revisionism: Essays on the History of Marxist Ideas. Edited by LEOPOLD LABEDZ. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.—404 pp. $7.95.

This volume, published under the auspices of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, gives permanent form to twenty-seven essays and articles, some academic and some sophisticated-journalistic, many first published in the magazine *Survey,* on a wide variety of Marxist and semi-Marxist writers and movements whose only common characteristic is some deviation from orthodox Marxism-Leninism. After a nod at Bernstein, who is demoted to "the Precursor," and short essays on Plekhanov, Rosa Luxemburg, Trotsky, and Bukharin, it moves on to little-known figures: the Indian, M. N. Roy; Alexander Helphand, of whom we get only a tantalizing glimpse in the course of a fourteen-page essay by Z. A. B. Zeman which sweeps "From the Communist Manifesto to the Declaration of '81' " (was it an editorial oversight that leaves the reader to guess that "the Declaration of '81,' " which is not mentioned in the essay itself, is the Statement of the Meeting of the Communist and Workers' parties in Moscow in November 1960, which is briefly discussed at the end of the essay, or was it assumed that no one but a Sovietologist would be tempted to read this book?); Alexander Bogdanov; and Abram Deborin. These are followed by a substantial essay on Lukacs by Morris Watnick, a shorter essay on Ernst Bloch, extracts from two polemical articles recently published in Poland as part of the debate about the significance of the 1844 manuscripts of Marx, and an interesting and contentious essay by Daniel Bell on "The Debate on Alienation." Professor Bell argues that "Marx had repudiated the idea of alienation divorced from his specific economic analysis of property relations under capitalism" and that "While one may be sympathetic to the idea of alienation, it is only further myth-making to read this concept back as the central theme of Marx" (p. 197). It is a pity that this polemical essay was not accompanied by a polemical reply. No extraordinary logical ability or acquaintance with the subject is needed to notice that, of the two Bell propositions just quoted, the first is only tenable at all because of the qualifying phrase "divorced from . . . ," and that, so qualified, it provides no basis for the second. Professor Bell's essay should not have been presented as an analysis of, but as a contribution to, the debate on alienation. One wonders incidentally why neither Dr. Watnick's chapter nor Professor Bell's (which also discusses Lukacs, and refers [p. 208, n. 20] to Lukacs' book as being "generally unobtainable here") mentions the French translation published in 1960; Pro-

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fessor Bell's essay was indeed written in 1959, but has an editor no duties?

In the second half of the book, the essays become more diffuse and more condescending. There are papers on Tito, on Soviet economics, on "The New Left" in France, the United States, Japan, India, and Britain. The essay on Britain, by G. L. Arnold, may serve as a sample of these. It deals mainly with the *New Left Review* writers. Its adequacy can be judged by the fact that two-thirds of the way through an eight-page outline of the *New Left* point of view, an outline which uses the same presumptuous concept of "post-bourgeois society" (the New Left finds it "excessively difficult to perceive that Western society has become 'post-bourgeois'" [p. 308]) as adorns the recent volume on Marxism by George Lichtheim, Mr. Arnold plays cricket by saying: "So bald a summary of the political programme outlined in this essay necessarily fails to do justice to the thinking that underlines the New Left's concrete specifications for pulling the Socialist rabbit out of the neutralist hat" (p. 310). With a few more condescensions the essay is finished. This sort of thing is all very well as journalism, but need it be made into a book?

C. B. MACPHERSON

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

The Theory, Law, and Policy of Soviet Treaties. By JAN F. TRISKA AND ROBERT M. SLUSSER. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1962.—xi, 593 pp. $10.00.

The present joint treatise is a follow-up, interpretive study to an earlier collection of Soviet treaties and other international acts and instruments relating to the Soviet Union, produced by the same authors, as joint editors, in 1959. (*A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917–1957,* by Robert M. Slusser and Jan F. Triska). The authors have rightly recognized that the study of Soviet practice and policies of treaty-making, treaty interpretation, and treaty implementation and termination or denunciation, only becomes meaningful when considered in relation to broader Soviet attitudes as to the hierarchical ranking, *inter se,* of the various authoritative "sources" of international law and as to the function and nature of international law in general. Much more frankly perhaps, and certainly more consistently than in other countries, international law is accepted by Soviet decision-makers as being one among a number of available, and sometimes competing, instruments for effecting national policies in international arenas. It is the characteristic of Soviet interna-

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tional law theory and practice, so to speak, to respond directly to the current needs of Soviet policy-makers that accounts both for the principal strength and principal limitation in Professors Triska and Slusser's study. The authors' method of unfolding, through time, the development of Soviet practice, gives the advantage of historical sweep and broad perspective to their detailed analysis. On the other hand, in essentially limiting themselves to the materials covered by their original volume of sources —that is, materials up to 1957—they have also necessarily cut themselves off from much of the practical effects of the "wind of change" in Soviet jurisprudence, since the inauguration of the era of de-Stalinization. Viewed simply in relation to traditional or "classical" conceptions of the authoritative "sources" of international law, the clear Soviet preference, over the years, for treaties, especially bilateral treaties, as the prime source of international law, stems from the essentially hostile or defensive role that the Soviet Union felt compelled to adopt to traditional international law, which, as manifested especially through historically-based custom, seemed to the Soviet policy-makers to have an essentially Western, capitalist ethic. Latter-day sources of international law norms—international agencies like the League of Nations, the United Nations, the World Court, even the United Nations Secretary-Generalship—also seemed, by virtue of their composition and organization and the formal and actual weighting of their voting procedures, to be politically biased and loaded against the Soviet Union. Professors Triska and Slusser have fairly rendered the quite considerable ingenuity, if not actual intellectual gamesmanship, whereby Soviet policy-makers, while hewing consistently to a cardinal policy of *pacta sunt servanda* and strict observance of treaties as the only possible basis, in Soviet eyes, in the defensive period of Soviet foreign policy, for minimum East-West accommodation, have yet been able to slough off unwanted, and especially pre-1917, treaty obligations without embracing the revolutionary (Western-favored) principle of *clausula rebus sic stantibus* which might challenge or threaten clear Soviet interests in maintaining the cardinal policy of *pacta sunt servanda*. Professors Triska and Slusser do not, however—for the reasons of emphasis already mentioned—adequately present the contemporary mood in Soviet international law thinking, which, as with Professor Gregory Tunkin and some of the younger, post-World War II jurists, displays a new element of technical sophistication and wit and a new confidence in the ability of Soviet juristic science—making full tactical use of the traditional international law hierarchy of sources (without any overly rigid preference for treaty-based norms to the exclu-

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sion of all else, and certainly with full recourse to asserted new sources of international law like the resolutions of professional and scientific bodies and national, domestic legislation)—to move to the intellectual offensive against Western-based jurisprudence and so to reorder and rewrite classical doctrine as to create a new "Socialist" international law. This new "Socialist" international law, as proclaimed at least by an Old Guard writer like Korovin, will reflect variously the epoch of Socialist revolutions, the collapse of imperialism, the ending of colonialism, and the victory of Socialism and Communism on a world scale, the latter objective to be achieved under the Khrushchev rubric of "peaceful coexistence" through ideological weapons and in direct economic competition with the West. Though questions of so recent a character are not included in their work, it is clear that Professors Triska and Slusser have given us a pioneer, interpretive monograph in what we might call comparative international law—the particular policy preferences of the present contending systems of world public order as to "sources" of international law and the instruments of international law-making. It is to be hoped that the authors can soon follow it up with a further volume covering the period from 1957 to the present day.

EDWARD MCWHINNEY

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

Florentine Politics and Society, 1343–1378. By GENE A. BRUCKER. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962.—xiii, 431 pp. $10.00.

The century from 1250 to 1350 in which Dante and Giotto lived, and the Medicean Age of the fifteenth century are high points of Florentine history and are frequently studied; the second part of the fourteenth century with which Mr. Brucker's book deals has been neglected as a rather lack-lustre period. Only one event, the Revolt of the Ciompi in 1378, has been intensively studied, but in isolation, as "the first proletarian revolution," rather than in the general context of Florentine history.

Mr. Brucker's book can be considered as a further study on the Revolt of the Ciompi because it culminates in an account of the Florentine events in the summer of 1378. But Mr. Brucker has realized that the Revolt of the Ciompi was caused by a variety of factors and forces rooted in the Florentine past. Thus Mr. Brucker goes back to the situation which existed in Florence around the middle of the century after the expulsion of the Duke of Athens and the devastations of the Black Death. And his

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book becomes a political and social history of Florence from 1343 to 1378.

Because this period of Florentine history has attracted little attention, Mr. Brucker's book is the first treatment of this period based on systematic exploration of the Florentine archives. The manner in which Mr. Brucker uses archival material is exemplary. He has studied not only the obvious files containing laws and the official correspondence, but also voting lists, court records, guild archives, and data on loans and taxes. The increasing number of political crimes as indicated by the court records permits Mr. Brucker to "measure" the rise and decline of political tension; voting lists show that it is erroneous to assume that a family of Florentine patricians always acted as a political unit. Other records establish that the wealthy upper group monopolized the important ecclesiastical positions in the Florentine domain, and this connection helps to explain the strength of anti-church feeling in the middle classes and even the existence of some anti-religious trends at that time. The overall result of Mr. Brucker's investigation is a far-reaching revision of previously held views about Florentine developments in the second half of the fourteenth century. General histories of Florence, chiefly relying on narrative sources, have characterized the Florentine regime of this time as unstable, sometimes controlled by the wealthy upper group, sometimes by the middle classes, torn by a struggle between the old families and the "new men" whom the decline of population after the Black Death had brought into Florence. Mr. Brucker shows that the regime which was established after the political and economic crises of the forties contained both oligarchic and democratic elements, and that old families and new men cooperated in the government. For more than two decades this regime, based on an equilibrium of forces, worked successfully. The economic depression of the sixties, however, brought the conflict of interests between the wealthy upper group and the middle classes out into the open; the external crisis, created by the re-emergence of the church-state as a power factor, intensified the internal tension, and the war of Florence against the Pope, promoted by the middle classes but sharply opposed by the upper group, developed into a civil war in Florence. The Revolt of the Ciompi was the last link in this chain of events.

The student of Florentine history will read this study with unflagging interest, but the non-expert may find the reading sometimes hard going. The book opens with two brilliant chapters, providing a clear and concise analysis of the political and social situation in Florence around 1340; the last chapter gives a dra-

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matic description of the events in the summer of 1378. But the account of the intervening developments moves somewhat slowly. However, it ought to be said that the breakup of the regime would have appeared sudden and incomprehensible if Mr. Brucker had not carefully explained the nature and the significance of the issues on which the groups of society divided and if he had not followed the changes in the attitudes of the various leading personalities from meeting to meeting and from vote to vote. The richness of details makes Mr. Brucker's interpretation of this period of Florentine history convincing. Moreover, through its concreteness and circumstantiality Mr. Brucker's book throws a revealing light on the general background of political action. The reader is struck by the influence which ideology exerted and by the importance of purely personal factors. Guelphism, although entirely outmoded, still had such a strong appeal that it determined the political attitude of a great number of people. The rivalries and animosities of the leaders were frequently more important in deciding their attitude on a disputed issue than economic interests or social status. Even the Revolt of the Ciompi was the result of the instigation of individual party leaders rather than a spontaneous outbreak of dissatisfaction. Mr. Brucker achieves what every historical monograph ought to accomplish but rarely does: a clarification of a specific issue that leads to a better understanding of the general problems of the time.

FELIX GILBERT

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

Studies in German Colonial History. By W. O. HENDERSON. London, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1962.—xvi, 150 pp. 25/-.

This collection of nine essays on some of the lesser known facets of German colonial history by W. O. Henderson, Senior Lecturer in History at the University of Manchester, is a welcome contribution to the field of African studies. Indeed, it is one of the few substantial pieces of work in English on the overseas possessions of the Second Reich, along with such classics as Harry Rudin's study of German policy in the Cameroons, Mary Evelyn Townsend's standard history of German colonialism, and William Aydelotte's volume on Bismarck and the founding of South West Africa.

Henderson delves into such topics as the importance of British investment capital in the economic development of the German *Schutzgebeite,* the role of the chartered commercial companies in the exploration and administration of the colonies, the nature

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and extent of German economic penetration in the Middle East prior to the outbreak of the First World War, and the enforced policy of autarchy in German East Africa as a result of the British naval blockade during World War I.

Using a vast and impressive array of both primary and secondary sources in German, English, and French, Henderson presents a well balanced and dispassionate analysis of the German colonial experience. As he points out, four factors militated against the complete success of Germany's venture into colonialism. First, from a geopolitical point of view, the German overseas holdings were an ill-assorted lot and lacked contiguity. Second, because Germany was an *arriviste* in the colonial scramble, other nations already possessed the critical strategic points (such as Walvis Bay, a British enclave in South West Africa) which would have enhanced the value of these colonies from a *Weltpolitik* standpoint. Third, only two of the colonies (Togoland and Samoa) ever reached the economic "take-off point." Henderson estimates that the Reich spent approximately £100 million in its colonial program and contends that "Neither as reservoirs of raw material nor as markets for manufactured articles did the colonies play any significant part in Germany's economic life." Fourth, "The colonies never absorbed a large number of German settlers," due to ". . . the unhealthiness of tropical colonies, the infertility of large regions of those colonies in which settlement was possible, the considerable amount of capital required to establish a plantation or farm, the difficulties of transport and the uncertainty concerning the land and native policies of the German Government."

This, then, was the debit side of the German colonial ledger, the side upon which the Allied statesmen concentrated when drafting Article 119 of the Versailles Treaty (which deprived Germany of its colonial possessions) and Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant (which institutionalized the mandates system). But there was also a credit side. The Germans abolished the Arab slave trade, made eminent contributions to the study of tropical medicine, developed mineral resources, engaged in experimental agriculture, and laid the economic infrastructure of the colonies by founding schools, constructing transportation networks, and providing hospital facilities. Later, the mandatory powers—and now the independent nations of Africa—were to benefit from these large capital outlays.

Although Henderson does discuss the "new look" in German colonial policy under Secretary Bernhard Dernburg following the 1907 "Hottentot" *Reichstag* elections, he might with profit have delved more deeply into the muckraking efforts of the distin-

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guished Center party statesman, Matthias Erzberger, who was assassinated by the *Freikorps Feme* for having signed the Armistice Agreement, and of the Social Democrats, who bitterly antagonized German chauvinists by their exposé of colonial scandals. Unfortunately, the author adroitly skirts the all-important (and refractory) subject of Germany's policy toward its African subjects. He could have pointed out that both the South African Prime Minister, General Hertzog, and the Legislative Assembly of South West Africa officially repudiated the well-known British Blue Book (Cmd. 9146) which excoriated the Germans in South West Africa for their treatment of the Africans. Finally, Dr. Henderson might have furnished his readers with a more extensive analysis of the colonial claims of the Third Reich. However, these are but minor oversights and detract but little from the sound and impressive scholarship of this little volume.

RICHARD DALE

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

African One-Party States. Edited by GWENDOLEN M. CARTER. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1962.—xii, 501 pp. $7.25.

Because such a large proportion of the growing body of literature on contemporary Africa is devoted to continental surveys, the appearance of this collection of six monographs on countries that are not well known in the United States will be welcomed by the general academic public and especially by teachers of political science and history courses related to Africa. The essays, sixty to ninety pages long, cover Liberia and five new nations: Tunisia, Senegal, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, and Tanganyika. The contributors have all conducted field work in the countries they discuss. Four of them are American scholars of political science and history (Charles F. Gallagher, Tunisia; L. Gray Cowan, Guinea; Virginia Thompson, the Ivory Coast; Margaret L. Bates, Tanganyika). The author of the section on Senegal, Ernest Milcent, is editor of the outstanding French-language weekly published in Dakar, *Afrique Nouvelle.* As editor, Gwendolen Carter provided the outline followed by the individual authors and supplied a brief introduction in which she discusses the one-party phenomenon in Africa as a whole.

For those who dread exposure to social science jargon, this book will be comforting; for those who anticipate conceptual stimulation, it will be somewhat disappointing. The overall tone is that of sound, commonsense scholarship. Each section

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begins with a fifteen to twenty-five-page historical summary, followed by a five to fifteen-page section on "Land and People." The difficult task of tracing many phases of political change and of presenting pluralistic societies within such a compressed format is not always successfully accomplished. The European-oriented approach to African history displayed by all the contributors with the exception of Margaret Bates and Charles Gallagher will be found deficient by some; the commonplace discussions of the physical and human environment will be found wanting by others. The remainder of each essay, devoted to politics and government, is usually organized in the following sequence: "The political process" (formal structure of government, the party and associated organizations); "Contemporary issues" (internal); and a brief section on "External relations." Useful bibliographies are appended.

From the point of view of political science, the most important contribution of the book is the revelation of the wide variety of phenomena encompassed by the label "one-party state." It covers the Liberian case of a small oligarchical machine, closely akin to mid-nineteenth-century European phenomena or to the varieties encountered in some American cities to this day, as well as the highly structured, disciplined mass party of Guinea, based on a modified Marxist ideology, related to parties of total integration found in other parts of the world. Tunisia, the Ivory Coast, and Senegal also have mass parties, but they possess neither the ideological fervor nor the taut structure found in Guinea. Tanganyika, a latecomer to the nationalist scene, resembles some of its West African counterparts at an earlier stage of political development.

Different party functions correspond to these structural and ideological variations. In Guinea, as Cowan indicates, "The party . . . is the supreme organ, occupying a role that is higher than the government itself" (p. 178). The *Parti Démocratique de Guinée*'s major goal since independence has been "the spiritual reconversion of Guinean society in order to remove the psychological as well as the physical traces of colonialism" (p. 194). Because this involves all aspects of the society, the party is oriented toward the achievement of totalitarian control. Nevertheless, because this is combined with a genuine populist orientation and is based on enthusiasm as well as coercion, the evaluative categories of Western political philosophy are not fully applicable.

The contrast with Liberia is very great. The True Whig party, now led by President Tubman, is the instrument wielded by the Americo-Liberian oligarchy to maintain control over the

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tribal majority for nearly one hundred years. No attempt is made to use the party as a lever for the mobilization of human and physical resources. Economic development is of interest to party leaders primarily as the major source of patronage, crucial for continued control. Besides presenting Liberia in more realistic terms than usual, J. Gus Liebenow has contributed a lively discussion of "The family in the political system" (pp. 367–70). His application of the methods of structural anthropology to an analysis of the kinship structure of a political oligarchy may appear humorous, but its relevance beyond the confines of Liberia makes these four pages an extremely original contribution to the analysis of African politics.

Although the other sections are also sound and interesting, one wonders whether the approach exemplified by this book is suitable for its subject matter. It would be unfair to expect Milcent to have anticipated the attempted coup d'état in Senegal; Thompson to have known that inter-generational political conflict, long latent in the Ivory Coast, would explode; or Gallagher to have predicted the attempt to assassinate the President of Tunisia, all within a few months of the book's publication. Yet it is possible that a more systematic analysis of the patterns found in each country, comparisons between them, and the conscious use of relevant aspects of social science theory would have provided a better basis for the understanding of the tensions which have produced the one-party states of Africa and which continue to sustain and to challenge their existence.

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Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity. By LUCIAN W. PYE. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1962.—xx, 307 pp. $7.50.

The Union of Burma. A Study of the First Years of Independence. By HUGH TINKER. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 1961.—xiv, 424 pp. $6.75.

Economic Development in Burma, 1951–60. By LOUIS J. WALINSKY. New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1962.—xxvii, 680 pp. $10.00.

These three studies of Burma share a common feature: they are significantly interdisciplinary both in methodology and content. They are also alike in that they are concerned with what

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is currently fashionable to call the subject matter and processes of modernization and nation-building in a newly independent but old or traditional, underdeveloped society.

Walinsky, the economist, and Tinker, the historian, relying on more conventional modes of research (ample acquaintance with primary and secondary source material, considerable field experience in the capital and countryside, and so forth) succeed in turning out commanding and reliable studies. To say this is not to exclude variations in the interpretation of their data, nor the ever continuing search for new data which may or may not support their current judgment.

Pye, the political scientist, chose a more difficult task. He decided "to explore the dynamics of a particular transitional system —that of Burma—by investigating the basic attitudes and orientation of various key groups in the society toward the political process." From this "case history" he hoped to draw inferences from which a model could be constructed. He used the method of "open-ended interviews" with some seventy-nine "significant actors in the Burmese political process," drawn entirely, it appears, from Rangoon. There is no evidence that Pye explored the countryside. He relied, as he admits, on four of the very few available cultural anthropological and psychological studies of the Burmese. Of these four, only two can be called serious field studies, but even these have been seriously questioned. Pye's material, as Professor Max Millikan suggests in his "Foreword," leads to "insights," and has possibly been subjected to "a more impressionistic and intuitive treatment than the strict canons of scientific method would permit" (p. vii). I do not think that the "motion picture" (Millikan's phrase) of Burma which emerges from Pye's pages is in fact a motion picture of Burma, not even of the elites in Rangoon. His camera was excessively confined to a single location and to a partial view of it. This is not to say that one does not here find many valuable and provocative frames and vignettes which appear to portray discrete truth to the knowledgeable viewer.

This third edition of Tinker's study, the first appeared in mid-1957, remains as we are told in the preface, "substantially" what it originally was, an account of the first ten years of Burmese independence, 1948–57, strongly supportive of the role of Premier U Nu during these years. A few footnotes here and there (p. 211, for example) update the material. The last two pages—but not the ultimate, optimistic concluding paragraph—have been changed so as to include a brief reference to the 1960 elections and the restoration of the admired U Nu to power. It retains its mild anti-Americanisms (for example, p. 110, pp. 210–

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211, p. 369). It is still antagonistic to the Burmese Nationalist hero, Aung San, the architect of Burmese independence (p. 27) and to the "Thakins," those Burmese who decided to be "masters" in their own house, led by Aung San. Understandably, it remains more kindly disposed to the British policy for eventual Burmese self-government "from 1922 onwards" than one finds in most non-British studies. Despite these comments, as I indicated when I reviewed the first edition, Tinker has succeeded in admirable fashion in fulfilling his purpose, namely, providing a sequel to John L. Christian's *Modern Burma.*

Walinsky's thorough book on economic development in Burma during the past decade must necessarily remain one of the indispensable titles about the country. Not only did he spend six years, 1953–1959, in Burma as general manager and chief economist for his company, advising the Burmese government, he also had the advantage of intimate relations with the Prime Minister, several members of the Cabinet, many secretaries of government, and of the research material prepared by a number of well-trained agricultural, fiscal, industrial, and other economists on his staff. The result is a study so rich in detail and in the exploitation of the material as to arrive at helpful hypotheses about the nature and conduct of development programs in such settings.

Walinsky learned—as the earlier analysts of his company (1951–53) and their contractual engineering associates had not—that development is as much if not more dependent upon non-economic factors as it is on strictly economic ones. It requires good and stable government, law and order in the country, crucial political leadership capable of making human and material resource allocations, and decisions which advance rather than hinder development. Above all, it requires the ability to energize imagination, provide incentives, win loyalty, and adopt modern technologies in societies unaccustomed to rapid change. That the Burmese have not yet succeeded in executing these many tasks is merely to say that they are as difficult as they are long-range in character. Whether Burma will be able to make progress under the present military regime is still to be discovered. Walinsky's work makes us profoundly aware of the number and complexity of these tasks and the problems they create and the possible course for some solutions to some of these problems.

Pye, as I have indicated, set for himself the more difficult scholarly objective, to discover what there was in the individual psychology and social fabric of Burmese society which advanced or hindered the progress of modernization in a transitional period. On the whole he appears to be convinced that external

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capital and other assistance play a secondary, perhaps even an inhibiting role with respect to such development, unless they are introduced in ways fully appreciative of the primary subjective factors within the personality of the individual and the "spirit of associational life" of the leaders.

Ultimately as a social scientist one must raise this fundamental question about Pye's work: Can (a) reliance upon a limited unstratified number of interviews, confined to the capital city, no matter how skillfully executed, (b) supported by few and still very inadequate field studies in the socio-cultural and psychological disciplines, and (c) by limited coverage of the preceding primary and secondary sources, produce, as Pye intended, a reliable study, that is, one which in the main conveys verified and verifiable propositions in contrast to more or less insightful assertions which may lack demonstrable evidence?

I do not think that the social scientist can do what Pye wanted to do in Burma unless he himself is superbly equipped and steeped in the subject matter of the country of his inquiry and unless, further, he is buttressed by a wide variety of monographic and other studies on this country within the disciplines pertinent to his inquiry. Pye did not so equip himself, nor are the necessary supportive studies on hand or in sight.

In sum Pye deserves to be carefully read, but, even more, carefully tested against the available public record, and where this is not possible, put up for future testing by Pye and others interested in Burma.

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Economic Development and Social Change in South India. By T. SCARLETT EPSTEIN. New York, The Humanities Press, 1962.—xix, 363 pp. $8.50.

Prospects for Indian Development. By WILFRED MALENBAUM. New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.—325 pp. $5.75.

India's Urban Future. Edited by ROY TURNER. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1962.—xv, 470 pp. $7.00.

These three volumes differ widely in scope but nevertheless have a thread of common pattern. All touch on one or more phases of the process by which a static, ritualistic, and agrarian society of just under 450 million people is being transformed

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into a dynamic nation based on industry as well as agriculture. Each study impinges on one or more phases of India's growing industrialization and urbanization, agricultural improvement and reform, and development of equality and political rights. Professor Malenbaum's eye is on the planning process and its practical effects; Mrs. Epstein's is on the developments within two neighboring villages resulting from a program of canal irrigation carried through in 1939; the authors of the papers in *India's Urban Future* focus on changes in the urban population and the effect on economic development, whether planned or spontaneous.

Professor Malenbaum's careful, scholarly study is an important contribution to our knowledge of the Indian economy. Realizing that India alone among the emerging nations has a detailed record of its past under Britain and, more recently, in a decade of development under planning, he examines the legacy of the Indian economic past with reference to the present and future of the country's planning. He describes the characteristics of what has been primarily a static economy, assesses the validity of the hypotheses on which the First, Second, and Third Five-Year Plans have been built, and analyzes the significant gaps between the projections of the plans and their actual fulfillment. He looks ahead at least for the next five to ten years and appraises the likelihood that the necessary economic adjustments will be made under the policies being followed by the government of India. He notes that plan performance has been below expectations, and that unemployment is a seriously growing problem and constitutes a larger percentage of the work force than at the beginning of the planning effort in 1951 because the labor force has been growing more rapidly than had been envisaged. Professor Malenbaum believes the targets for output and estimates for investment in the Third Five-Year Plan are too low and that it fails to confront the all-important need of stepping up employment opportunities as a concomitant or prelude to progress in the elimination of poverty. For all his realistic appraisal of the three Plans in terms of accomplishment and his present—though tentative—pessimistic judgment on the Third Five-Year Plan, he by no means gives a discouraging picture of the possibilities for development in India, particularly if the government allows more scope for the individual and his savings and if the "new leadership for new tasks"—a subject to which he devotes a chapter—is vigorous and attuned to specifically Indian tasks and developments.

While Professor Malenbaum's chief contribution is his excellent analysis of the facts in the whole planning process, Mrs.

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Epstein's study is of the particular. It concerns two multi-caste Hindu agricultural villages; one, called Wangala in the book, is "wet" as a result of the canal irrigation and the other, Dalena, is "dry." Not far from each other in the same section of the southern state of Mysore, both are the same distance from and equally accessible to a growing and prosperous industrial town, Mandya. Before irrigation, both had similar economic, social, and political organizations and were close to the subsistence level.

With the coming of the irrigation canal, Wangala and its lands were irrigated while Dalena, above the canal level, remained dry. In Wangala the shift to crops growing on irrigated land gave agriculture a new importance, particularly as sugar cane was sold at a price fixed in advance by the new sugar factory in the neighboring town of Mandya. The new agricultural prosperity meant that villagers were willing to continue to work the land, while some of those who previously had left it returned. The people greatly increased their expenditures on festivals, wedding feasts, processions, and, especially, jewelry.

In the dry village of Dalena, however, where there was no agricultural improvement, men began to go to Mandya to work. A flour mill was set up in the center of the village, electricity was brought in to Dalena to run the mill machinery, the village became a servicing center for the nearby irrigated areas and developed a regional market for the bullocks which are so important a part of the economy of the Indian countryside. The people began to spend their money on improving their homes and cattle sheds and on extending the village's power facilities.

Nor were social and political changes absent. Both villages turned to a cash economy and both persisted with their caste distinctions. In both, living standards of the untouchables were raised, but their relative position in the community deteriorated. In Wangala a peasant master still continued his annual payment in paddy and straw to the untouchables who must provide labor for the peasant farmers' needs. In Dalena, on the other hand, those who had formerly provided such labor turned to various other kinds of work. There the diversity in economic interests caused a tendency for the village to split into opposing factions of conservatives and innovators, even within the elected village council of the *panchayat*. In Wangala, with people more limited in experience, the *panchayat* continued strong in influence.

The study would seem to indicate that other than agricultural developments alone are needed for change in a static farming environment. Yet too much of a general nature must not be concluded from the book. With only 707 inhabitants in Dalena and 958 in Wangala, the numbers are too small to permit valid

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statistical comparisons. Nor can the villages be assumed to be typical. Mrs. Epstein, while recognizing the existence of other factors than irrigation which have brought changes, fails to stress those factors adequately. She has, however, cast light on rural development and stagnation within the range she has undertaken. Her pictures of the two villages would be utterly fascinating reading were it not for the ceaseless repetition in her writing.

At the other end of the spectrum from particular village developments are the problems of India's urban population increase, discussed in *India's Future* by scholars who took part in an international conference held in Berkeley, California, in 1960. The first part of the volume consists of studies describing the migratory movements of Indian villagers and predicting something of the demographic picture of the Indian cities of the future. Although the rise in urbanization over the last decade appears less than had been anticipated, this represents a situation which will not last. Even the lowest estimates call for a net shift of residence of 85.6 million people during the next decade; other estimates rise as high as 258 million. In India as elsewhere the largest numbers will come through migration from country to city in a process which is already under way.

The second section of the book deals with the Indian city as it exists today. It contains notable essays on "The Impact of Urban Society Upon Village Life" and "The Village and the Community." The latter concludes that the village is a plural society consisting of a number of primary communities each of which is formed by a caste and which thinks of its own interests at the same time—or even before—it thinks of those of the village (p. 148). This explains the slow growth of many Community Development Programs and makes abundantly apparent the enormity of the Indian economic task in the villages.

The third section of the volume comes to the crux of the all-important issues of urbanization and economic development and sheds light on the impact of industrialization and industrial location on the growth and size of cities. The last section, on Government and Planning, is too diffuse to come to real grips with the subject, but contains an excellent treatment of various separate subjects and an unforgettable essay on Calcutta. The whole volume points up the fact that in order to solve its present economic problems in the face of population growth in general and of the cities in particular, the Indian economy must move ahead at the unprecedented speed of Japan and Italy.

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BOOK NOTES

The purpose of this brief note is to bring to the attention of readers interested in German affairs Ossip K. Flechtheim's collection of German party materials: *Dokumente zur parteipolitischen Entwicklung in Deutschland seit 1945* (Berlin, Dokumenten-Verlag Dr. Herbert Wendler, Vol. 1, 1962, xxiv, 567 pp.; Vol. 2, 1963, viii, 511 pp.; Vol. 3, 1963, vii, 500 pp.). Some material on postwar party developments in Germany had been made available by the editor of the present publication in his little volume *Die deutschen Parteien seit 1945* (Berlin, 1955). In this new and truly monumental publication he now has assembled all the source material that any serious student of recent German history, politics, and party affairs is likely to need. The first volume contains sources on the origin or re-establishment of German parties in the early postwar period; there follows material on the legal and constitutional status of German parties (including, together with the respective statutes and decrees, relevant decisions by the Federal Constitutional Court), and, finally, the statutes not only of the West German but also of the East German parties. Inclusion of East German material—frequently neglected in documentation as well as in scholarly treatment of German affairs—is also a characteristic feature of the detailed, indeed exhaustive, collection of party platforms and programs, which is found in tomes two and three. The amount of the material, due in particular to the proliferation of parties in the late forties and early fifties, is here especially great. But this is not all. Professor Flechtheim promises further volumes, which are to contain, among other things, materials on party financing, relation of parties and pressure groups, and party groupings and coalitions. Not the last merit of this publication lies in the editor's own informative and thought-provoking introductions to the different sections of the documentation (see, for example, his remarks on programs, crystallizing in a few dozen pages an entire history of German postwar politics). This is a work of which German scholarship can be justly proud.—JOHN H. HERZ, The City College of New York.

The Action Française was dedicated to the proposition that the basic values which should guide the French and the fundamental

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institutions which should and could realize these values were of the ancien régime. It stood for monarchy at a time when monarchy was patently anachronistic; it defended Catholicism in an age of empiricism; it supported the officer corps of the army—the traditional voice of authority—even when it used forged documents to prove the guilt of Captain Dreyfus; and it abhorred the science, the industrialism, and the non-classical art forms of the "stupid nineteenth century." Its reactionary positions were so completely out of step with the times that even the Orleanist Pretender repudiated those who would have put him on the throne; the Pope placed the newspaper on the index; and the people of France refused the party support at the polls.

Yet in spite of its anachronisms and paradoxes the Action Française had influence in its own country. Its message reached many a student in arts faculties and rallied a group of militants to the cause of reaction. It encouraged an everlasting and know-nothing criticism of republican governments. And it contributed to an attitude of hostility to economic growth.

To try to understand such a movement is essential if other societies are to profit from France's experience. Such understanding Eugen Weber displays in full measure in *Action Française: Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth-Century France* (Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1962; xiv, 594 pp., $10.00). His is the masterly investigation—competent in every detail and beautifully written. Undoubtedly this work will become a classic study of one type of reactionary action. Little remains to be said about the movement itself, but, as the author suggests, the secondary effects of the Action Française offer further opportunities for study to those who would know how much mischief (or good) can be done by powerful pens and stubborn effort.

In brief compass David C. Gordon, *North Africa's French Legacy, 1954–1962* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Middle Eastern Monograph Series, 1962; 121 pp.) endeavors to explain how the peoples of Tunis, Morocco, and Algeria reacted against *la présence française*, developed their own form of nationalism, and created a will for independence. Here is an enlightening case study in decolonization, as it is coming to be called, rendered especially useful by its extensive notes and bibliography of nearly forty pages.—SHEPARD B. CLOUGH, Columbia University.

Students of early twentieth-century American history will welcome *Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the Progressive Move-*

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ment (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1962; ix, 283 pp., $6.00) by Robert H. Wiebe as a significant addition to the literature of the Progressive era. In an impressively researched study Wiebe analyzes the relationship between businessmen and the Progressive movement and concludes that their contribution has been underrated. Rejecting the blanket assaults perpetrated by many progressives and some historians, he clearly delineates the numerous divisions within the business community and shows the effect of these on public policy. In regard to reform Wiebe identifies three broad areas of concern: improving the lot of the underprivileged, making governments more democratic, and regulating the economy in the public interest. While he admits that it did very little in the first two areas, he holds that at least one segment of the business community made important contributions to all the major programs of economic regulation. Here, concludes Wiebe, "businessmen exercised their greatest influence on reform and laid their claim as progressives" (p. 212). Wiebe also makes a brief survey of the historiography of the Progressive era and effectively criticizes the analysis of Progressive leadership popularized by Mowry and Hofstadter. As most reforming businessmen fail to fit the "progressive profile" they have generally been denied a place on the roll of honor. By beginning with the content of Progressivism Wiebe suggests a means to avoid this difficulty. Similar studies are badly needed to revaluate the role of other elements in the Progressive movement, particularly labor, for businessmen have not been the only ones slighted by the exclusive Progressive club. Despite the merits of Wiebe's analysis, however, he has not completely demolished the older, unfavorable image of the business community. This picture was a product of what business opposed as well as what it favored. If support by at least one segment of the business community for each major effort at economic regulation is business' claim to progressive credentials, so too is the vigorous opposition to each of these reforms by other powerful segments of that community a basis for the hostile description of business as a reactionary defender of the *status quo*. Furthermore, no matter how progressive some businessmen might have been in regard to economic regulation, if they remained outspoken opponents of the extension of democracy and of social reform, their reputation inevitably and properly became tarnished in the eyes of other progressives.—RICHARD B. SHERMAN, College of William and Mary.

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